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Summary in English
This cumulative PhD thesis explores the potential of a more contextual approach for
energy policies targeted at private households. The five chapters of the thesis consist
of an introduction, which motivates the thesis and gives a brief summary of the chap-
ters with a joint conclusion, three paper-based chapters intended for publication, and
a methodological chapter for an extension of the existing sampleSelection package in
the statistics programme R. The thesis mainly contributes to the energy policy and
economics literature, but it is also relevant to related disciplines, such as other social
sciences, engineering, and psychology.
Energy savings in private households play an important role in achieving reduction
targets for the European Union and its member states, as the residential sector consti-
tutes about 25 percent of total final energy consumption. As only 1 percent is added to
the building stock in new housing per year in the EU, the majority of savings must be
realized through retrofitting and changes in consumption habits. Evidence from policy
programs in the last couple of decades has been mixed and it appears that households are
harder to reach than previously thought. This has led to the perception that there is an
Energy Efficiency Gap, describing a situation in which households are not aware of the
financial savings they could achieve by investing in more energy efficient technologies.
However, more recent evidence indicates that the financial potentials at the household
level may have been overstated. While there is still no consensus on whether there is an
Energy Efficiency Gap, a pragmatic way forward suggests a more contextual approach
that pays closer attention to barriers and promoters of energy efficiency in private homes.
Against this background, the thesis applies different methodologies to investigate the
role of context in energy policies targeted at private households: a meta-analysis drawing
on existing evidence in the literature, an ex-post policy analysis based on data from
an energy audit programme in Southern Denmark, and a novel experimental economic
i
framework.
The first analysis provides indicative evidence that income, age, and education posi-
tively influence a household’s propensity to invest, while household size has a negative
effect. However, these findings are only partly significant due to a limited base of com-
parable evidence, highlighting a need for compatibility in empirical studies, and more
repetition studies. The second analysis shows that changes in certain life situations
increase the propensity for households to have an audit and make energy investments;
specifically we find that moving and retiring make households more likely to join a free
energy audit programme, while getting married and moving correlates with higher in-
vestments. This indicates opportunities to develop more efficient policy programmes
that depend on a household response, by reaching out to households at a time when
they are more likely to be encouraged. The final analysis investigates potential spillover
effects induced by behavioural policy interventions, i.e. when an intervention aimed at
one behaviour may also affect another behaviour positively or negatively. In an eco-
nomic experiment we find evidence for a positive spillover induced by a social norms
based intervention, but the primary contribution of this part of the thesis is the novel
experimental framework developed for the purpose of a systematic analysis of spillovers.
Overall, the results of this thesis indicate that a more contextual policy approach holds
promise to encourage energy efficiency improvements and savings by incorporating the
context in which decisions are made, be it the socio-economic circumstances, changes
in life situation, or the decision environment. Although the insights generated by the
thesis are also relevant for policy design, its main contributions are to future policy
research, as it highlights the need for energy policy research to be put on a more robust
and evidence-based foundation, mainly through increased application of experimental
methods.
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Summary in Danish
Denne ph.d.- afhandling undersøger potentialet for en kontekstuel tilgang til energi poli-
tiker m˚alrettet private husholdninger. De fem kapitler af afhandlingen best˚ar af en
introduktion der motiverer afhandlingen samt danner et overblik over de inkluderede
kapitler med en fælles konklusion, tre artikel-baserede kapitler tiltænkt publicering, og
et metodeafsnit omhandlende udvidelser til den eksisterende sampleSelection pakke til
det statistiske programme R. Afhandlingens hovedbidrag er primært til energipolitikker
og –økonomisk litteratur, men dens bidrag er ogs˚a relevant for beslægtede discipliner
som; socialvidenskab, ingeniørkunst og psykologi.
Da husholdninger udgør 25 procent af EU’s samlede energiforbrug spiller energieffek-
tivisering af disse en vital rolle i opfyldelsen af EU’s klimam˚al. Nybyggeri i EU udgør
kun 1 procent, hvorved hovedparten af energieffektivisering skal realiseres energireno-
vationer samt adfærdsændringer. Resultater af incitamentsprogrammer fra de sidste
a˚rtier har været blandet, og vist at husholdninger er svære at influere end hidtil antaget.
Dette har ledt til en opfattelse af et ”Energy Efficiency Gap”, som beskriver en situa-
tion hvori husholdninger er uvidende om de økonomiske besparelser som kan opn˚as via
investering i energirenovering. Nyere studier indikerer at det økonomiske potentiale i
husholdninger er overvurderet. Uagtet manglende konsensus om eksistensen af ”Energy
Efficiency Gap”, kan en pragmatisk kontekstuel tilgang med fokus p˚a barriere ved- og
fortalere for energirenovering være en farbar retning.
Denne afhandling anvender forskellige metoder til at undersøge kontekst som indfly-
delse p˚a succes af energiincitamenter m˚alrettet private husholdninger. En meta-analyse
baseret p˚a eksisterende litteratur, samt data analyse af afsluttede incitamenter, inklusive
data fra afsluttet energirevisionsprogram fra Region Syddanmark, samt et nyt eksperi-
mentelt økonomisk design har dannet baggrund for resultaterne.
Den første analyse indikerer en positiv korrelation af indkomst, alder samt uddan-
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nelsesniveau p˚a en husholdnings tilbøjelighed til at udføre energirenoveringer, mens hus-
standstørrelsen har en negativ indflydelse. Disse indikatorer er kun delvist signifikante
grundet begrænset sammenlignelig viden, hvilket understreger nødvendigheden af em-
piriske studier. Anden analyse viser at visse ændringer i livssituation/levebetingelser
øger husholdningers villighed til energir˚adgivning og investering. Særligt finder vi at
flytning og p˚abegyndelse af pension øger husholdningers villighed til at deltage i gratis
energir˚adgivning, mens at blive gift og flytning korrelerer med husholdningers villighed
til at investere. Dette indikerer muligheder for at m˚alrette incitamentsprogrammer til
specifikke husholdninger ved rettidig kontakt til husholdninger. Den afsluttende analyse
undersøger potentiallet for ”spillover” effekter fremkaldt af indsatser specielt rettet mod
adfærd, eksempelvis ved interventioner rettet mod specifik adfærd kan afføde anden posi-
tiv og negativ adfærd. I et økonomisk eksperiment finder vi evidens for positiv ”spillover”
fra sociale normer. Hovedbidragene fra denne analyse skal findes i nyt eksperimentelt
design udviklet til systematisk analyse af ”spillover” effekter.
Overordnet set indikere resultaterne i denne afhandling at en mere kontekstuel til-
gang til incitamenter, a˚bner for hvor husstandens aktuelle forhold som; socio-økonomi,
signifikante ændringer livssituation eller andet, kan bruges som motivation for energiren-
overing. Afhandlingens resultater er relevante for ”policy design” men dens hovedbidrag
omhandler ”future policy” da den fremhæver nødvendigheden mere strukturerede energi
incitaments forskning med større forankring i eksperimentelle metoder.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
About 25% of final energy consumption in the European Union occurs in private house-
holds (see Figure 1.1), of which more than two thirds are due to space heating (IEA,
2008). Therefore, the European Commission and national governments place emphasis
on energy savings in private homes, either through efficiency improvements or change
in consumer behaviour (EC, 2013). Although today’s building codes place stronger de-
mands on the physical properties of new construction, most developed countries have a
mature building stock with a small replacement rate (Lucon et al., 2014; Artola et al.,
2016), and estimates suggest that at least 70% of the building stock that will be used in
2050 already exists today (Power, 2008). Furthermore, new construction often expands
the living space, because the total number of apartment units increases, and units in-
crease in size (Serrano et al., 2017). Hence, even with a lower consumption of energy per
square meter, a reduction in overall consumption is not guaranteed. This points to the
crucial role of household behaviour in the realization of energy savings through energy
saving investments or adoption of more energy conscious consumption habits.
Energy policy is a key factor in the realization of energy savings in developed countries,
as energy systems and energy markets are usually not left to free market forces. Two
welfare-based arguments for state intervention in energy markets are consideration of
the social dimension, in that a lot of energy services are considered to provide basic
human amenities (heat in cold seasons, cooking amenities, telecommunication, etc.),
and externalities that arise in the provision of energy services (Kerr et al., 2017). Hence,
energy policy aimed at households is a matter of balancing the demand for affordable
energy services with the externalities that arise through the provision of such services.
There is some academic debate about the potential of energy saving investments at
the household level. The so-called Energy Efficiency Gap (EEG) describes the appar-
ent discrepancy between estimated high savings from the adoption of a wide range of
2
1.1 Motivation
Figure 1.1: Final energy consumption in the European Union in 2015 (% of total, based
on all energy sources in TJ; source: Eurostat, online data code: nrg 100a)
technologies, but low uptake by households. A typical way to measure the EEG is to
calculate an implied discount rate based on household adoption decisions (given technol-
ogy costs and estimated savings), and compare them to a common market discount rate,
typically some measure of interest rate from capital markets (Gillingham et al., 2009).
Results from previous studies suggest implied discount rates ranging between 25 percent
to over 100 percent (Sanstad et al., 2006). This appears to be a win-win situation, where
households would gain in terms of their welfare (a gain in the social dimension), while
externalities are reduced at the same time.
Based on the assumption of the EEG, it can be argued that it is enough to inform
and educate households. A fully-informed and rational household should recognize the
potential offered by energy saving investments, and implement measures based on a
positive net present value. Programmes that subsidize energy audits, sometimes coupled
with subsidy programmes based on favourable loans or grants, have been employed
3
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frequently on such a premise (Lutzenhiser, 1993).
However, recent empirical studies have cast some doubt on the EEG narrative, and
while the existence of an EEG still seems plausible for some contexts (e.g. LED lighting),
it does not seem as broad a phenomenon as previously assumed (Allcott and Greenstone,
2012). A typical pattern is that a priori estimates based on engineering analyses and
test cases find large potential for energy savings that are even financially beneficial for
the households themselves. In ex post evaluation studies, however, savings fall short
of expectations and households are generally hard to motivate into becoming active.
Explanations for this discrepancy can be broken down into three categories: unrealistic
assumptions or flaws in both engineering and economic models; market failures, such as
imperfect information or capital market failures; and failure to account for the many be-
havioural hurdles and possible biases that affect households when making an investment
decision (Gerarden et al., 2015).
The lack of evidence for the EEG as a pervasive phenomenon has implications for
energy policies targeted at private households. In the absence of a pervasive EEG, the
state cannot justify the promotion of energy investments to a vast part of the population
purely based on financial savings, and risks losing credibility if it promises financial
savings that do not materialize. This necessitates a re-evaluation of the objectives for
energy policies targeted at households, as the argument that a large fraction of the
population can save money is weakened. Policies need to be more carefully designed and
evaluated with emphasis on identifying and reaching segments of the population that
are affected by investment inefficiencies. Audit-based interventions in particular need to
ensure that they deliver valuable information to those households that need it. Although
there is still an argument for energy investments in the form of reduced externalities,
this might not motivate all segments of the population.
This shift in the arguments for energy policies targeted at private households requires
new approaches in energy policy research and design. Questions about which segments
4
1.2 Analytical Framework
of the population react to energy efficiency programmes, and how households are moti-
vated to become more energy efficient – besides pure economic rationality – are becoming
crucial for policy success. Investigating these questions requires a more contextual ap-
proach in energy policy research, which emphasizes household heterogeneity as a way
to identify investment potentials and receptiveness to certain policy interventions. The
ultimate goal is to develop and test new policy solutions using established information-
and market-based instruments, as well as insights from behavioural policy.
This thesis explores the potential for a more contextual policy design, and points
out new directions for policy evaluation and research. It generates new knowledge and
methodological contributions that are mainly relevant for future research-policy collab-
orations, e.g. in field-based research projects. The remainder of this chapter provides
the analytical framework underlying the thesis, outlines the contribution of the different
thesis chapters, and gives a joint conclusion and outlook on further research. This is
followed by four chapters based on the academic work carried out during the PhD.
1.2 Analytical Framework
This thesis focuses on household energy consumption in a developed country context, i.e.
countries that have nearly ubiquitous energy coverage and high per capitaCO2 emissions.
At its core this thesis deals with household behaviour and the trade-off between people’s
demand for energy services and externality related issues, mainly climate change. It
takes a pragmatic-descriptive approach, in contrast to a theoretic-normative approach.
In other words, the thesis aims to improve knowledge in an applied policy context, and
is less concerned with finding optimal solutions in a theoretical framework.
The thesis takes departure in economic theory with regard to private households and
their decision making processes. Hence, to generate hypotheses, the dominant theoret-
ical perspective regarding individual decision making is that of utility maximising self-
5
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interested, rational actors with well-defined preferences. However, the discussion and
interpretation of results will also draw on recent insights from behavioural economics,
a stream of economics that relaxes assumptions made in the rational actor model. Al-
though behavioural economics has become very popular and influential in recent years,
it has not yet produced a generalized framework as parsimonious as the neo-classical
rational actor theory. This is due to the fact that relaxing assumptions in the rational
actor model easily makes models intractable (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
The different chapters of the thesis are best understood in an evidence-based policy
framework, which aims to understand how policy affects households, and how policy
can nudge societal outcomes in a desired direction (see Figure 1.2). This framework
is presented using the lens of experimentation as the most robust source for (quanti-
tative) evidence (Burtless, 1995). Researchers use established theoretical frameworks
and policy results as feedback to formulate hypotheses, and design experiments to test
these. Experiments in the lab are generally good to establish qualitative results and
basic behavioural patterns, but it is not certain that results generated in the abstract
lab environment translate well to the real world. Therefore, the results from a lab exper-
iment are ideally verified in the field, before the evidence should be applied to new policy
programmes (Levitt and List, 2007). The evidence generated through testing starts a
new cycle of feedback, which is used to design new experiments in the lab or the field.
Each chapter in this thesis can be located in a different part of Figure 1.2. Chapter 2
is a meta-analysis investigating evidence on heterogeneity in investment decisions related
to socio-economic factors. The majority of the studies included in the analysis were not
conducted as (field) experiments, but as an ex-post evaluation of existing policy and
market data. As a meta-analysis, it draws on multiple sources of evidence and tests the
accumulated knowledge. In this way it takes stock of the whole process conceptualized
in Figure 1.2.
Chapter 3 mathematically derives an interval regression estimation technique which
6
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Figure 1.2: Accumulation of Knowledge in Evidence-based Policy Design
accounts for sample selection. This estimator is applied in Chapter 4, which draws
on a policy programme run in Southern Denmark that offered private households free
energy audits. The two chapters are most appropriately classified as generating feedback
from policy in Figure 1.2, as well as making a methodological contribution on how such
feedback can be interpreted.
Chapter 5 is a novel framework for investigating spillovers that may arise in the context
of behavioural policies. While the work was inspired by existing policy evidence, its
contribution is in the domain of developing a framework for testing hypotheses in the lab,
which should then be validated in field experiments to provide policy relevant insights.
It may thus be seen as a contribution in the left hand side of Figure 1.2.
1.3 Chapter Summaries
The papers contained in this thesis are quite heterogeneous in terms of their focus and
the applied methodologies, with a meta-analysis drawing on empirical studies in the
literature, an empirical analysis based on a unique dataset in the Danish context, and
7
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Table 1.1: Overview of Thesis Contributions
Chapter Title Authors Publication Status
2 Can Household Characteristics
Consistently Explain the Hetero-
geneity in Households’ Energy
Efficiency Investments? A Meta-
Analysis
Ge´raldine Henningsen
and Sebastian Petersen
Submitted to En-
ergy Policy in May
2017
3 Interval Regression with Sample
Selection
Arne Henningsen, Se-
bastian Petersen, and
Ge´raldine Henningsen
Documentation for
sampleSelection
package
4 Can Changes in Households’ Life
Situations Predict Participation
in Energy Audits and Invest-
ments in Energy Savings?
Sebastian Petersen,
Ge´raldine Henningsen,
and Arne Henningsen
Working Paper
5 Detecting Behavioral Spillovers
in a Real Effort Public Good Ex-
periment
Sebastian Petersen and
Helene Willadsen
Working Paper
an experimental economic study. The following sections give a brief summary of each
chapter, with a focus on describing the applied methodologies for a general audience to
facilitate the understanding of the later chapters, as they are written for journals in dif-
ferent areas of the economic landscape. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the contributions
included in the thesis.
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1.3.1 Can Household Characteristics Consistently Explain the Heterogeneity
in Households’ Energy Efficiency Investments? A Meta-Analysis
Chapter 2 conducts a meta-analysis that investigates patterns of heterogeneity in house-
hold investment behaviour related to four socio-economic characteristics: income, age,
education, and household size. It draws on evidence from empirical studies in the existing
literature which include one or more of these socio-economic characteristics. Identifying
consistent patterns of correlation between socio-economic characteristics and investment
behaviour may indicate contextual factors in household decision making that could be
useful in designing policy, as it can show what characteristics make households more
likely to make energy investments. The analysis takes departure in a micro-economic
model to generate hypotheses about how different socio-economic characteristics may
influence energy efficiency investments.
Methodology
A meta-analysis draws on multiple studies in a given field and aims to extract statistically
robust findings at a meta level, and is therefore also referred to as an analysis of analyses
(Glass, 1976). Meta analyses are based on the assumption that studies asking similar
research questions are investigating the same underlying issues, even though they may
use different methodologies and data. In the context of the accumulation of knowledge in
science, it can be understood as a way to jointly evaluate evidence from multiple studies
to answer a certain research question. In terms of its aim – extracting and refining
existing knowledge – it is closely related to the literature review, but with a focus on
quantitative results and methods.
In principle, if studies were very homogeneous in the way they have been carried out, a
meta-analysis could be conducted by pooling observations and controlling for the study
they have come from. However, this is rarely the case for policy studies that have not
been conducted with the explicit purpose of including them in a common estimation.
9
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Furthermore, it is often not possible to obtain the full data upon which analyses are
based, which in the policy context is often due to privacy concerns. An alternative with
limited information is to apply a two-stage approach, which uses the point estimates
of a set of studies as observations and weight these based on their standard errors in a
fixed-effects estimator (Sutton and Higgins, 2008).
Since the meta-analysis in Chapter 2 is only based on information provided in output
tables of different studies in the literature, we apply a fixed-effects estimator under the
assumption that estimates from the different studies are distributed:
θi ∼ N(τi,vi), (1.1)
where i indicates the study the estimate comes from, θi the effect estimates, τi the
(unknown) true effect, and vi the sampling variance (Hedges and Vevea, 1998). To ac-
count for differences in the sampling variances due to, e.g. different sample size and data,
the fixed-effects estimation weights each study estimate by the inverse of its sampling
variance:
θ¯ = ∑
wiθi
∑wi
, (1.2)
where θ¯ is the weighted average of the effect that is estimated, and wi weights applied
to the study estimates calculated as 1vi (Viechtbauer, 2010).
The analysis proved to be challenging, possibly due to differences in the set of variables
and the estimation techniques used in our sample of studies, but also because of a limited
body of evidence we were able to draw on. These challenges are further discussed in
Chapter 2.
10
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Results
Findings from the meta-analysis provide indications for positive correlation between in-
come, age, and education with energy investments, and negative correlation between
household size and energy investments. However, these results are only partially signifi-
cant, as the body of comparable studies is too small. The fact that the meta-study was
hard to carry out and only provides indicative results is an important finding in itself,
as it documents a severe limitation in the potential to assess accumulated knowledge
in this area of energy policy. It stands to reason that the indicative evidence from the
meta-analysis warrants more attention to heterogeneity in future studies, but it also
calls for more repetition studies, to ensure a broader empirical basis. In the context
of project applications this raises the of question how the need for replication studies
can be communicated to funding agencies and governments, as funding agencies often
look for novelty that may sacrifice comparability. One answer could be an increased
use of randomized controlled trials that allow for the testing of different treatments.
While one of the most robust techniques available in the scientific toolbox, randomized
controlled trials will also allow for testing new and innovative ideas in conjunction with
more conventional interventions as a baseline for comparison.
1.3.2 Interval Regression with Sample Selection
Chapter 3 is a methodological chapter that formally develops an interval regression es-
timator with sample selection. The approach used to develop the estimator is closely
related to the selection model formulated by Heckman (1979), which is often applied
in policy analysis. Heckman (1979)’s approach, however, only applies to cases in which
a linear outcome variable of interest is estimated by OLS and not when the outcome
variable of interest is non-linear. This chapter mathematically derives an econometric
approach for an interval censored outcome variable estimated by joint maximum likeli-
hood under the assumption of a bivariate normal distribution of the error terms in the
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selection and outcome stage.
Methodology
Sample selection is a common problem for all kinds of policy evaluations. It is likely to
be an issue for policy programmes in which individuals in the target population have
to actively join the policy, i.e. participation is voluntary. Self-selection into policy
treatment is often related to characteristics that also influence the final outcome of
interest, which leads to bias in econometric estimations of the outcome (Reed, 2000).
While it is still possible to evaluate the policy outcome by comparing with a control
group, this limits the generalizability of findings, as they only capture the effect on the
biased sample. Additionally, policy data is often subject to limited observability, i.e. it
often only includes data on the treated population, which makes a direct comparison
between treated and untreated individuals impossible (Meng and Schmidt, 1985).
These issues can be addressed ex-post by estimating a sample selection model speci-
fication. In this class of models, the researcher attempts to separate the decision to join
the policy from the outcome of interest. However, this approach requires additional data,
especially on the untreated population. Furthermore, to separate the two decisions, an
exclusion restriction is needed to ensure identification. An exclusion restriction is an
instrumental variable that predicts the selection into policy, but not the actual outcome
decision. This is a major obstacle for most ex-post policy evaluations, and although
there are a large number of studies that apply sample selection models, it is not always
certain if the inference is valid, due to doubts about the chosen instrument (Smith and
Sweetman, 2016).
Randomized controlled trials are a way to avoid some self-selection issues by, for
example, randomizing treatment among the interested part of the population. However,
this does not address issues of bias in the sample, as households that are willing to
join the policy have already self-selected. The crucial advantage of a randomization
12
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in treatment assignment is that it provides a perfect instrument that can be used as
exclusion restriction. By design, being selected into treatment is perfectly correlated
with being subject to the policy treatment, but not with the final outcome of interest.
Therefore, even when a study is well-designed, sample selection models play an important
role in policy evaluation with econometric methods (Smith and Sweetman, 2016).
Results
The main result of Chapter 3 is an econometric estimator suitable to provide unbiased
estimates for an interval coded outcome variable that accounts for sample selection. The
mathematical derivations of the estimator and the gradients in this chapter were used
to program the estimator as an extension of the existing R package ”sampleSelection”
(Toomet and Henningsen, 2008) in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017). The
estimator is applied to the case of household energy investments in Petersen et al. (2017),
which is presented in Chapter 4.
1.3.3 Can Changes in Households’ Life Situations Predict Participation in
Energy Audits and Investments in Energy Savings?
Chapter 4 investigates changes in the life situation of private home owners as potential
drivers of the decision to have an energy audit and make an investment in their home.
The chapter is based on a comprehensive data set on participants of a free energy audit
programme and a representative control group of home owners from Sønderborg munic-
ipality in Southern Denmark, it investigates the impact of four life situational factors –
marriage, retirement, unemployment, and relocation into a new home – on a household’s
decision to have a free energy audit and make an energy investment.
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Methodology
Sample selection is a common issue in ex-post policy evaluation, as discussed in the
previous section. This becomes apparent when looking at the decision process for house-
holds participating in the ProjectZero energy audit programme, which is analysed in
Chapter 4 (see Figure 1.3). Households decide to have an energy audit in the first stage,
and then make the decision if and how much to invest in a second stage. However, the
investment decision is only observed for households that had an energy audit. Selection
issues may arise, when there are factors that determine both the decision to join the
policy and the decision to make an energy investment. This results in correlation in the
error terms that, if unaccounted for, leads to a biased estimator (Smith and Sweetman,
2016).
Figure 1.3: Household Decision Process for Participation in the ProjectZero Energy Au-
dit Programme
Although issues with sample selection complicate the estimation of the second stage,
it does not impede the analysis of the first stage decision if this is of interest. Probit
and logit are common estimators for estimating dichotomous choices, e.g. the decision
to join a policy programme. In our case we use a probit estimation, which is a bit more
common in economic applications where self-selection is involved. The probit estimator
is based on the assumption that the outcome variable, which only takes on values of zero
or one is a representation of a latent variable that reflects the propensity of joining the
14
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policy (Wooldridge, 2010). In some cases this propensity may have an explicit meaning,
e.g. in economics it may conceptually be considered the utility a household derives from
joining the treatment group.
Sample selection only becomes an issue when estimating the investment into energy
savings in the second stage. As described in Section 1.3.2 this issue is commonly ad-
dressed through joint estimation. In the present case the issue is complicated by the
outcome of interest coded in intervals. Hence, an appropriate estimator has to address:
(1) the self-selection of households into the audit programme and (2) the censored out-
come variable for investments, which is coded in intervals. This estimator is described
in more detail in Section 1.3.2 and developed in Chapter 3.
Results
Results suggest that relocation and entering retirement are significant predictors of join-
ing the audit programme, while including the current life situation variables does not
significantly improve the fit of our estimation model. This confirms that the change in
these life situational factors is driving the effect, and not the difference in the life situ-
ation by itself. This insight supports the notion that timing is important for reaching
private home owners with energy efficiency programmes.
The joint estimation results show that getting married and relocation are strongly
associated with the amount that is invested into energy saving measures. This finding,
however, is preliminary at the moment, as there are issues with the data that still need
to be addressed, before publication of the paper. While the findings are suitable to
inspire policies designed to reach out to people in these specific life circumstances (e.g.
offering audit programmes that target households that recently moved into a new house),
it is highly desirable to implement this in a randomized field experiment. This would
allow for a better evaluation of the specific new policy, but also provide a better general
understanding, as issues in ex-post evaluation, which could only be partly addressed in
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this thesis, could be alleviated with an appropriate experimental design.
1.3.4 Detecting Behavioral Spillovers in a Real Effort Public Good
Experiment
Chapter 5 develops a novel experimental framework to investigate the conditions de-
termining occurrence and direction of spillovers induced by behavioural policies. The
experiment applies a Social Norm intervention, in which the communication of other
people’s behaviour is used to influence decision making. Among other areas of applica-
tion, Social Norm interventions are increasingly used as a policy tool to influence people’s
everyday consumption behaviour. They promise a significant demand response at low
financial costs. Often overlooked in the application of such behavioural interventions,
however, is that they can have unintended spillover effects. The experimental framework
developed in this chapter recreates a decision context in the lab, in which spillover effects
of behavioural interventions can be systematically analysed.
Methodology
Experimental economics has become quite popular in recent years, and its rise in use is
closely related with the ascent of behavioural economics, which is a sub-field of economics
strongly influenced by psychology. Applications of behavioural economics generally re-
lax assumptions commonly made in neo-classical economics, mainly the assumption of
perfectly rational actors. As such it moves towards greater behavioural realism, and
adoption of experimental methods that allow for more rigorous testing of hypotheses
generated by theory (Smith, 1989). While economic experiments are also run in the
field, the focus here is on lab experiments.
One of the main advantages of running experiments in the laboratory is the tight con-
trol the experimenter has over the decision environment in which actors make decisions.
Furthermore, accurate description of the control settings allows for replication of exper-
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iments. This gives researchers the ability to validate their own and others’ results and
increases the explanatory power by running multiple sessions of the same experiment.
However, the application of experimental economics is not without critique. The tightly
controlled environment often leads to an abstract decision making context, which par-
ticipants do not find in the real world. This raises the question if participants behave
the same way as they do in the real world. Another issue often voiced is that the pop-
ulations from which experimental economists draw their samples are not representative
of the rest of the population. It is common to use university students, because they are
available in great number, always offer fresh subjects as new students enroll every year,
and are easy to recruit with a low to medium hourly compensation.
It is within the nature of economic experiments that these points of critique can be
tested. If there is worry that an experimental outcome is biased, because the subject
pool consists of students, the experiment can be replicated with subjects from the general
population (as done in e.g. Exadaktylos et al. 2013). The question if results found in
an abstract lab environment hold up in the real world is commonly tested by running
field experiments to confirm results, before concrete policy recommendations are made.
Hence, lab and field experiments should be seen as complementary tools (Levitt and
List, 2007).
Economic experiments can take many forms, but nowadays the majority are run in
computer-based laboratory environments or online. A typical computer-based laboratory
experiment invites a group of participants, which are assigned a computer running a
software environment, in which decisions are made. Within the experiment subject
decisions are incentivized, i.e. the decisions they make result in monetary payments,
depending on the decisions they make. In this way, a subject’s decision in the laboratory
mimics real-world consequences of decisions and aims to elicit their true preferences
(Smith, 1976).
The experimental framework presented in Chapter 5 is a variation of a public good
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game, which captures problems of collective action described early on in Olsen (1965).
In the standard public good game subjects receive an endowment, which they can either
keep for themselves, or contribute into a common fund shared with a group of people in
the same experiment. Each unit of the endowment kept for themselves is put into their
private account, which is converted into real money at the end of the experiment. Each
unit of the endowment allocated to the common fund provides a pay-off smaller than
one, but to everyone in the group. The total group earnings from a unit in the group
fund is usually larger than one, which results in a pay-off function for an individual i as
follows:
pii = E− ci +0.5 · ci +0.5
3
∑
j=1
c j, (1.3)
in which pii is the earnings (in points that are converted into real money at the end
of the experiment), E the endowment, ci the points invested in the public good, and
c j the amount of points invested into the public good by other player in the game (in
this game a group is composed of 4 players). The best course of the group would be
for everyone to place their endowment in the common fund, but the individual pay-off
is maximized by keeping the endowment. Hence, the game theoretical Nash-equilibrium
is for everybody to keep their endowment for themselves. In contrast to this prediction,
studies commonly find that subjects do invest a good part of their endowment, though
far from the social optimum of full cooperation. This cooperation usually decreases in
repeated games, highlighting the conditional nature of contributing to the public good
(Ledyard, 1995).
In the public game variation we develop in Chapter 5 we investigate behavioural
spillovers. This is inspired by findings from policy and experiments in the field about
possible side-effects of behavioural policies. Though, the spillover term describes a some-
what new stream of investigation in experimental economics, it is closely related to the
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rebound effect in energy economics. Truelove et al. (2014) defines a spillover as ”an effect
of an intervention on subsequent behaviours not targeted by the intervention” (p. 128),
while the rebound effect goes back to Jevons (1866)’s observation that increases in the
efficiency in the utilization of coal lead to an increased demand of coal-related services,
increasing demand for coal. Therefore, the rebound effect is a special case of a spillover,
in which inducing an efficiency improvement in the provision of a good or service changes
subsequent consumption behaviour of the same good or service.
In the experiment, subjects complete real effort tasks in a public good environment, in
what we call a Real Effort Public Good game. Earnings are generated through a private
task which benefits the individual only, and two public tasks, which benefit a group.
A social reference intervention is applied in the treatment group in which participants
receive information about session-level contributions to only one public good. The exper-
imental framework aims to create an abstract version of a decision environment in which
subjects make low-stake decisions about contributing to two different public goods. In
the version we tested in the lab the two public goods are only separated through their
appearance in the game and in the instructions, while the underlying incentives are iden-
tical. This provides a baseline, from which it is possible to design additional treatments
that vary and mimic different decision environments in future extensions of this work.
Results
In the experiment we find evidence of a positive spillover between two tasks that were
only differentiated through framing, a setup which we deem favourable for the occur-
rence of spillovers. Nevertheless, we see merit in this result as a baseline from which
to generate a systematic analysis framework by varying, e.g.: the similarity of the mo-
tive of the two public goods; the public good tasks; group composition in the public
goods; or the type of intervention that is applied to the treated public good. Such ex-
periments have great potential to increase our knowledge of the occurrence of currently
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unaccounted spillovers. While we advise caution when translating lab results into advice
for policy makers, our results support general notions from the literature that spillover
effects should receive more attention when designing and evaluating policy. Our result
of a positive spillover in closely related tasks with a similar motive may open up ways
to design policy that generates positive spillovers, by making these linkages between
activities salient to consumers.
1.4 Conclusion and Further Research
This thesis presents a collection of studies exploring new approaches to get a better
understanding of household decision making in the context of energy policy. It is founded
in a contextual approach to policy design influenced by the recent influx of behavioural
economic theory and application of experimental methods. While the results are partly
applicable to the political discourse, the main contributions are in terms of opening up
new pathways in future evidence-based policy research.
Overall, the thesis contributes to the field of energy policy targeted at households,
by applying new methodologies and exploring previously neglected aspects of household
decision making. A general point the results of this thesis emphasize is that energy pol-
icy needs to be put on a more robust evidence-based footing, mainly through increased
application of experimental methods. Three broader insights have been produced by
this thesis: (1) the current empirical evidence in the literature is limited in terms of the
comparability and robustness of studies, making it hard to generalize insights beyond
the context of single studies; (2) ex-post evaluations of policy data (i.e. policy-based ev-
idence) are inherently limited in their ability to generate generalizable evidence, due to
confounding factors, such as selection effects, and issues with identifying proper instru-
ments to use in sophisticated econometric models to address these issues; (3) a contextual
policy approach holds promise to improve energy policy and induce energy efficiency im-
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provements, e.g. by reaching out to households that are in a phase of life where they
are more susceptible to policy, or a better understanding of how different consumption
domains are related.
All in all, this thesis does not provide direct policy prescriptions on how households
can be induced to save energy, but it points out questions that are worthwhile to ask,
and how to investigate them. Specifically, it highlights the importance of understanding
the different factors that play a role in making people more likely to participate in policy
programmes, and when policy programmes might have unintended side-effects. How
this information can be used to achieve additional savings is an empirical question that
remains to be answered through future testing in the field.
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2.1 Introduction
Abstract
The Energy-Efficiency-Gap (EEG) often rationalises broadly-targeted policies for energy-
efficiency measures in residential buildings. However, the idea of a pervasive EEG finds
little support in the economic literature. One implication of this finding is that household
heterogeneity is more consequential than previously assumed. Hence, knowledge on
what kinds of household are likely to engage in energy efficiency investments becomes
crucial for formulating effective policies. Although ‘policy targeting’ and ‘household
heterogeneity’ have been extensively covered in the energy-policy literature, a meta-
analysis of how observable characteristics correlate with energy-efficiency investments
has not been conducted to date. This article aims at reviewing the empirical evidence
in the energy-policy literature in order to assess the existence of behavioural patterns
connected with the following four frequently included and easily observable household
characteristics: income, age, education, and household size. Additionally, by means
of a standard investment model, we compare the theoretical and empirical impact of
these four factors on households’ investment decisions. We find consistently positive
effects for income, but more ambiguous positive effects for age and education, as well as
ambiguous negative effects for household size. Our results cannot confirm an influence
of the decision domain on the effect of these four household characteristics.
2.1 Introduction
Policies to encourage energy efficiency investments in residential housing are common in
many developed countries (e.g., Weatherization Assistance Program in the United States,
Green Deal in the UK, Energieeffizient Sanieren in Germany or Bedre Bolig in Denmark).
Such policies are often broadly targeted, i.e., most households are potentially encouraged
through information provision and subsidies. Two common arguments expressed in
favour of these policy campaigns are reduced negative externalities from mitigating CO2
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emissions, and untapped financial gains for households, the so-called Energy Efficiency
Gap (EEG). Hence, residential energy efficiency policies are often depicted as a win-win
for both private households and society.
A review of the EEG by Allcott and Greenstone (2012), however, shows that the
magnitude of the EEG is smaller than has been suggested by engineering studies that
often motivate these policies; also, these policies often fail to create significant future
welfare gains under the assumption of reasonable discount rates. These findings have
been confirmed by recent ex-post evaluations of residential energy efficiency programmes
(Davis et al., 2014; Fowlie et al., 2015; Zivin and Novan, 2015).
To address these findings, Allcott and Greenstone (2012) suggest designing policies
that consider the heterogeneity in energy inefficiencies across households; a point which
has also been emphasised in other studies (e.g., Stern, 1992; Allcott et al., 2014; Gilling-
ham and Palmer, 2013). The rationale behind this suggestion is straightforward: if
only a subset of the population stands to gain from a policy, targeting this part of the
population, for example, through target-oriented information (Fogg, 2003), will be more
effective and eventually more efficient than targeting the whole population. However,
despite calls for the increased utilisation of household heterogeneity in policy design, it
is unclear whether systematic and exploitable patterns in household heterogeneity exist.
Secondly, if patterns do exist, are they connected to variables that are accessible enough
for energy modellers and policy makers who want to incorporate household heterogeneity
into their analyses and policy designs?
Empirical evidence for heterogeneity across households has been documented in vari-
ous studies (e.g., Hausman, 1979; Newell and Siikama¨ki, 2013), but a systematic meta-
analysis with the purpose of establishing systematic and exploitable patterns connected
to accessible household characteristics is still missing to date. We address this gap and
contribute to the energy policy discussion on households’ energy efficiency investment
decisions by analysing and evaluating the empirical evidence.
28
2.1 Introduction
Allcott and Greenstone (2012) identify unobserved costs and benefits of an energy
efficiency measure as a major source of the divergence between economic and engineering
studies. Consequently, if these costs and benefits are mostly unobservable, the question
arises as to whether they can be proxied by observable variables, e.g., socio-economic
variables. Train (1985) investigates the impact of socio-economic variables on (implied)
discount rates in the adoption of energy efficiency measures. The study identifies a
positive influence of income on the propensity of adoption, but produces mixed results
for age and education due to limited evidence. The present study takes up this discussion
and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first meta-analysis to investigate systematic
patterns in household characteristics that have shown to influence households’ decisions
to invest in energy efficiency.
In order to screen the results from 19 empirical and experimental studies, we develop
a systematic approach to evaluate and compare the empirical results with respect to
the following four frequently included and easily observable socio-economic variables:
income, age, education, and household size. We investigate the existence of consistent
patterns across these four variables with respect to a household’s propensity to conduct
energy efficiency investments. Furthermore, we apply a classic microeconomic approach
to evaluate the theoretical connection between observable socio-economic variables and
the latent variables that influence a household’s investment decision. This enables us to
compare empirical evidence with the assumptions from classic micro-economic theory.
The article is structured as follows: section two describes the methodology of our
literature search; section three outlines the theoretical economic model and derives the
hypotheses; section four presents the empirical findings; section five discusses the empir-
ical findings and compares them to our hypotheses; and section six concludes.
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2.2 Literature Search
To identify the relevant literature, we screened the literature for empirical studies that
analysed the determinants of households’ energy efficiency investment decisions both
under market conditions and as a reaction to policies. For each identified study, we
conducted a forward and backward citation search using the Google Scholar, Scopus,
EconStor, and EconPapers databases.
We focused our search on three broad categories: real market behaviour, stated prefer-
ence studies, and policy evaluations. In order to increase comparability, we concentrated
on studies conducted in industrialised countries. We screened these studies for observ-
able household characteristics in order to determine the most frequently used variables.
Studies use a multitude of different household characteristics, although the most fre-
quently included are income, age, education, and household size. Additional frequently
applied characteristics are race and children living in the household, while variables such
as home ownership, household debt, employment status, and gender are infrequently
used variables. Environmental attitude and political affiliation are often included, es-
pecially in studies from the political science and psychological literature. However, as
these characteristics are not easily observable for energy modellers and policy makers,
but require extensive surveys, we abstract from them in our study. Given these results,
we focus on the following four most frequently used variables: income, age, education,
and household size.
From the potentially relevant literature, we selected articles fulfilling the following
criteria:
 published in a peer-reviewed journal or in an established working paper series,
 presenting empirical results of the determinants of private households’ engagement
in energy efficiency,
 containing at least one of the four selected household characteristics as a covariate.
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Broadly defined, the studies included in our analysis present empirical results that allow
inference about the propensity of households to invest in energy-efficiency.
2.3 Model and Hypotheses Formulation
To set a theoretical framework for the analysis of the empirical results, we start by
defining a simple investment model such as in Allcott and Greenstone (2015). Households
can improve energy efficiency by investing into energy-efficient portable and non-portable
assets such as energy-efficient appliances or weatherisation improvements.
Let θi j = (ei j,ξi j,ci j,Ti j)′ be a vector, where i = 1, . . . ,I is the household index, and
j ∈Ji indicates a specific energy efficiency measure from the set of all feasible measures,
Ji, available to household i. ei j is the expected monetary Present Day Value (PDV)
of the energy savings of the investment; ξi j is the expected PDV of the monetised non-
monetary benefits of the investment (e.g., better indoor climate); ci j are the monetary
costs of the investment and Ti j are its expected monetised non-monetary costs (e.g.,
disturbances through construction work).
We set up the following expected utility function:
E(U(yi,ei0,Bi0,Θi,Ii)) = yi− ei0 +Bi0 + ∑
j∈Ji
Ii j(ei j +ξi j− ci j−Ti j), (2.1)
where yi is household income, a proxy for wealth1; ei0 is the PDV of the expenditures
of the future baseline energy consumption without improvement; Bi0 are the monetised
non-monetary features of the status quo; Θi = {θi j; j ∈Ji} is the set of the costs and
benefits of all energy efficiency measures available to household i; Ii j is a dummy variable
indicating whether household i adopts the jthe energy efficiency measure, and Ii = {Ii j; j∈
Ji}.2
1Although income may be relevant by itself, we would expect overall wealth to be more relevant.
However, because data on wealth is seldom included in empirical studies, we omit it in our model.
2We presume that all energy efficiency measures in setJi are independent of each other. In consequence,
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As all of these variables, except for yi and Ii j, are usually unobserved latent variables,
we suggest expressing them through functions that depend on four observable household
characteristics: income, yi; age, ai; education, di, and household size, zi:
E(U(yi,ei0,Bi0,θi1, . . . ,θiJ)) = (2.2)
yi− ei0(yi,ai,di,zi)+Bi0(yi,ai,di,zi)
+ ∑
j∈Ji
Ii j(ei j(yi,ai,di,zi)+ξi j(yi,ai,di,zi)− ci j(yi,ai,di,zi)−Ti j(yi,ai,di,zi))
Equation (2.3) shows the effect of an investment j on the expected utility of household
i:
λi j(·) = ei j(yi,ai,di,zi)+ξi j(yi,ai,di,zi)− ci j(yi,ai,di,zi)−Ti j(yi,ai,di,zi), (2.3)
where λi j = E(U(·) | Ii j = 1)−E(U(·) | Ii j = 0). Equation (2.3) shows that λi j will be posi-
tive, negative or neutral depending on the Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment.
We argue that the NPV of an investment depends on latent variables that are functions
of heterogeneous household characteristics. Hence, in the following, we examine the ef-
fects for each of the four household attributes on the NPV of an investment, λi j, keeping
as close as possible to classic micro-economic theory. Hypotheses derived from these
effects will serve as a benchmark in the evaluation of the empirical results in section 2.5.
2.3.1 Income
∂λi j
∂yi
=
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂ei j
∂yi
+
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂ξi j
∂yi
−
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂ci j
∂yi
−
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Ti j
∂yi
(2.4)
some energy efficiency measures are package solutions if their conservation effect is dependent on the
combination of several single conservation measures, e.g., a household with two possible investments
A and B has three option: ’A‘, ’B‘, or ’A and B‘.
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The direction of the overall effect of income, yi, on λi j depends on the magnitude of the
single effects in equation (2.4):
1. We presume that income, yi, has a positive effect on the energy conservation poten-
tial of an investment j. An energy efficiency investment will increase the efficiency
of the provision of corresponding energy services and, hence, reduce the costs of
these services. Assuming that energy services are a normal good, a reduction in
their costs will translate into an increase in demand (rebound effect) (Fouquet and
Pearson, 2012). However, we argue that wealthier households have a smaller price
elasticity of the demand for energy services (see Appendix 2.A) as their initial
demand for energy services is already high. In consequence, wealthier households
will be less prone to the rebound effect and the net-savings effect, ei j, of an en-
ergy efficiency measure j that increases energy efficiency by a certain factor will
be larger (in absolute terms) in wealthier households than in poorer households.
2. An increase in the consumption of energy services implies an increase in non-
monetary benefits. It then follows from the previous point that poorer household
will benefit more from the investment, i.e., have greater non-monetary benefits due
to a larger rebound effect.
3. We assume that the monetary costs, ci j, will be lower for wealthier households.
Although pure purchasing costs are expected to be the same for all households,
the associated capital costs might vary considerably. Wealthier households have
better access to capital and lower interest rates because they own more assets as
collateral. This effect should be more pronounced the larger the investment sum
associated with the energy efficiency measure.
4. Non-monetary costs, Ti j, are higher for high income households because their
leisure time is more valuable to them (in monetary terms). This is based on the
standard assumption that individuals work until their marginal benefit of leisure is
33
Chapter 2 Household Characteristics Meta-Analysis
equal to their marginal benefit of work. Thus, the higher the household’s income
from labour, the higher the costs linked to lost leisure time resulting from energy
efficiency measures.3
The overall effect of income, to a large extent, will depend on the energy efficiency
measure at hand. Irrespective of the income level, households will profit from the in-
vestment: either through monetary savings or through an increase in the non-monetary
benefits. Hence, the impact of income is most pronounced on the cost side. A higher
income will be most advantageous if the investment is capital-intensive, while on the
other hand, it will create higher non-monetary costs for time-intensive measures. Based
on these considerations, we formulate the following testable hypothesis for income, yi j:
Hypothesis 1 A household’s propensity to invest will increase with income in tact with
the capital intensity of the investment.
2.3.2 Age
∂λi j
∂ai
=
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂ei j
∂ai
+
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂ξi j
∂ai
−
(+/−)︷︸︸︷
∂ci j
∂ai
−
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Ti j
∂ai
(2.5)
The overall effect of age is ambiguous and complicated by the fact that many effects will
be non-linear across a life span:
1. Because of a lower expectation in healthy life years, elder households might have a
shorter time horizon to accumulate the benefits of an energy efficiency investment.
Hence, the PDV of the energy efficiency measure, ei j, and the PDV of the non-
monetary benefits, ξi j, decrease with age, implying that age has a negative effect
on the valuation of the benefits if we assume a common discount rate across all
households.
3However, these considerations are no longer valid if the main source of income is not or no longer from
labour, e.g., in the case of retirees or households with a large income from capital investments.
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2. The monetary costs of an investment, ci j, follow a more complicated pattern across
age groups. While overall age seems to decrease credit-constraints (Jappelli, 1990;
Lyons, 2003), capital costs eventually sharply increase after a certain age (lenders
evaluate the risk of giving loans to elderly households as high). This effect might
be strongest for energy efficiency measures that require larger investments.
3. Finally, as age increases, the share of labour income from total income will decrease
considerably for most households (Aaronson et al., 2014). Hence, elder households
will ceteris paribus (e.g., for a given total income) have a lower marginal income
from labour, i.e. they will have lower opportunity costs of leisure time. Conse-
quently, the valuation of leisure time will be lower and, hence, elder households
will consider a loss of leisure time as less costly.
Overall age appears to reduce the benefits, but also decreases the costs of an energy
efficiency investment. We expect a more pronounced negative effect of age on the benefits
of energy efficiency measures with long amortisation periods. On the other hand, with
the exception of the elderly, age has a positive effect on both monetary and non-monetary
costs. Based on these considerations, we formulate the following hypothesis for age, ai:
Hypothesis 2 The effect of age on the likelihood of a household investing in energy
efficiency measures is ambiguous for capital-intensive investments with long amortisation
periods.
2.3.3 Education
∂λi j
∂di
=
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂ei j
∂di
+
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂ξi j
∂di
−
(0)︷︸︸︷
∂ci j
∂di
−
(0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Ti j
∂di
(2.6)
Although the effect of education on the expected utility of an investment is predominantly
positive, the magnitude and total direction of the overall effect of education will depend
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on the magnitude of the single effects.
1. Harrison et al. (2002) find large and significantly negative effects of education on
the discount rate of the future benefits of an investment. Hence, individuals with
a longer education are, on average, more patient, i.e., able and willing to wait for
the future benefits of their investment. Hence, we expect that an increase in years
of education correlates negatively with the discount rate of future monetary and
non-monetary benefits of an energy efficiency investment. This effect should be
more prominent, the greater the benefits and the longer the amortisation period.
2. We presume that education has no effect on the up-front monetary and non-
monetary costs of the investment.
The positive impact of education will mainly manifest itself on the benefit side, and
will be more significant for benefits that accrue further in the future. Thus, we posit the
third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Education is expected to increase the propensity to invest in energy effi-
ciency measures, particularly if the amortisation period is long.
2.3.4 Household size
∂λi j
∂ zi
=
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂ei j
∂ zi
+
(0)︷︸︸︷
∂ξi j
∂ zi
−
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂ci j
∂ zi
−
(0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Ti j
∂ zi
(2.7)
Household size is primarily a control variable and it will, therefore, only impact the
propensity to invest, λi, through other variables:
1. Larger household size will, ceteris paribus, correlate with a higher demand for
energy services. If these energy services can be provided more efficiently, large
households will profit over-proportionally through greater energy savings, ei j.
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2. On the other hand, larger household size means lower per capita income, which
eventually translates into higher costs of financing capital intensive investments.
3. The impact of household size on non-monetary costs and benefits is unclear, and
might be more influenced by the structure of the household, e.g., age and number
of children, number of elderly, etc.4
Hence, the overall impact of household size depends on the magnitude of the two
opposing effects. Based on these assumptions, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The effect of household size on the likelihood of a household to invest in
energy efficiency measures is ambiguous for capital-intensive investments, but positive
for less capital-intensive investments.
2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Overview of studies
Table 2.1 summarises the empirical evidence for heterogeneity in household energy ef-
ficiency investment behaviour. Houde (2014) appears twice as the study conducts two
analyses that fall in different categories.
The column “Data Source” documents the kind of data used as the primary input.
Stated Preference studies are referred to as “Choice Experiment (SP)” or “Survey Data
(SP)”. They survey preferences through choice experiments or through survey questions.
Revealed Preference (RP) studies, which are based on statements about current or past
behavior, are labelled “Survey Data (RP)”. “Empirical Data” are data on household
behaviour collected from a third source (e.g., tax authorities).
4E.g., a household with small children or elderly persons might put a higher value on a better indoor cli-
mate. On the other hand, these households might have less leisure time or will be over proportionally
affected by the inconvenience of a large building project.
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The column“Policy”indicates whether the study evaluates an energy policy. Observing
only general market behaviour, however, does not imply that energy policies were not
effective, but rather that the study does not focus on measuring the effect of a particular
policy. The distinction is important as the sole participation in a policy evaluation study
(experiment) might be sufficient to trigger behavioural changes in households that are
very different from their market behaviour.
The“Decision domain”column describes the type of conservation decision that a study
investigates. Studies investigating more than one decision are referred to as “Multiple”.
The included studies cover a vast spectrum of different investment decisions, which can
have very different non-monetary benefits. Housing investments often lead to improved
indoor climate; appliances, on the other hand, have important comfort features in operat-
ing them and might also entail status considerations. These differences in non-monetary
benefits may strongly correlate with household characteristics and, thereby, further im-
pact the effect of these characteristics on a household’s investment decision.
The column labelled ‘n’ indicates the sample size of the study. For studies that run
different model specifications based on various subsets, we note the range of the sample
sizes.
Finally, the columns labelled “Inc”, “Age”, “Educ”, and “Size” display the correlation
between the likelihood to invest in energy efficiency and the four household character-
istics: income, age, education, and household size. This correlation is inferred from
the different dependent variables used in the studies (e.g., adoption decision, investment
sums, etc.). A positive (negative) correlation, indicating a higher (lower) propensity to
invest in energy efficiency, is represented by ‘+’ (‘-’). Studies where no statistically signif-
icant correlation is found are indicated by “0”. Studies that do not include a determinant
are indicated by “φ”. The values in parenthesis show the t-value for the estimates, where
bold font indicates statistical significance. In cases where multiple models were estimated
(e.g., different subgroups or model specifications), we indicate the range of the t-values
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for the different estimates. Cases where t-values were unobtainable or inappropriate for
the methodology applied in a study are indicated by “NA”.
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2.4.2 Quality of the studies
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the different quality aspects of the collected studies, which
obviously are very heterogeneous. Many studies do not conduct any form of robustness
analysis and often accept the results from only a single – untested – model specification
at face value, which unfortunately reduces the contribution of these studies considerably.
Most studies use a wide set of variables on household and housing characteristics of
which many are probably highly correlated (e.g., income and home ownership, family size
and dwelling area, or income and education). However, we did not find a single study
that discusses this issue. Although collinearity does not bias estimators, it leads to
inefficient estimators (large standard errors), which might be problematic in studies that
are primarily investigating the determinants of households’ energy decisions or studies
that are interested in the correlation between policy effects and household and housing
characteristics.
A further aspect is the external validity of the study results. As Table 2.2 shows, very
few studies work with a final sample that is unbiased and facilitates full generalisation
of the results. Most studies – unsurprisingly – experience considerable problems with
low response-rates, non-random attrition, or problems of missing observations in certain
variables for non-random subsets of the sample (e.g., missing taxation data for households
in certain income groups). Other studies (e.g., Murray and Mills, 2011), voluntarily
reduce a representative random sample to an unrepresentative sub-sample.
This problem is not in any way specific to the selected studies, but is a widespread
problem of observational studies in economics and other social sciences. What is prob-
lematic, though, is that many of the cited studies use their results as the basis for
extensive policy recommendations, often without discussing the external validity of their
results or checking the representatives of their sample. In this respect, the growing body
of studies using data from carefully designed field experiments (e.g., Wilhite and Ling,
1995; Abrahamse and Steg, 2009; Ito et al., 2014; Fowlie et al., 2015) is a positive trend
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in the literature that should be further encouraged.
Finally, we encountered a number of studies that either ignore self-selection of house-
holds, e.g., self-selection into energy efficiency programmes, or treat self-selection prob-
lems in a very nonchalant way in analyses evaluating the effectiveness of policies pro-
moting energy conservation in households. Since the seminal work by James Heckman
(e.g., Heckman, 1979; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001, 2007) it has become apparent that
ignoring self-selection of decision-makers into policy treatments can lead to inconsistent
estimates of policy effects. Unfortunately, recent studies also often ignore self-selection
problems in their policy analyses, which indicates that awareness of this problem is still
low. Therefore, studies following approaches like in Murray and Mills (2011) or Mills
and Schleich (2010), which fully account for self-selection, should be further encouraged.
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ct
io
n
p
ro
b
le
m
o
f
th
e
in
v
es
tm
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
,
b
o
th
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
in
v
es
tm
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
tr
ea
te
d
a
s
tw
o
se
p
a
ra
te
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
N
o
W
a
rd
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
1
)
In
fl
u
en
ce
o
f
th
e
E
n
er
g
y
st
a
r
la
b
el
o
n
co
n
su
m
er
s’
w
il
li
n
g
-
n
es
s
to
p
ay
fo
r
a
n
a
p
p
li
a
n
ce
.
O
n
li
n
e
su
rv
ey
,
U
S
A
,
2
0
0
9
,
re
p
-
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
o
n
li
n
e
re
se
a
rc
h
p
a
n
el
.
S
tu
d
y
b
a
se
d
o
n
st
a
te
d
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s,
d
a
n
g
er
th
a
t
re
sp
o
n
-
d
en
ts
g
iv
e
‘c
o
rr
ec
t’
a
n
sw
er
b
ec
a
u
se
th
er
e
a
re
n
o
re
a
l
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
th
ei
r
d
ec
is
io
n
.
N
o
n
e,
sa
m
p
le
co
r-
re
ct
ed
fo
r
n
o
n
-
ra
n
d
o
m
o
p
t-
o
u
t.
C
h
o
ic
e
o
f
re
fr
ig
er
a
to
r
m
o
d
el
N
o
n
e
Y
es
M
il
ls
a
n
d
S
ch
le
ic
h
(2
0
1
0
)
D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s’
k
n
ow
l-
ed
g
e
a
n
d
ch
o
ic
e
o
f
cl
a
ss
A
en
er
g
y
a
p
p
li
a
n
ce
s.
M
a
il
su
rv
ey
,
G
er
-
m
a
n
y,
2
0
0
2
.
Y
es
R
es
p
o
n
se
ra
te
7
5
%
,
a
u
th
o
rs
d
o
n
o
t
d
is
-
cu
ss
o
r
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
p
o
-
te
n
ti
a
l
b
ia
s.
K
n
ow
le
d
g
e
a
n
d
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n
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-
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o
f
cl
a
ss
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en
er
g
y
a
p
p
li
a
n
ce
s.
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o
n
e
U
n
cl
ea
r,
a
s
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l
b
ia
s
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th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
n
o
t
d
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ss
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.
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a
m
te
ss
a
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0
1
3
)
D
et
er
m
in
a
n
ts
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s’
p
a
r-
ti
ci
p
a
ti
o
n
in
th
e
E
G
H
h
o
m
e
re
tr
o
fi
t
p
ro
g
ra
m
.
E
G
H
a
u
d
it
re
p
o
rt
s
su
b
m
it
-
te
d
to
N
R
C
a
n
,
C
a
n
a
d
a
,
1
9
9
8
–
2
0
0
5
.
S
tu
d
y
d
es
ig
n
d
o
es
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
va
li
d
ex
-
cl
u
si
o
n
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st
ri
ct
io
n
.
N
o
n
-r
a
n
d
o
m
a
tt
ri
-
ti
o
n
o
f
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
d
u
e
to
m
is
si
n
g
va
lu
es
in
so
m
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
im
p
le
m
en
te
d
re
tr
o
-fi
t
m
ea
-
su
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s.
D
o
n
o
t
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rr
ec
t
fo
r
se
lf
-
se
le
ct
io
n
p
ro
b
le
m
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-
v
es
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en
t
d
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io
n
,
d
u
e
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m
is
si
n
g
IV
.
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b
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1
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h
e
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n
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b
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h
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o
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n
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it
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s.
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p
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l
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U
S
A
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b
a
se
d
o
n
st
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d
p
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n
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a
t
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ea
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d
b
eh
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io
u
r
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o
es
n
o
t
re
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t
re
a
l
w
o
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d
b
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av
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u
r.
H
ow
ev
er
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le
g
a
l
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
d
o
n
o
t
a
ll
ow
a
fi
el
d
ex
p
er
im
en
t.
R
es
p
o
n
se
ra
te
6
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,
ri
sk
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f
n
o
n
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a
n
d
o
m
o
p
t-
o
u
t
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f
h
o
u
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h
o
ld
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o
f
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e
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o
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o
f
a
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n
d
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o
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er
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o
d
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a
s
a
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n
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w
h
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h
h
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h
o
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s
a
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er
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b
el
.
N
o
n
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k
el
y
H
o
u
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h
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
en
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er
g
y
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b
el
s
a
n
d
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er
g
y
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a
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o
n
o
n
h
o
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se
h
o
ld
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p
p
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n
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b
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p
le
.
P
u
rc
h
a
se
o
f
re
fr
ig
er
a
to
r
m
o
d
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f
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ra
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p
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b
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p
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p
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p
ay
a
n
d
th
e
o
m
is
si
o
n
o
f
u
n
o
b
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b
o
il
er
m
o
d
el
.
N
o
n
e
Y
es
45
Chapter 2 Household Characteristics Meta-Analysis
T
ab
le
2.
2:
Q
u
al
it
y
of
se
le
ct
ed
st
u
d
ie
s
S
tu
d
y
R
e
se
a
rc
h
q
u
e
st
io
n
S
a
m
p
le
A
p
p
ro
p
ri
a
te
st
u
d
y
d
e
si
g
n
R
is
k
o
f
b
ia
s
O
u
tc
o
m
e
m
e
a
su
re
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
Is
su
e
s
G
e
n
e
ra
li
sa
b
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is
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n
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is
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n
ce
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ro
g
ra
m
.
E
x
p
er
im
en
ta
l
d
a
ta
o
n
lo
w
-
in
co
m
e
h
o
u
se
-
h
o
ld
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M
ic
h
ig
a
n
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S
A
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2
0
1
1
Y
es
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is
u
n
cl
ea
r
to
w
h
a
t
ex
te
n
t
th
e
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ea
te
d
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
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u
ld
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m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
w
it
h
u
n
tr
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te
d
h
o
u
se
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ld
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w
h
ic
h
co
u
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ev
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a
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y
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a
d
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il
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er
eff
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o
f
th
e
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en
t
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th
e
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n
tr
o
l
g
ro
u
p
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er
eb
y,
d
il
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ti
n
g
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en
t
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su
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s.
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ra
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R
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p
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g
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b
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u
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o
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e
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su
re
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
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su
e
s
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e
n
e
ra
li
sa
b
il
it
y
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ro
n
d
el
a
n
d
V
a
n
ce
(2
0
1
3
)
T
h
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
h
o
m
e
en
er
g
y
a
u
d
it
s
o
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s’
re
tr
o
-fi
t
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
R
es
id
en
ti
a
l
E
n
er
g
y
C
o
n
-
su
m
p
ti
o
n
S
u
rv
ey
o
f
d
et
a
ch
ed
h
o
u
se
ow
n
er
s,
G
er
m
a
n
y,
2
0
0
7
.
S
tu
d
y
d
es
ig
n
d
o
es
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
e
va
li
d
ex
-
cl
u
si
o
n
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
.
U
n
cl
ea
r
A
u
d
it
p
a
rt
ic
-
ip
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
im
p
le
m
en
-
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
o
f
fo
u
r
re
n
ov
a
-
ti
o
n
m
ea
su
re
s
(r
o
o
f
in
su
la
-
ti
o
n
,
fa
ca
d
e
in
su
la
ti
o
n
,
w
in
d
ow
re
-
p
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ce
m
en
t,
a
n
d
re
-
p
la
ce
m
en
t
o
f
h
ea
ti
n
g
eq
u
ip
m
en
t)
D
o
n
o
t
co
rr
ec
t
fo
r
se
lf
-
se
le
ct
io
n
p
ro
b
le
m
in
in
-
v
es
tm
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
,
d
u
e
to
m
is
si
n
g
IV
.
N
o
W
a
ls
h
(1
9
8
9
)
T
h
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
in
-
co
m
e
a
n
d
ta
x
cr
ed
it
s
o
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s’
re
tr
o
-
fi
t
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
R
es
id
en
ti
a
l
E
n
er
g
y
C
o
n
-
su
m
p
ti
o
n
su
rv
ey
,
U
S
A
,
1
9
8
2
.
Y
es
U
n
cl
ea
r,
n
o
t
d
is
-
cu
ss
ed
.
B
in
a
ry
va
ri
-
a
b
le
o
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
’s
in
v
es
tm
en
t.
D
o
es
n
o
t
ta
k
e
u
n
o
b
-
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ed
h
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o
g
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a
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o
u
n
t.
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b
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9
9
3
)
D
et
er
m
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a
n
ts
o
f
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tr
o
-fi
t
in
v
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en
ts
.
IR
S
ta
x
fi
le
s
co
n
-
ta
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in
g
en
er
g
y
in
-
v
es
tm
en
t
re
la
te
d
ta
x
re
tu
rn
s,
U
S
A
,
1
9
7
8
–
8
5
.
S
tu
d
y
m
is
se
s
co
u
n
te
r
fa
ct
u
a
l
to
b
e
a
b
le
to
q
u
a
n
ti
fy
eff
ec
t
o
f
ta
x
re
tu
rn
s
o
n
re
tr
o
-fi
t
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
.
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
w
it
h
>
$2
00
,0
00
ex
cl
u
d
ed
,
A
la
sk
a
a
n
d
H
aw
a
ii
ex
cl
u
d
ed
.
ex
te
n
si
v
e
d
is
cu
ss
io
n
o
f
th
e
im
p
a
ct
o
f
th
es
e
se
le
c-
ti
o
n
cr
it
er
ia
o
n
th
e
fi
n
a
l
sa
m
p
le
.
In
v
es
tm
en
t
su
m
a
n
d
re
tr
o
-fi
t
m
ea
-
su
re
s.
N
o
n
e
U
n
cl
ea
r
B
re
ch
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n
g
a
n
d
S
m
it
h
(1
9
9
4
)
D
et
er
m
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a
n
ts
o
f
re
tr
o
-fi
t
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
.
E
n
g
li
sh
H
o
u
se
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
,
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ft
in
su
la
ti
o
n
,
w
a
ll
in
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o
n
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d
o
u
-
b
le
g
la
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n
g
S
u
rv
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(E
H
C
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E
n
g
la
n
d
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9
8
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N
o
n
e
B
in
a
ry
va
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-
a
b
le
s
o
n
d
ec
is
io
n
to
co
n
d
u
ct
lo
ft
in
su
la
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o
n
,
w
a
ll
in
su
la
-
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
d
o
u
-
b
le
g
la
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n
g
in
v
es
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en
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.
D
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is
io
n
s
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n
d
u
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e
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e
m
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b
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t
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b
u
t
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m
a
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d
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b
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b
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d
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d
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m
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f
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p
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R
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id
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a
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E
n
er
g
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o
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-
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m
p
ti
o
n
S
u
rv
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E
C
S
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S
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0
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.
Y
es
O
n
ly
in
cl
u
d
e
h
o
u
se
-
h
o
ld
s
w
it
h
a
p
p
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a
n
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s
<
5
y
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av
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o
n
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–
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0
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o
f
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a
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y
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p
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n
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v
e
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m
p
le
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B
in
a
ry
va
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a
b
le
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o
n
k
n
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d
g
e
a
n
d
p
u
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h
a
se
o
f
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g
y
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a
r
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b
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e
a
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a
n
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n
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p
u
rc
h
a
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-
er
g
y
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a
r
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a
to
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h
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a
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a
n
d
w
a
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-
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g
m
a
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in
e
m
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h
t
b
e
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a
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d
.
M
o
d
el
le
d
a
s
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e
in
d
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en
d
en
t
d
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i-
si
o
n
s.
R
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u
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s
st
il
l
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n
-
si
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en
t,
b
u
t
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tu
a
ll
y
le
ss
effi
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en
t.
N
o
D
u
b
in
a
n
d
H
en
-
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n
(1
9
8
8
)
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
a
l
co
n
se
-
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
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e
E
n
-
er
g
y
T
a
x
A
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.
IR
S
T
a
x
p
ay
er
C
o
m
p
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a
n
ce
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t
P
ro
g
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2.4.3 Methodology and Results of the meta-analysis
The difficulty of conducting a meta-analysis on correlation studies is the vast difference in
the chosen estimates, model specifications, and units of measurement of the endogenous
variable as well as the covariates, e.g., a simple shift in the scale of the income variable
(income in $ versus income in e) makes the parameters from two studies incomparable.
To address the first problem, we divide the studies into two categories: (i) those with
a binary outcome variable, usually adoption or participation studies, and; (ii) those with
a continuous outcome variable measuring investments in energy efficiency. Dividing the
studies up into these two categories provides the basis for comparing the magnitude of
the effects. However, even within models with binary outcome variables and models with
continuous outcome variables, we find a multitude of different econometric approaches
applied to the data. Several studies compare various econometric approaches to the same
model specification in order to test different econometric assumptions. This creates
a trade-off for our choice of estimates between the quality of the estimator and the
comparability of the estimates across studies, i.e., a study might contain both the results
from a standard econometric approach and those from a very specialised approach, with
the latter returning more valid results. In order to increase the comparability of the
estimates across all studies, we choose to include, as far as possible, the results from the
standard estimator.
The second point is the influence of the inclusion of other covariates on the effects of the
four extracted variables. Evidently, the number and type of covariates vary considerably
across studies. In cases where some of these additional covariates are strongly correlated
with one or several of our four household characteristics, the measured effect of the
latter may be influenced by their mere presence or absence in the analysis. We see no
possibility of controlling for this influence in our analysis as the variation in the model
specifications across all studies is too large to be systematised in any meaningful way.
Another problem that results from different model specifications is that not all studies
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include all four variables (income, age, education, and household size), which means that
the mean effects of these four variables are based on different subsets of the included
studies. This is a weakness in our analysis, which we cannot control for as reducing our
sample to the subset of studies containing all four variables would leave us with only five
studies. However, we thoroughly check the influence of each study on the mean effect
and we discuss this point more thoroughly in section 2.5.
A further difficulty are studies that use ordinal covariates such as income or age
categories, or educational degrees. Naturally, the number of categories and the interval
borders are seldom identical across studies and, hence, we need to find a mean effect
across all categories, whilst still preserving any eventual non-linear effect of the variable.
We solve this problem in the following way:
 Only one study uses income categories and, as our theoretical model and most
studies assume a linear effect of income, we calculate the weighted mean effect
across all income categories.5
 Many studies report a non-linear influence of age, and either include a quadratic
age term or several age categories. As a non-linear influence of age is plausible,
also from the point of view of our theoretical model, we resume the estimates (also
linear estimates) into estimates for three age categories: young, 18–35 (base line),
middle-age, 36–55, and old-age, > 55.
 In the case of education, most studies differentiate between households with or
without a college degree. We maintain this distinction and calculate the effect of a
college versus non-college degree, with the latter as the base category. For studies
that use a different base category, we re-base the categories to fit our narrative.
 Household size is predominately included as a count data variable assuming a linear
5 β¯ = 1K ∑k
(
βk−βk−1
Ak−Ak−1
)
, with K the number of categories k = 1, . . . ,K, and Ak the mid-range value of
category k.
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effect. For the few studies that use categories for household size, we calculate the
weighted mean effect across all categories (same approach as in income).
Finally, in order to overcome the problem of different units of measurement for both the
endogenous variable and the covariates, we calculate the semi-elasticity of the marginal
effect for the continuous variables (income and household size) in studies of category (i)
and the elasticity for each of these two variables in studies of type (ii) at the sample
mean.6 For the categorical variables (age and education), we calculate the effect at
the sample mean. In order to calculate approximate standard errors of the calculated
(semi-)elasticities, we first applied the delta-method (Greene, 2012) at the sample mean.
However, as none of the included studies published the covariance matrix of the estimated
parameters, we had to set the covariances in the variance-covariance matrix to zero. Tests
showed that the calculated standard errors proved to be too far off the mark. Hence, we
decided instead to disregard the variance of φ(Xβ ) for probit analyses and the variance of
p(1− p) for logit analyses because the inclusion of these terms requires the non-available
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates. As such, this approximation of the standard
errors of the calculated elasticities then only requires the standard error (or t-value) of
the estimated parameter and not the non-available covariance matrix.
A number of studies do not report summary statistics and/or the standard errors of
their estimates or only measure pairwise correlations between the endogenous variable
and household characteristics, which means that we, unfortunately, had to remove these
studies from the meta-analysis, although we include the direction of the measured effects
in our discussion.7 However, a number of the remaining studies conduct analyses on
6For studies of category (i): the semi-elasticity of ‘income’ and ‘household size’ is calculated as εxi =
∂ p(y = 1)
∂xi
· x¯i, with y the binary dependent variable, and xi the continuous explanatory variable, as
well as x¯i the sample mean of the continuous explanatory variable. The effect of ‘age’ and ‘education’
is calculated as ∆y = p(y = 1|xi = Ak)− p(y = 1|xi = Abase), with k the respective category. For studies
of category (ii): the elasticity of ‘income’ and ‘household size’ is calculated as εxi =
∂y
∂xi
· x¯i
y¯
and the
effect of ‘age’ and ‘education’ as ∆y =
y(xi = Ak)− y(xi = Abase)
y¯
.
7Studies not included in the meta-analysis are: Powers et al. (1992); Gamtessa (2013); Houde (2014);
54
2.4 Analysis
multiple cases, which boosts the number of observations in our meta-analysis.8 Our final
Exp = dummy variable experimental study, Inv = investment category.
Figure 2.1: Semi-elasticities for income, binary outcome
sample contains 13 articles, with a total of 22 observations for income; 21 observations
for age; 12 observations for education; and 14 observations for household size.
We use the fixed-effects estimator from the add-on package ‘metafor’ (Viechtbauer,
2010) to the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017), estimating the mean effect
weighted by the standard errors of the estimates across all studies. We also test the
influence of two moderators: ‘experiment’ and ‘investment’, measuring the effect of ex-
Fowlie et al. (2015); Davis and Metcalf (2016).
8One could argue that by using multiple cases from the same study, estimates are no longer independent
observations, which would require a hierarchical model to estimate the mean effect. However, all
studies that report results from multiple cases base their estimates on different sub-samples from their
target population, which means that independence between observations might not be completely
fulfilled, although correlations across observations are expected to be reasonably low.
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Figure 2.2: Elasticities for income, continuous outcome
perimental data (0 = ’no experiment’, 1 = ‘experiment’) and the investment level (1 =
’medium’ – mainly appliances – and 2 = ’high’ – mainly retrofit investments) on the
magnitude of the (semi-)elasticities, respectively.
Figures 2.1–2.10 report the results for the weighted mean effects of the semi-elasticities
and elasticities, as well as the respective semi-elasticities and elasticities and the associ-
ated 95% confidence intervals for each included study.
Figure 2.3: Semi-elasticities for medium-age (35–55), binary outcome
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Figure 2.4: Elasticities for medium-age (35–55), continuous outcome
Table 2.3 reports the effects of the two moderators for each of the 5 models. Unfor-
tunately, our data does not contain enough information to allow us to test all possible
combinations of moderator effects. Additionally, some combinations contain very few
observations. Results from estimations with fewer than 4 observations have been omit-
ted.
As the dependent variables do not always follow a normal distribution, we adopt the
approach suggested by Viechtbauer (2010) and also calculate exact permutation tests in
order to ensure valid and more conservative p-values (see Table 2.8 in the appendix).
In order to identify influential observations in the estimation of the mean effects, we
compare the z-standardised residuals, Cook’s distance, and the calculated weights of each
observation for each estimation model. Results from Hasset and Metcalf (1995) have a
considerable influence on the fixed-effect estimate of the semi-elasticity for income as
the estimate from this study has a relatively small standard error. Results from Murray
and Mills (2011) and Ward et al. (2011) have a considerable influence on the fixed-effect
estimates of the old-age and education effect. None of these influences vanish when
moderators are included.
To check the de facto effect of these studies on the magnitude of the fixed-effect
estimates, we follow Viechtbauer (2010) and conduct a leave-one-out analysis, where
each study is omitted from the estimation in turn (see Table 2.6 for details). Overall,
the results are remarkably stable over all subsets of the studies. However, the impact
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Figure 2.5: Semi-elasticities for old-age (> 55 years), binary outcome
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Figure 2.6: Elasticities for old-age (> 55 years), continuous outcome
of Hasset and Metcalf (1995) on income and Murray and Mills (2011) and Ward et al.
(2011) on the fixed-effect estimates of age are still obvious. As all three studies report
very low standard errors for their estimates, we are reluctant to remove these studies
from our analysis.
Finally, in order to check the normality of the residuals from the models that include
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Figure 2.7: Semi-elasticities for education, binary outcome
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Figure 2.8: Elasticities for education, continuous outcome
moderators, we plot the residuals in a Q-Q plot (see Figure 2.11). The plots show
that almost all models have residual distributions with heavy tails, revealing that some
observations still markedly deviate from the mean, which indicates that our moderators
might be insufficient to capture all the systematic variance in the elasticities (dependent
variables) and that other factors might affect the deviation of these observations from
the mean effect.
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Figure 2.9: Semi-elasticities for household size, binary outcome
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Figure 2.10: Elasticities for household size, continuous outcome
2.5 Discussion
We set out with the goal to identify the existence of clear patterns across four frequently
used and easily observable household characteristics (income, age, education, and house-
hold size) that can be exploited to design and model heterogeneous energy efficiency
policies. Our results confirm to some extent the existence of patterns in the effects of
the four variables across the included studies.
However, as discussed in the previous section, the fact that the fixed-effects estimates
are based on different subsets of the studies – with the exception of middle-age and
old-age – means that a direct comparison of the magnitude of the different effects would
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Table 2.3: The influence of moderators (experimental study and investment level)
(a) Income, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.32 -0.01 0.02
investment: 2 -0.01 0.01 -0.92 0.36 -0.02 0.01
(b) Income, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.70 0.28 2.46 0.01 0.14 1.25
experiment: 1 -0.70 0.28 -2.48 0.01 -1.25 -0.15
investment: 2 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.80 -0.02 0.03
(c) Mid-age (45), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.01 0.00 8.21 0.00 0.01 0.01
investment: 2 -0.01 0.00 -3.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(d) Old-age (70), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.01 0.08 -0.19 0.85 -0.16 0.13
investment: 2 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.81 -0.13 0.17
(e) Old-age (70), continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.23 0.16 -1.49 0.14 -0.54 0.07
experiment: 1 0.09 0.15 0.58 0.57 -0.21 0.39
investment: 2 0.49 0.14 3.37 0.00 0.20 0.77
(f) Education, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.02 0.01 2.64 0.01 0.01 0.04
investment: 2 0.12 0.16 0.73 0.46 -0.20 0.43
(g) Education, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.01 0.02 -0.37 0.71 -0.05 0.03
investment: 2 0.23 0.14 1.65 0.10 -0.04 0.50
(h) HH size, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.48 -0.00 0.01
investment: 2 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.34 -0.01 0.02
experiment: 0 = no experimental data, 1 = experimental data
investment: 1 = medium scale monetary investment (appliances),
2 = large scale monetary investments (retrofit measures)
be fallacious. Influential studies, e.g., Hasset and Metcalf (1995) or Murray and Mills
(2011), do not include all four variables and, hence, are not included in the estimation
of each of the four effects. Furthermore, we cannot disentangle the weight of their
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estimates in the calculation of the mean effect from the selected model specification. If,
for example, age, education, and income are strongly correlated, estimates from a study
such as Hasset and Metcalf (1995), which only includes income, might get a relatively
small standard error for the income estimate compared to studies that include all three
variables, e.g., Mills and Schleich (2010), and, consequently, will dominate the mean
effect of income much more than the latter9. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings,
we can examine the direction of the mean effect and compare the consistency of the
results for each of the four effects.
Although some results are ambiguous, we can distinguish some tendencies in all four
mean effects. Tendencies that are mirrored in the estimates from the studies not included
in our meta-analysis (see Table 2.1):
 Although we find largely contradictory results for income across the included stud-
ies – sometimes even within the same study – income still displays the least am-
biguous effect of all the four variables; the positive effect of income is confirmed
by the mean effects of studies with binary and those with continuous outcome
variables – although the latter is statistically insignificant (small sample size) (see
Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In the case of the binary studies, a 1% increase in income
increases the propensity to invest in energy efficiency by 0.06%. This effect remains
consistently positive under all combinations of the included studies (see Table 2.6
(a)), which confirms that the positive effect of income is not driven by a single
study, but remains stable irrespective of the specific subset of studies we apply.
Furthermore, four of the five excluded studies confirm a positive effect of income
on the propensity to invest. Hence, we can state that income has a consistent and
positive effect on the propensity to invest.
 Age shows more ambiguous results (see Figures 2.3–2.6). For middle-age (45 years)
9It could be argued that the exclusion of certain household characteristics in some of the studies leads
to omitted variable bias, but we refrain from discussing this further.
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we find a significantly positive result for studies with binary outcome variables. In
comparison to the young group, the likelihood of middle-aged households invest-
ing in energy efficiency increases by 0.62 percentage points. However, for studies
with continuous outcome variables, the effect of being middle-aged is significantly
negative. Compared to the young group, middle-aged households invest 5.57%
less. However, as this effect is only based on two studies, with Ward et al. (2011)
negatively dominating the effect, we discount this finding in favour of the positive
effect from the first set of studies.
The picture looks quite similar for the effect of old-age (70). The mean effect of
the old-age category based on studies with binary outcome variables is significantly
positive. Compared to the young group, households in the old-age category are
0.4 percentage points more likely to invest in energy efficiency. A simple Wald
test confirms that for studies with a binary outcome variable, the effect of old-age
is significantly smaller than the effect of middle-age, which hints at an inverted
U-shape effect for age. The effect of old-age based on studies with continuous
outcome variables is negative, though statistically insignificant.
For studies with binary outcome variables, both effects remain positive and stable
under all combinations of the included studies (see Table 2.6 (c) and (e)). However,
the negative effect of old-age for studies with continuous outcome variables persists
in all combinations of included studies but one (see Table 2.6 (f)), which strongly
indicates that the negative effect of this subset is mainly driven by the results from
Ward et al. (2011).
The five excluded studies show ambiguous results with a tendency towards a posi-
tive effect, which complements the overall picture of a tendentially positive, albeit
non-linear, effect for age.
 Education shows a distinctively positive effect in studies with a binary outcome
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variable; on average a college educated household will be 2.5 percentage points more
likely to invest in energy efficiency compared to a non-college educated household.
For studies with continuous outcome variables, however, this effect is reversed;
college educated households invest 4.3 % less than non-college educated households.
However, this effect is statistically insignificant. Of the five excluded studies, three
confirm a positive effect of education. Hence, we carefully conclude that college
education tends to have a positive effect on the propensity to invest.
 Finally, household size has the most ambiguous effect of all four variables. The
mean effect of household size for studies with binary outcome variables is positive,
albeit statistically insignificant. For studies with a continuous outcome variable,
the effect is statistically significant and negative. A 1% increase in household size
leads to a 7% decrease in investments. However, this result is based on cases from
a single study (Long, 1993) and should, therefore, be interpreted with care.
The results in Tables 2.6 (g) and (h) show that the positive and the negative
effects are consistent across all combinations of the included studies. This seems
to indicate that household size has a dual effect on the propensity to invest, in the
sense that household size might increase the likelihood of adopting energy efficient
appliances or retrofitting measures, but might decrease the amount spent on such
measures.
The five excluded studies confirm a negative effect of household size on the propen-
sity to invest. We, therefore, carefully conclude that household size displays a weak
tendency to influence the propensity to invest negatively.
We now turn to the hypothesis derived in section 2.3. Table 2.5 compares each hy-
pothesis to the results from the mean effect as well as the effects of the moderators from
Table 2.3. As can be seen in Table 2.3, most estimates for ’investment’ are statistically
insignificant, and the few significant effects vanish when we use the more conservative
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Table 2.5: Comparison of hypotheses with empirical results
Hypotheses Results Confirmed?
Hyp 1 A household’s propen-
sity to invest will increase with
income for capital intensive in-
vestments.
Positive effect of income on
both adoption and investment
sum. No impact of investment
category on income elasticities.
Partly
Hyp 2 The effect of age on the
likelihood of a household to in-
vest in energy efficiency mea-
sures is ambiguous for capital-
intensive investments with long
amortisation periods.
Positive and non-linear effect
of age on adoption. Ambigu-
ous effect of investment sum.
Higher investment category sig-
nificantly reduces likelihood of
participation for middle-age,
but increases semi-elasticity of
investment sum for old-age.
However, estimates for old-
age are lower than for mid-
age, which indicates decreasing
propensity to invest from a cer-
tain age onwards.
Partly
Hyp 3 Education is expected
to increase the propensity to in-
vest in energy efficiency mea-
sures, particularly if the amor-
tisation period is long.
The impact of education tends
to be positive for adoption, but
negative for investment sum.
However, the effect of income on
investment sum is more positive
for a high level of investment.
Partly
Hyp 4 The effect of house-
hold size on the likelihood of
a household to invest in en-
ergy efficiency measures is am-
biguous for capital-intensive in-
vestments, but positive for less
capital-intensive investments.
Negative effect of household size
on investment sum, but positive
effect on adoption. However,
there is no significant effect of
investment level on likelihood of
adoption.
Partly
permutation test (see Table 2.8). Furthermore, the few significant effects seem to con-
tradict our theoretical assumptions (see effects age-middle and age-old). However, given
the limited number of observations in our analyses, these results should be interpreted
with care. Although we only include up to two moderators in our analyses, many com-
binations have too few observations or not enough variation in the moderators to return
meaningful results (see Figures 2.1-2.10). Although we cannot confidently fully reject or
confirm the hypotheses based on our results, we can conclude that our results support
the derived hypotheses to some extent. However, our results cannot confirm a qualitative
distinction of the effects of the four household characteristics with regard to the mag-
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nitude of the energy efficiency investment, i.e., we find no confirmation that household
characteristics have a different impact for larger energy efficiency investments compared
to smaller energy efficiency investments.
2.6 Conclusion
Our results indicate that some patterns exist across the four investigated household
characteristics. However, the results show that the limiting factor in our analysis is still
the number of observations. Although our largest data set comprises 22 observations,
in total we had to base our study on only 13 articles. A number of studies had to be
removed due to simple reasons such as missing standard errors or t-values, or missing
summary statistics. Naturally, we strongly recommend that these measures are included
in all empirical studies. The limited number of studies puts considerable strain on our
ability to further investigate and explain the partly considerable variance in the estimated
elasticities and semi-elasticities. We, therefore, strongly encourage repetition studies and
further investigations in the field of households’ energy efficiency investment behaviour
in order to augment the volume of available data for future analyses. Currently, we
deem the empirical evidence to be insufficient to support valid policy recommendations
for targeted energy policies.
Although we found a considerable number of studies that investigate adoption or par-
ticipation decisions, we found few studies that investigate the determinants of the actual
investment sums. Adoption of energy efficiency measures or participation in energy effi-
ciency programmes only reveals one side of household heterogeneity with regard to the
energy efficiency gap. If we want to gain a thorough understanding of the lack of house-
holds’ investments in energy efficiency in order to design targeted and tailored energy
policies, we need more information on the determinants of actual investment decisions.
As our results demonstrate, using the decision domain as a proxy for the investment sum
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is too rough a measure to return valid estimates of the correlation between investment
sum and household characteristics. Future work should, therefore, concentrate on the
heterogeneity in the households’ monetary (and non-monetary) costs of energy efficiency
investments.
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Appendix
2.A Effect of income on energy savings
This point becomes more obvious when considering the Slutzky equation in elasticities:
εi,x,px = εci,x,px− si,xεi,x,mi , where εi,x,px is the uncompensated (Marshallian) price elasticity
for energy services of household i; εci,x,px is the compensated (Hicksian) price elasticity for
energy services of household i; si,x is household i’s budget share spent on energy services;
and εi,x,mi is the income elasticity for energy services of household i. As we assume that
energy services are a normal good, the second term on the right will be positive, i.e.,
both terms move in the same direction. Engel’s law states that the budget share spent
on a normal commodity is lower the wealthier the household, hence, the higher y the
lower si,x. Consequently, under the assumption of constant Hicksian price elasticities and
constant income elasticities across all households, the Marshallian price elasticity will be
smaller in absolute terms for wealthier households due to the lower si,x.
However, relaxing the assumption of constant compensated price elasticities and con-
stant income elasticities across all income classes may either reinforce or weaken this
effect. In the case of the income elasticity
εy,i =
∂xe,i
∂yi
yi
pexi
· pe = ∂xe,i∂yi
1
se,i
· pe (2.8)
the overall change depends on whether
∂xe,i
∂yi
decreases faster than
1
se,i
or vice versa,
i.e., the overall change depends on the shape of the Engel curve. On the other hand,
there is no theoretical foundation whatsoever for the effect of income on the Hicksian
price elasticity of demand. Hence, the outcome of relaxing the assumption of a constant
compensated demand elasticity remains an empirical question.
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Table 2.6: Leave-one-out analysis
(a) Income, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
1 0.00063 0.00008 8.01676 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
2 0.00061 0.00008 7.64943 0.00000 0.00045 0.00077
3 0.00063 0.00008 7.92462 0.00000 0.00047 0.00078
4 0.00315 0.00065 4.83720 0.00000 0.00187 0.00442
5 0.00063 0.00008 8.01205 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
6 0.00064 0.00008 8.04016 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
7 0.00064 0.00008 8.02993 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
8 0.00064 0.00008 8.03505 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
9 0.00064 0.00008 8.03296 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
10 0.00064 0.00008 8.03281 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
11 0.00063 0.00008 8.02365 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
12 0.00064 0.00008 8.03458 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
13 0.00064 0.00008 8.03274 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
14 0.00064 0.00008 8.02861 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
15 0.00063 0.00008 8.00698 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
16 0.00064 0.00008 8.04847 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
17 0.00064 0.00008 8.03839 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
18 0.00064 0.00008 8.03509 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
19 0.00064 0.00008 8.03047 0.00000 0.00048 0.00079
(b) Income, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
1 0.00098 0.00100 0.98302 0.32560 -0.00097 0.00293
6 -0.00086 0.01284 -0.06720 0.94643 -0.02602 0.02430
7 0.00101 0.00100 1.00876 0.31309 -0.00095 0.00297
(c) Mid-age (45), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
1 0.00615 0.00081 7.59275 0.00000 0.00456 0.00774
2 0.00735 0.00091 8.10567 0.00000 0.00558 0.00913
3 0.00623 0.00082 7.62539 0.00000 0.00463 0.00783
5 0.00626 0.00081 7.72218 0.00000 0.00467 0.00785
6 0.00603 0.00081 7.42493 0.00000 0.00444 0.00762
7 0.00616 0.00081 7.60591 0.00000 0.00458 0.00775
8 0.00616 0.00081 7.59782 0.00000 0.00457 0.00774
9 0.00616 0.00081 7.60238 0.00000 0.00457 0.00775
10 0.00616 0.00081 7.60024 0.00000 0.00457 0.00775
11 0.00617 0.00081 7.61152 0.00000 0.00458 0.00776
12 0.00761 0.00086 8.83302 0.00000 0.00592 0.00930
13 0.00555 0.00083 6.66115 0.00000 0.00391 0.00718
14 0.00166 0.00128 1.29973 0.19369 -0.00084 0.00416
16 0.00615 0.00081 7.59127 0.00000 0.00456 0.00774
19 0.00628 0.00081 7.72119 0.00000 0.00468 0.00787
(d) Mid-age (45), continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
6 -0.06035 0.01267 -4.76252 0.00000 -0.08518 -0.03551
7 0.24500 0.13100 1.87023 0.06145 -0.01176 0.50176
(e) Old-age (70), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
1 0.00397 0.00198 1.99944 0.04556 0.00008 0.00786
2 0.00753 0.00699 1.07746 0.28128 -0.00617 0.02123
3 0.00377 0.00204 1.84696 0.06475 -0.00023 0.00778
5 0.00455 0.00199 2.29254 0.02187 0.00066 0.00845
6 0.00318 0.00199 1.59557 0.11059 -0.00073 0.00708
7 0.00399 0.00198 2.01377 0.04403 0.00011 0.00788
8 0.00398 0.00198 2.00603 0.04485 0.00009 0.00786
9 0.00399 0.00198 2.01071 0.04436 0.00010 0.00787
10 0.00398 0.00198 2.00852 0.04459 0.00010 0.00787
11 0.00401 0.00198 2.01978 0.04341 0.00012 0.00789
12 0.00399 0.00198 2.01050 0.04438 0.00010 0.00787
13 0.00399 0.00198 2.00961 0.04447 0.00010 0.00787
14 0.00399 0.00198 2.01012 0.04442 0.00010 0.00787
16 0.00393 0.00198 1.97995 0.04771 0.00004 0.00782
19 0.00421 0.00199 2.11283 0.03462 0.00030 0.00811
(f) Old-age (70), continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
2 -0.08634 0.02759 -3.12920 0.00175 -0.14042 -0.03226
3 -0.06231 0.02744 -2.27085 0.02316 -0.11608 -0.00853
4 -0.05229 0.02638 -1.98173 0.04751 -0.10400 -0.00057
5 -0.04025 0.02670 -1.50746 0.13169 -0.09257 0.01208
6 -0.05711 0.02676 -2.13403 0.03284 -0.10956 -0.00466
7 0.26683 0.05306 5.02929 0.00000 0.16285 0.37082
(g) HH size, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
7 0.00314 0.00273 1.14891 0.25059 -0.00221 0.00849
8 0.00337 0.00270 1.24858 0.21182 -0.00192 0.00866
9 0.00344 0.00270 1.27683 0.20166 -0.00184 0.00873
10 0.00285 0.00270 1.05561 0.29115 -0.00244 0.00814
11 0.00258 0.00271 0.95135 0.34143 -0.00273 0.00789
12 0.00282 0.00315 0.89344 0.37162 -0.00336 0.00899
13 0.00387 0.00310 1.25004 0.21129 -0.00220 0.00995
14 0.00467 0.00310 1.50657 0.13192 -0.00141 0.01075
15 0.00217 0.00293 0.73954 0.45958 -0.00357 0.00790
19 0.00307 0.00269 1.14357 0.25280 -0.00219 0.00834
(h) HH size, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
2 -0.03769 0.04037 -0.93364 0.35049 -0.11682 0.04143
3 -0.08889 0.03886 -2.28715 0.02219 -0.16506 -0.01272
4 -0.09023 0.03122 -2.89025 0.00385 -0.15141 -0.02904
5 -0.06592 0.03229 -2.04114 0.04124 -0.12921 -0.00262
(i) Education, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
7 0.02096 0.01245 1.68335 0.09231 -0.00344 0.04537
8 0.02396 0.00988 2.42587 0.01527 0.00460 0.04331
9 0.02681 0.00967 2.77253 0.00556 0.00786 0.04576
10 0.02655 0.00995 2.66739 0.00764 0.00704 0.04605
11 0.02574 0.01066 2.41493 0.01574 0.00485 0.04664
19 0.02460 0.00931 2.64137 0.00826 0.00635 0.04286
(j) Education, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
6 -0.00796 0.02154 -0.36972 0.71159 -0.05017 0.03425
7 0.22250 0.13800 1.61232 0.10689 -0.04798 0.49298
74
2.B Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.8: The influence of moderators using permutation tests (experimental study and
investment level)
(a) Income, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.32 -0.01 0.02
investment: 2 -0.01 0.01 -0.92 0.36 -0.02 0.01
(b) Income, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.70 0.28 2.46 1.00 0.14 1.25
experiment: 1 -0.70 0.28 -2.48 0.67 -1.25 -0.15
investment: 2 0.00 0.01 0.26 1.00 -0.02 0.03
(c) Mid-age (45), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.01 0.00 8.21 0.23 0.01 0.01
investment: 2 -0.01 0.00 -3.21 0.45 -0.01 -0.00
(d) Old-age (70), binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.01 0.08 -0.19 0.98 -0.16 0.13
investment: 2 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.88 -0.13 0.17
(e) Old-age (70), continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.23 0.16 -1.49 0.77 -0.54 0.07
experiment: 1 0.09 0.15 0.58 0.90 -0.21 0.39
investment: 2 0.49 0.14 3.37 0.27 0.20 0.77
(f) Education, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.02 0.01 2.64 0.50 0.01 0.04
investment: 2 0.12 0.16 0.73 0.17 -0.20 0.43
(g) Education, continuous outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt -0.01 0.02 -0.37 1.00 -0.05 0.03
investment: 2 0.23 0.14 1.65 1.00 -0.04 0.50
(h) HH size, binary outcome
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
intrcpt 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.89 -0.00 0.01
investment: 2 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.24 -0.01 0.02
experiment: 0 = no experimental data, 1 = experimental data
investment: 1 = medium scale monetary investment (appliances),
2 = large scale monetary investments (retrofit measures)
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Figure 2.11: Residual Q-Q plots - regressions with moderators
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Chapter 3 Interval Regression with Sample Selection
This vignette derives the econometric specification used to program the Interval Re-
gression estimator with sample selection as part of the sampleSelection package (Toomet
and Henningsen, 2008) in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017). The specifi-
cation finds a practical application in Petersen et al. (2017) (see Chapter 4).
3.1 Model Specification
We formulate a general specification of an interval regression model with sample selection
as follows:
yS∗i = β
S′xSi + ε
S
i (3.1)
ySi =

0 if yS∗i ≤ 0
1 otherwise
(3.2)
yO∗i = β
O′xOi + ε
O
i (3.3)
yOi =

unknown if ySi = 0
1 if α1 < yO∗i ≤ α2 and ySi = 1
2 if α2 < yO∗i ≤ α3 and ySi = 1
...
M if αM < yO∗i ≤ αM+1 and ySi = 1
(3.4)
 εSi
εOi
∼ N2

 0
0
 ,
 1 ρσ
ρσ σ2

 , (3.5)
where subscript i indicates the observation, yO∗i is a latent outcome variable, y
O
i is a
partially observed categorical variable that indicates in which interval yO∗i lies, M is the
number of intervals, α1, . . . ,αM+1 are the boundaries of the intervals (whereas frequently
but not necessarily α1 =−∞ and αM+1 =∞), ySi is a binary variable that indicates whether
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yOi is observed, y
S∗
i is a latent variable that indicates the “tendency” that y
S
i is one, x
S
i
and xOi are (column) vectors of explanatory variables for the selection equation and
outcome equation, respectively, εSi and εOi are random disturbance terms that have a
joint bivariate normal distribution, and β S and β O are (column) vectors and ρ and σ
are scalars of unknown model parameters.
3.2 Log-Likelihood Function
Based on the general specification above we derive probabilities for the different possible
outcomes, and the log-likelihood function for the maximum likelihood estimator.
The probability that yOi is unobserved is:
P
(
ySi = 0
)
= P
(
yS∗i ≤ 0
)
(3.6)
= P
(
β S
′
xSi + ε
S
i ≤ 0
)
(3.7)
= P
(
εSi ≤−β S
′
xSi
)
(3.8)
The probability that yOi is observed and indicates that y
O∗
i lies in the mth interval is:
P
(
ySi = 1∧ yOi = m
)
= P
(
yS∗i > 0∧αm < yO∗i ≤ αm+1
)
(3.9)
= P
(
β S
′
xSi + ε
S
i > 0∧αm < β O
′
xOi + ε
O
i ≤ αm+1
)
(3.10)
= P
(
εSi >−β S
′
xSi ∧αm−β O
′
xOi < ε
O
i ≤ αm+1−β O
′
xOi
)
(3.11)
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The log-likelihood contribution of the ith observation is:
`i =(1− ySi ) ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)]
(3.12)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)]
,
where Φ(.) indicates the cumulative distribution function of the univariate standard nor-
mal distribution and Φ2(.) indicates the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate
standard normal distribution.
3.3 Restricting coefficients ρ and σ
The parameter ρ needs to be in the interval (−1,1). In order to restrict ρ to be in
this interval, we estimate arctanh(ρ) instead of ρ so that the derived parameter ρ =
tanh(arctanh(ρ)) is always in the interval (−1,1). We use the delta method to calculate
approximate standard errors of the derived parameter ρ, whereas the corresponding
element of the Jacobian matrix is:
∂ tanh(arctanh(ρ))
∂ arctanh(ρ)
=
∂ρ
∂ arctanh(ρ)
= (1+ρ2) (3.13)
The parameter σ needs to be strictly positive, i.e. σ > 0. In order to restrict σ to be
strictly positive, we estimate log(σ) instead of σ or σ2 so that the derived parameters
σ = exp(log(σ)) and σ2 = exp(2 log(σ)) are always strictly positive. We use the delta
method to calculate approximate standard errors of the derived parameters σ and σ2,
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whereas the corresponding elements of the Jacobian matrix are:
∂ exp(log(σ))
∂ log(σ)
= exp(log(σ)) = σ (3.14)
∂ exp(2 log(σ))
∂ log(σ)
= 2 exp(2 log(σ)) = 2 σ2 (3.15)
3.4 Gradients of the CDF of the bivariate standard normal
distribution
In order to facilitate the calculation of the gradients of the log-likelihood function, we
calculate the partial derivatives of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
bivariate standard normal distribution:
Φ2(x1,x2,ρ) =
∫ x2
−∞
∫ x1
−∞
φ2(a1,a2,ρ) da1 da2, (3.16)
where φ2(.) is the probability density function (PDF) of the bivariate standard normal
distribution:
φ2(x1,x2,ρ) =
1
2pi
√
1−ρ2 · exp
(
−x
2
1−2ρx1x2 + x22
2(1−ρ2)
)
(3.17)
In the following, we check equation (3.17) by a simple numerical example:
> library( "mvtnorm" )
> library( "maxLik" )
> x1 <- 0.4
> x2 <- -0.3
> rho <- -0.6
> sigma <- matrix( c( 1, rho, rho, 1 ), nrow = 2 )
> dens <- dmvnorm( c( x1, x2 ), sigma = sigma )
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> print( dens )
[1] 0.1831324
> all.equal( dens, ( 2 * pi * sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) )^(-1) *
+ exp( - ( x1^2 - 2 * rho * x1 * x2 + x2^2 ) / ( 2 * ( 1 - rho^2 ) ) ) )
[1] TRUE
3.4.1 Gradients with respect to the limits (x1 and x2)
∂Φ2(x1,x2,ρ)
∂x2
=
∫ x1
−∞
φ2(a1,x2,ρ) da1 (3.18)
=
∫ x1
−∞
φ(a1|x2,ρ)φ(x2) da1 (3.19)
=
∫ x1
−∞
φ˜
(
a1,ρx2,1−ρ2
)
φ(x2) da1 (3.20)
=
∫ x1
−∞
φ
(
a1−ρx2√
1−ρ2
)(√
1−ρ2
)−1
φ(x2) da1 (3.21)
=
∫ x1
−∞
φ
(
a1−ρx2√
1−ρ2
)(√
1−ρ2
)−1
da1 φ(x2) (3.22)
=
∫ x1−ρx2√
1−ρ2
−∞
φ(a1) da1 φ(x2) (3.23)
=Φ
(
x1−ρx2√
1−ρ2
)
φ(x2), (3.24)
where φ˜( ,µ,σ2) indicates the density function of a normal distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2.
In the following, we use the same simple numerical example as in the beginning of
section 3.4 to check the above derivations. First, we check whether the PDF of the
bivariate standard normal distribution, i.e. φ2(x1,x2,ρ) (part of equation 3.18), is equal
to φ˜
(
x1,ρx2,1−ρ2
)
φ(x2) (part of equation 3.20) and equal to φ
(
(x1−ρx2)/(
√
1−ρ2)
)
(√
1−ρ2
)−1
φ(x2) (part of equations 3.21 and 3.22):
82
3.4 Gradients of the CDF of the bivariate standard normal distribution
> all.equal( dens, dnorm( x1, rho * x2, sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) * dnorm(x2) )
[1] TRUE
> all.equal( dens, ( dnorm( ( x1 - rho * x2 ) / sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) /
+ sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) * dnorm(x2) )
[1] TRUE
In the following, we will numerically calculate the derivative of the cumulative distribu-
tion function of the bivariate normal distribution (equation 3.16) with respect to x2 and
check whether this partial derivative is equal to the right-hand sides of equations 3.18,
3.21, 3.22, and 3.24:
> funX2 <- function( a2 ) {
+ prob <- pmvnorm( upper = c( x1, a2 ), sigma = sigma )
+ return( prob )
+ }
> grad <- c( numericGradient( funX2, x2 ) )
> print( grad )
[1] 0.2320142
> funX1 <- function( a1 ) {
+ dens <- rep( NA, length( a1 ) )
+ for( i in 1:length( a1 ) ) {
+ dens[i] <- dmvnorm( c( a1[i], x2 ), sigma = sigma )
+ }
+ return( dens )
+ }
> all.equal( grad, integrate( funX1, lower = -Inf, upper = x1 )$value )
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[1] TRUE
> funX1a <- function( a1 ) {
+ dens <- rep( NA, length( a1 ) )
+ for( i in 1:length( a1 ) ) {
+ dens[i] <- ( dnorm( ( a1[i] - rho * x2 ) / sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) /
+ sqrt(1-rho^2) ) * dnorm(x2)
+ }
+ return( dens )
+ }
> all.equal( grad, integrate( funX1a, lower = -Inf, upper = x1 )$value )
[1] TRUE
> funX1b <- function( a1 ) {
+ dens <- rep( NA, length( a1 ) )
+ for( i in 1:length( a1 ) ) {
+ dens[i] <- dnorm( ( a1[i] - rho * x2 ) / sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) /
+ sqrt(1-rho^2)
+ }
+ return( dens )
+ }
> all.equal( grad,
+ integrate( funX1b, lower = -Inf, upper = x1 )$value * dnorm(x2) )
[1] TRUE
> all.equal( grad,
+ pnorm( ( x1 - rho * x2 ) / sqrt( 1 - rho^2 ) ) * dnorm( x2 ) )
[1] TRUE
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3.4.2 Gradients with respect to the coefficient of correlation (ρ)
∂Φ2(x1,x2,ρ)
∂ρ
(3.25)
=
∂
[∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞ φ2(a1,a2,ρ) da2 da1
]
∂ρ
(3.26)
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
∂φ2(a1,a2,ρ)
∂ρ
da2 da1 (3.27)
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
∂
∂ρ
exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
2pi
√
1−ρ2
 da2 da1 (3.28)
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi
∂
∂ρ
exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
√
1−ρ2
 da2 da1 (3.29)
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi

∂
∂ρ
(
exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
))
·
√
1−ρ2
1−ρ2 (3.30)
−
∂
∂ρ
(
√
1−ρ2) · exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
1−ρ2
 da2 da1
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=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi

∂
∂ρ
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
·
√
1−ρ2
1−ρ2 (3.31)
−
(
− ρ√
1−ρ2
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
1−ρ2
 da2 da1
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi

(−4ρ(a21−2ρa1a2 +a22)−2(1−ρ2)(−2a1a2))
4(1−ρ2)2 · exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
·
√
1−ρ2
1−ρ2
(3.32)
−
(
− ρ√
1−ρ2
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
1−ρ2
 da2 da1
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi

(−4ρ(a21−2ρa1a2 +a22)−2(1−ρ2)(−2a1a2))
4(1−ρ2)2 ·
√
1−ρ2
1−ρ2 −
(
− ρ√
1−ρ2
)
1−ρ2

(3.33)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da2 da1
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi
((−4ρ(a21−2ρa1a2 +a22)−2(1−ρ2)(−2a1a2))
4(1−ρ2) 53
+
ρ
(1−ρ2) 32
)
(3.34)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da2 da1
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=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi
((−4ρ(a21−2ρa1a2 +a22)−2(1−ρ2)(−2a1a2))
4(1−ρ2) 52
+
ρ
(1−ρ2) 32
)
(3.35)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da2 da1
=
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
1
2pi
(
ρ
(1−ρ2) 32
− ρ(a
2
1−ρa1a2 +a22)−a1a2
(1−ρ2) 52
)
(3.36)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da2 da1
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∫ x1
−∞
∫ x2
−∞
(
ρ
1−ρ2 −
ρ(a21−ρa1a2 +a22)−a1a2
(1−ρ2)2
)
(3.37)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da2 da1
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∫ x1
−∞
∣∣∣∣(−2a1−2ρa22(1−ρ2)
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)∣∣∣∣x2
−∞
da1 (3.38)
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∫ x1
−∞
((
−2a1−2ρx2
2(1−ρ2)
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1x2 + x22
2(1−ρ2)
)
(3.39)
− lim
a2→−∞
1
2(1−ρ2)
−2a1 +2ρa2
exp
(
a21−2ρa1a2 +a22
2(1−ρ2)
)
 da1
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Applying L’Hospital on the last term leads to
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∫ x1
−∞
((
−2a1−2ρx2
2(1−ρ2)
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1x2 + x22
2(1−ρ2)
)
−0
)
da1 (3.40)
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∫ x1
−∞
(
−2a1−2ρx2
2(1−ρ2)
)
· exp
(
−a
2
1−2ρa1x2 + x22
2(1−ρ2)
)
da1 (3.41)
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2)
∣∣∣∣exp(−a21−2ρa1x2 + x222(1−ρ2)
)∣∣∣∣x1
−∞
(3.42)
=
1
2pi
√
(1−ρ2) · exp
(
−x
2
1−2ρx1x2 + x22
2(1−ρ2)
)
(3.43)
=φ2(x1,x2,ρ) (3.44)
This result is in line with Sibuya (1960) and Sungur (1990).
In the following, we will numerically calculate the derivative of the cumulative distri-
bution function of the bivariate normal distribution (equation 3.26) with respect to ρ
and check whether this partial derivative is equal to the right-hand sides of equation 3.44:
> # Numerical gradient of the PDF w.r.t. rho
> funrho <- function( p ) {
+ prob <- dmvnorm( x = c( x1, x2 ),
+ sigma = matrix( c( 1, p, p, 1 ), nrow = 2 ) )
+ return( prob )
+ }
> grad <- c( numericGradient( funrho, rho ) )
> print( grad )
[1] -0.1775883
> # Comparison with analytical gradient for rho
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> efun <- exp(-(x1^2 - 2 * rho * x1 * x2 + x2^2)/(2*(1 - rho^2)))
> all.equal( grad,
+ ( (-((2*rho*(-2*rho*x1*x2+x1^2+x2^2) - 2*x1*x2*(1-rho^2)) * efun)/
+ (2*(1-rho^2)^(3/2) )) +
+ ((rho*efun)/(sqrt(1-rho^2))) ) /
+ (2*pi*(1-rho^2)) )
[1] TRUE
> #Eq29
> all.equal(grad,
+ (1/(2*pi)) * (
+ ((((-4*rho*(x1^2-2*rho*x1*x2+x2^2)-2*(1-rho^2)*(-2*x1*x2))/(4*(1-rho^2)^2)) *
+ efun * sqrt(1-rho^2))/(1-rho^2)) -
+ ((-(rho/(sqrt(1-rho^2)))*efun)/(1-rho^2))
+ ))
[1] TRUE
> #Eq33
> all.equal(grad,
+ (1/(2*pi)) *
+ ((rho/((1-rho^2)^(3/2))) - ((rho*(x1^2-rho*x1*x2+x2^2)-x1*x2)/
+ ((1-rho^2)^(5/2)))) * efun
+ )
[1] TRUE
> #Eq34
> all.equal(grad,
89
Chapter 3 Interval Regression with Sample Selection
+ (1/(2*pi*sqrt(1-rho^2))) *
+ (((rho/(1-rho^2)) - ((rho*(x1^2-rho*x1*x2+x2^2)-x1*x2)/
+ ((1-rho^2)^2))) * efun)
+ )
[1] TRUE
>
>
> # Numerical gradient of the CDF w.r.t. rho
> cdfRho <- function( p, xa = x1, xb = x2 ) {
+ prob <- pmvnorm( upper = c( xa, xb ),
+ sigma = matrix( c( 1, p, p, 1 ), nrow = 2 ) )
+ return( prob )
+ }
> grad <- c( numericGradient( cdfRho, rho ) )
> print( grad )
[1] 0.1831324
> # comparison with analytical gradient
> all.equal( grad, dmvnorm( x = c( x1, x2 ),
+ sigma = matrix( c( 1, rho, rho, 1 ), nrow = 2 ) ) )
[1] TRUE
> # comparisons with other values
> compDerivRho <- function( xa, xb, p ) {
+ dn <- c( numericGradient( cdfRho, p, xa = xa, xb = xb ) )
+ da <- dmvnorm( x = c( xa, xb ),
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+ sigma = matrix( c( 1, p, p, 1 ), nrow = 2 ) )
+ return( all.equal( dn, da ) )
+ }
> compDerivRho( x1, x2, rho )
[1] TRUE
> compDerivRho( 0.5, x2, rho )
[1] TRUE
> compDerivRho( 2.5, x2, rho )
[1] TRUE
> compDerivRho( x1, -2, rho )
[1] TRUE
> compDerivRho( x1, x2, 0.2 )
[1] TRUE
> compDerivRho( x1, x2, 0.98 )
[1] TRUE
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3.5 Gradients of the Log-Likelihood Function
3.5.1 Gradients with respect to the parameters in the self-selection decision
(β S)
First, we use equation 3.24, to determine the derivative of the bivariate standard normal
distribution with respect to the parameter β S as part of the loglikelihood function:
∂Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂β S
=Φ
 αm−β O ′xOiσ −ρβ S′xSi√
1−ρ2
φ(β S′xSi ) · ∂β S′xSi∂β S (3.45)
=Φ
 αm−β O ′xOiσ +ρβ S′xSi√
1−ρ2
φ(β S′xSi ) · xSi (3.46)
Using this result we can now derive the gradient for β S in the log-likelihood function:
∂`i
∂β S
=
∂
∂β S
(
(1− ySi ) ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)]
(3.47)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
= (1− ySi )
∂
∂β S
(
ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)])
(3.48)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂
∂β S
(
ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
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= (1− ySi )
φ
(
−β S′xSi
)
· (−xSi )
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
) (3.49)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂Φ2
(
αm+1−βO
′
xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂β S −
∂Φ2
(
αm−βO ′xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂β S
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
= (1− ySi )
φ
(
−β S′xSi
)
· (−xSi )
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
) (3.50)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
1
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
Φ
 αm+1−β O ′xOiσ +ρβ S′xSi√
1−ρ2
φ (β S′xSi ) · xSi
− Φ
 αm−β O ′xOiσ +ρβ S′xSi )√
1−ρ2
φ (β S′xSi ) · xSi

= (1− ySi )
φ
(
−β S′xSi
)
· (−xSi )
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
) (3.51)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
(
Φ
(
αm+1−βO
′
xOi
σ +ρβ
S ′xSi√
1−ρ2
)
−Φ
(
αm−βO ′xOi
σ +ρβ
S ′xSi√
1−ρ2
))
φ
(
β S
′
xSi
)
· xSi
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
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3.5.2 Gradients with respect to the parameters in the outcome decision
(β O)
Analogous to β S and by using equation 3.24 we derive the gradient of β O:
∂Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂βO
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
·
(
−x
O
i
σ
)
(3.52)
Using this result we derive the gradient for the outcome parameter β O for the log-
likelihood function:
∂`i
∂βO
=
∂
∂βO
(
(1− ySi ) ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)]
(3.53)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂
∂βO
(
ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
(3.54)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
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=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂Φ2
(
αm+1−βO
′
xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂βO −
∂Φ2
(
αm−βO ′xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂βO
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.55)
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ·
1
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.56)
Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm+1−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
)
·
(
−x
O
i
σ
)
−Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
·
(
−x
O
i
σ
)
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ·
1
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.57)
Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm+1−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
)
−Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
) ·(−xOi
σ
)
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3.5.3 Gradients with respect to the coefficient of correlation (ρ)
Given the result that the derivative of the CDF with respect to ρ is equal to the PDF
(see equation 3.44), we can also derive the gradient of the correlation parameter (ρ):
∂`i
∂ρ
=
∂
∂ρ
(
(1− ySi ) ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)]
(3.58)
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂
∂ρ
(
ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
(3.59)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)])
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.60)
As we estimate arctan(ρ) to ensure that ρ is always in the interval (-1,1), we have to
adjust the gradient accordingly:
∂`i
∂ arctanh(ρ)
=
∂`i
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂ arctanh(ρ)
=
∂`i
∂ρ
(1−ρ2) (3.61)
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3.5.4 Gradients with respect to the standard deviation used for
normalisation (σ)
Finally, we derive the gradient for σ in the same way as we did for β S and βO, by first
calculating the derivative of the bivariate cdf with respect to σ :
∂Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂σ
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
· β
O′xOi −αm
σ2
(3.62)
lim
αm→∞
∂Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂σ
= lim
αm→∞
Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
· β
O′xOi −αm
σ2
(3.63)
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
 lim
αm→∞
φ
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
· β
O′xOi −αm
σ2
(3.64)
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
 lim
αm→∞
β O
′
xOi −αm
σ2(
φ
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
))−1 (3.65)
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
 (3.66)
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αm→∞
− 1σ2
−
(
φ
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
))−2(
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O ′xOi
σ
)
φ
(
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σ
)
1
σ
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=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
 lim
αm→∞
− 1σ(
φ
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
))−1
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
(3.67)
=Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
 lim
αm→∞
− 1σ φ
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
)
αm−β O ′xOi
σ
(3.68)
= 0 (3.69)
Similarly, for the negative limes of am:
lim
αm→−∞
∂Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂σ
= 0 (3.70)
We use this result to calculate the derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect
to σ :
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∂
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(
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=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
∂Φ2
(
αm+1−βO
′
xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
)
∂σ −
∂Φ2
(
αm−βO ′xOi
σ ,β
S ′xSi ,−ρ
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∂σ
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.73)
=
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m)
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O ′xOi
σ ,β
S′xSi ,−ρ
) (3.74)
Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm+1−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm+1−β O′xOi
σ
)
· β
O′xOi −αm+1
σ2
− Φ
β S′xSi +ρ αm−β O ′xOiσ√
1−ρ2
φ(αm−β O′xOi
σ
)
· β
O′xOi −αm
σ2

As we estimate log(σ) to ensure that σ is strictly positive, we also have to adjust this
gradient:
∂`i
∂ log(σ)
=
∂`i
∂σ
∂σ
∂ log(σ)
=
∂`i
∂σ
σ (3.75)
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Abstract
We suggest changes in the life situation of private home owners as important drivers of
the decision to have an energy audit and energy retrofit their home. Earlier findings in-
dicate that households seldom conduct renovations solely for energy efficiency purposes,
and that households may be inattentive to the energy properties of their home. Identi-
fying situations in which households are more likely to pay attention to energy matters
and take action could therefore be crucial to improve household response to energy ef-
ficiency programmes. Using a comprehensive data set on participants of a free energy
audit programme and a representative control group of home owners from Sønderborg
municipality in Southern Denmark, we investigate the relation between the initial life
situation and changes in the life situation during the policy period on a household’s de-
cision to (a) participate in the programme and (b) invest into an energy renovation. We
estimate the initial decision to have an energy audit as a weighted probit to account for
uneven representation of audit and non-audit households in our sample. We then analyse
the final investment into energy renovations by estimating an interval regression model
with sample selection to account for an interval coded outcome variable and endogenous
selection into the audit programme. The results suggest that relocation and entering
retirement are significant predictors of joining the audit programme, while including the
current life situation variables does not significantly improve the fit of our estimation
model. Furthermore, relocation and getting married in the policy period are associated
with a higher investment. The results support the notion that timing is important for
reaching private home owners with energy efficiency programmes.
4.1 Introduction
When people perceive a change in their life situation, they are more likely to make as-
pirational changes in their life, sometimes referred to as a Fresh Start Effect (Peetz and
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Wilson, 2012; Dai et al., 2014). Based on this concept we hypothesize that entering
certain life stages could provide an opportunity for policy programmes to reach out to
private households during a time when they are susceptible to new information. We in-
vestigate the influence of four life situational variables of home owners – getting married,
entering retirement, loosing a job, and moving into a new home – on their propensity
to join a free energy audit programme, and the decision to invest in energy renovations.
By testing both the effect of the current life situation and changes in the life situation
we will be able to test our hypothesis of a Fresh Start Effect.
Policy instruments to promote energy efficiency in private households have been pop-
ular since the late 1970’s (Hirst et al., 1981; Hirst and Grady, 1983; Hirst and Goeltz,
1985; Wirtshafter, 1985; Fuller et al., 2010). First set in place as a reaction to the
oil crises, they experienced revived interest as concerns about climate change started
to grow. A large fraction of these programmes comprise some form of a home energy
audit, sometimes coupled with a financial investment incentive (subsidies, loans, and
investment bonuses (Lutzenhiser, 1993; Wilson et al., 2015), or third-party pre-payment
schemes (Miller and Ford, 1985)). Although, the pursuit of post-audit energy invest-
ments is generally high (between 50 to 80% of all participating households conduct at
least one suggested investment) (e.g. Miller and Ford 1985; Stern 1999; Abrahamse et al.
2007; Frondel and Vance 2013; Palmer et al. 2015), the initial uptake of energy efficiency
programmes amongst eligible households is depressingly low (between 0.9 - 8%) (e.g.
Fuller et al. 2010; LaRiviere et al. 2014; Fowlie et al. 2015a,b). This seems remarkable as
Granade et al. (2009) estimate that by 2020, 29 % of the predicted baseline energy use
in buildings could be saved through investments with favourable amortisation periods.
However, it has become increasingly clear over the past three decades that households
face many hurdles and unobserved costs in connection with the realisation of these energy
saving potentials (e.g., Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Davis and Metcalf, 2014; Zivin and
Novan, 2015; Fowlie et al., 2015b; Wilson et al., 2015). In fact, when taking a closer
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look at the many factors that need to be in place for a household to finally invest, the
low uptake numbers are less surprising. In order to finally conduct an energy efficiency
investment, the household needs: to have an energy savings potential that surmounts
the investment costs (Stern, 1992; Hoicka et al., 2014; Palmer et al., 2015; Pettifor et al.,
2015); to be eligible to the energy efficiency programme in place (Hoicka et al., 2014;
Fowlie et al., 2015b); to be informed about the energy efficiency programme (Archer
et al., 1984; Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Pettifor et al., 2015; Palmer and Walls, 2015;
Fowlie et al., 2015b) and to trust the source of information and the agency conducting the
programme (Stern, 1992; Osterhus, 1997; Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2010); and finally,
to be able to conduct the investment financially (Stern et al., 1985; Wilson et al., 2015;
Palmer et al., 2015; Pettifor et al., 2015) and with regard to other limiting factors, such
as time (Palmer et al., 2015; Fowlie et al., 2015b), non-monetary transaction costs (Stern
et al., 1985; Palmer et al., 2015), and personal or social norms (Wilson and Dowlatabadi,
2007).
Recent work by Palmer and Walls (2015) highlights the role of household inattention
to the energy properties of their dwelling in the decision to have an energy audit. Home
owners that score high on an inattentiveness indicator are much less likely to have an
energy audit, which suggests that those most affected by an information gap are in fact
less likely to seek out additional information. Inattentiveness to the energy properties
of ones home may also explain why energy renovations are rarely motivated by energy
efficiency concerns alone, as a UK based study by Wilson et al. (2015) finds that only one
in ten energy renovators considered a renovation solely for energy efficiency purposes.
We propose that changes in certain life situations may indicate periods in which house-
holds are more likely to be attentive to new information and make changes in their home,
which presents a window of opportunity to reach inattentive households. If changes in
a household’s life situation do play an influential role in the decision to join an energy
efficiency programme, marketing strategies for future programmes should not only con-
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sider whom they target (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Henningsen and Petersen, 2017),
but also when they target households (Wilson et al., 2015).
Using the case of the ProjectZero home energy audit programme conducted between
September 2010 and June 2013 in Sønderborg municipality in Southern Denmark, we
investigate the influence of a home owner’s initial life situation and changes in the life
situation during the policy period on the decision to participate in the programme. We
use data from 978 participating home owners1 as well as a representative sample of
2,219 non-participating home owners from Sønderborg municipality. In a first analysis
we investigate the decision to participate in the audit programme with a weighted pro-
bit, accounting for an uneven representation of audit and non-audit households in our
sample, due to endogenous sampling. In a separate analysis we model the household’s de-
cision making process of first conducting an audit and subsequently investing in energy
renovation. Contrary to earlier analyses modelling the same decision making process
(e.g., Hartman, 1988; LaRiviere et al., 2014; Frondel and Vance, 2013), we estimate our
model as a joint maximum likelihood estimation with a probit selection equation and an
interval regression outcome equation in a regression model that accounts for non-random
sample selection.
Results indicate that two changes in the life situation – entering retirement and relo-
cation – positively influence the probability of joining the audit programme, while the
initial life situational factors do not seem to be associated with the propensity to join the
audit programme. For the final investment in energy renovations we find that getting
married and relocation are associated with a higher investment sum. The estimation
results also suggest that energy use in the form of heat consumption shows a remark-
ably small association with both having an audit and investing, supporting the notion
that households are either inattentive to the energy properties of their home (Palmer
and Walls, 2015), or that improvements in energy efficiency are only considered as a
1A total number of 1107 audits have been registered, but some entries could not be matched with
register data or were removed, as the property was not registered as single-family residential home.
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side-benefit in home improvements (Wilson et al., 2015).
The next section develops a theoretical model that describes the audit and investment
decision in formal terms and gives a foundation for the need of joint estimation to
account for self-selection. This will be followed by a description of the data from the
policy intervention, and the econometric approach. Results are then presented for both
the audit and investment decision, and the conclusion sums up the findings.
4.2 Theory
We follow Frondel and Vance (2013) and consider a utility-maximising household that
faces the decision to invest in retrofitting measures (e.g., improve wall insulation, change
windows, etc.) by either using an energy audit, or not. Hence, the household is faced
with two decisions: the decision to request an energy audit and the decision to make an
investment, which also comprises the choice to invest nothing, i.e., keep the status quo.
At the outset, we model the dichotomous decision of household i (i = 1, . . . ,n) to have
an energy audit. Household i has the following baseline characteristicsBi = {wi,yi, li,ρi},
where wi is the wealth of the household, yi is its income, li is the household’s leisure time,
and ρi are the household’s preferences over time, the environment, and all consumption
goods, including energy services.
Household i has the following feasible retrofitting options Vi = {vi1,vi2, . . . ,vim}, which
are determined by the technical condition of the household’s dwelling. As conservation
effects of different combinations of these single options might be non-additive (e.g., the
effect of a new heating system may depend on whether or not the building is re-insulated),
we defineJi as the power set of Vi, i.e., Ji = {Ji j : j = 1, . . . ,2m}= P(Vi), which contains
all 2m possible combinations of the measures in set Vi, including the empty set /0, i.e., the
status quo (no investment). Each element, Ji j ∈Ji, has an objective net present value
(NPV), based on the following function of its characteristics θi j(Bi) = ei j(Bi)−cIi j(Bi)+
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ξ Ii j(Bi), where ei j are the NPV of the future financial gains from a reduced energy
consumption, cIi j are the monetary cost of the investment, and ξ Ii j is the NPV of the
monetised non-monetary future costs and benefits of the investment, e.g., better indoor
climate or the inconveniences that follow from construction work. All three components
of θi j are functions of the household characteristics in Bi, which allows us to incorporate
the household’s budget and time restrictions directly into the NPVs of all alternatives
Ji j ∈Ji.
We define the set of objective NPVs over all options Ji j ∈ Ji as Θi = {θi1(Bi),
. . . ,θi2m(Bi)}. However, we assume that prior to the audit, the household has imperfect
information about Θi, i.e., it has a subjective set of NPVs over all options in Ji, which
may both be biased as well as uncertain. To model the effect of imperfect information on
Θi, we express the household’s uncertainty through a prior probability distribution for
each of the NPVs θi j ∈Θi, fi j(θi j(Bi)+bi j,σ2i j), with θi j +bi j = E[ fi j] and σ2i j =VAR[ fi j],
and which follows an unknown distribution and is specific to each investment option
and each household, which in the latter case takes the household’s prior knowledge into
account.2 In the case of a large |bi j| the expected value of each distribution θi j +bi j can
be far off θi j. We define the household’s subjective set of probability distributions over
the NPVs as ΘPriori = { fi1, . . . , fi2m}, with fi /0(θi /0+0,0), i.e. we assume that the household
has perfect information about the status quo situation. However, while the household
knows its subjective probability distributions over the NPVs, it has no information about
the objective NPVs, θi j, nor the size or direction of its biases, bi j.
The household now faces two options: either to choose the option that maximises
expected utility from the set ΘPriori , which includes choosing the status quo, /0, or to
conduct an energy audit and then to chose to maximise utilty over the objective set Θi,
which is yet unknown to the household.
For the first option, we define for each of the 2m investment options, u(θi j) as the
2We do not follow the common prior assumption (Harsany, 1955) in standard economic modeling, but
assume subjective uncertainty, irrespective of the access to the same information, as in Savage (1954).
107
Chapter 4 Participation in Energy Audits and Investments in Energy Savings
Bernoulli utility function that describes the utility the household derives over the dif-
ferent outcomes of θi j.3 The household is then able to determine its von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) (expected) utility for each option Ji j ∈Ji as
E[Ui j] =
∫ ∞
−∞
u(θi j) f (θi j)dθi j. (4.1)
Assuming that all preference conditions over the 2m investment options are fulfilled4,
the household can now determine which investment option Ji j derives the highest vNM
utility
J∗i = argmax
j
{E[Ui j] : j = 1, . . . ,2m}. (4.2)
In the second option, to maximize utility with an audit, the household compares the
expected utility from the energy audit,
E[Ui|Ai = 1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
. . .
∫ ∞
−∞
u
(
max
j
(θi1, . . . ,θi2m)− cAi +ξAi
)
(4.3)
· f (θi1, . . . ,θi2m) dθi2m . . .dθi1,
where Ai = {0,1} indicates the decision to conduct an audit or not, and cAi and ξAi are
the monetary costs5 and net-benefits of the audit, respectively, with the alternative to
maximise utility over the set ΘPriori . When uncertainty is present the value of additional
and accurate information consists in shifting towards better choices given a fixed set of
options (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979), hence, the value of the contrived information is
the difference in utility between choosing an investment option under uncertainty and
choosing an investment option with certainty. Using Jensens’s inequality it follows then
3The shape of the Bernoulli utility function will determine whether the household acts risk averse, risk
neutral, or risk seeking.
4The household has a rational relation over ΘPriori which implies completeness and transitivity.
5Audits can be subsidised to various extents. In our case study, audits are 100 % subsidised.
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that
E[Ui|Ai = 1]≥ E[UiJ∗i ]. (4.4)
which means that as long as the net-gain in utility from conducting the audit is positive,
the household will conduct the audit.
We assume that the energy audit is an expert opinion that provides the household
with perfect information, which means that the bias and the uncertainty disappear after
the audit. Hence, the household is now provided with the objective NPVs, Θi, and will
use these as a base for the investment decision. The household derives the following set
of utilities, which are a monotone function of the NPVs, and maximises over the set of
utilities in order to chose the option Ji j ∈Ji that generates the maximal utility
JA∗i = argmax
j
{U(θi j(Bi j)) : j = 1, . . . ,2m}. (4.5)
Please note, that /0 ∈Ji j is still an option for the household, i.e., the household can still
chose the status quo if it is the utiliy maximising option.
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4.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from a policy intervention in Sønderborg munici-
pality in Southern Denmark. In the intervention, single-family home owners were offered
free energy audits with the goal to increase investments in energy saving measures6 . The
intervention was designed and carried out by the private-public partnership ProjectZero.
The organisation carries out various initiatives with the goal of making the municipality
CO2-neutral by 2029. Energy audits were offered and carried out between September
2010 and June 2013. The intervention was marketed broadly through a wide range of
media channels (newspapers, radio, TV, trade shows, etc.), and households self-selected
into the energy audit programme.
The data collected in the course of the policy intervention notes when a free energy
audit was requested and carried out, as well as details on investment activity prior to
the audit. Investment activity after an audit was registered through follow-up phone
surveys carried out between Autumn 2012 and Fall 2013. During this period audit
participants were called up multiple times, capturing investment decisions at a later
time. Overall, 44.6 percent of the audit population have answered at least one survey.
When investments were registered (either during the audit or in the follow-up), it was
noted what kinds of measures where installed, and how much was invested in Danish
Kroner. Although the investment costs were registered based on actual billings, there
is some uncertainty about their accuracy, due to black labour and assigning costs when
larger renovations were carried out. Nevertheless, we consider the sum invested as an
approximation for the extent of the energy renovation activity of a household.
As households self-selected into policy participation, it is likely that the sample that
received energy audits is not representative of the population of single family home-
owners in the municipality. As a way to address this, a random sample of 2,219 single
6These measures also include installation of renewable energy supply, e.g., photovoltaic, which strictly
speaking do not qualify as energy saving. We still include them in the analysis, as they constitute
energy savings for the commercial energy grid.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of means between different samples in 2010 (Note: right hand
panel is only preliminary (see Section 4.3.1))
Audit Decision Investment Decision
No Audit Audit Diff. No Investment Investment Diff.
Number of Observations 2,219 978 377 601
Socio-economic variables
Gross Family Income (DKK/Year) 621,183.28 671,073.22 49,889.94* 639,937.5 690,463.8 50,526.3*
Property Value (DKK) 1,167,245.35 1,129,142.19 -38,103.16 1,140,730.95 1,121,925 -18,805.95
Family Debt (DKK) 1,093,474.42 1,107,695.95 14,221.53 1,180,010.47 1,062,660.22 -117,350.26
Family Wealth (DKK) 1,690,405.7 2,164,850.56 474,444.87* 2,316,611.55 2,070,337.5 -246,274.05
Share with Higher Education 0.85 0.93 0.08* 0.94 0.92 -0.01
Age of Household Head 51.48 51.33 -0.16 50.37 51.93 1.56
Number of Adults 1.9 1.9 0 1.9 1.9 0
Number of Children 0.89 0.77 -0.12* 0.74 0.79 0.05
House characteristics
Building Age 60.11 63.88 3.76* 61.1 65.61 4.51
Number of Rooms 4.94 5.17 0.23* 5.2 5.15 -0.05
Size of Dwelling (m2) 149.69 160.53 10.83* 160.7 160.42 -0.28
Heat Consumption (kWh/Year) 19,341.82 21,429.19 2,087.37* 20,940.86 21,752.1 811.25
Heat Consumption ([kWh/m2]/Year) 134.3 142.39 8.1* 138.71 144.85 6.14
Share with Oil Heating 0.06 0.08 0.02* 0.07 0.08 0.02
Share with Gas Heating 0.33 0.31 -0.02 0.34 0.29 -0.04
Share with District Heating 0.37 0.33 -0.04* 0.35 0.32 -0.03
City Center Distance (in m) 8,476.19 8,039 -437.19* 7,494.05 8,377.78 883.73*
Life Situation Variables
Share Married 0.73 0.73 0 0.71 0.75 0.04
Share Retired 0.23 0.21 -0.02 0.23 0.2 -0.03
Share Unemployed 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0
Note: ”*” indicates a mean difference with p-value < 0.05 based on a two-tailed t-test.
family home owners living in their homes from the same municipality was drawn from
register data available through Statistics Denmark (DST). The data from DST contains
household and house characteristics for the randomly sampled households, and house-
holds that participated in the audit programme. Finally, we obtained data on annual
heat consumption from the Danish Ministry of Taxation. The original dataset from the
policy intervention contains 1,107 observations. In the process of matching and merg-
ing with register data, only 978 could be clearly identified and were registered as single
family home owners.7
Table 4.1 shows mean values for socio-economic variables, house characteristics and
7Since not all home owners were clearly identified, unmatched households may have been sampled from
the remaining population. Assuming that all unmatched households are in the remaining population,
this could affect around 0.6% of the observations in the random draw.
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initial life situation variables for the sample populations in the audit and investment
decision in 2010. The left panel of the table reveals that mean values in the audit sam-
ple are different from the non-audit sample for most of the variables. Intuitively, the
observed differences appear to make sense, with households in the audit sample being
richer on average (availability of capital), having less children (lower living costs/more
time available), living in older homes that are larger and have more rooms (more possi-
bilities for improvements), and having a higher annual heat consumption (higher savings
potential) both in total and per square meter.
Mean differences in the investment sample (right hand panel of Table 4.1) are almost
all insignificant, with the exception of Gross Family Income and City Center Distance.
Households that make an investment have a higher mean income, indicating that liquidity
might play a role in the investment decision, and household distance from the city center
correlates with higher investment. Generally, the fact that the non-audit and audit
sample are so different, while the non-investment and investment sample are not, is a
strong indication that the decision to have an audit is a strong selection mechanism for
the decision to make an energy saving investment. The histogram in Figure 4.1 shows
the distribution of observations in the different investment intervals in the sample that
received an energy audit. Each investment interval represents an investment range of
DKK 30,000, with only the final interval unbounded in the positive range.
4.3.1 Note of Caution: Issues with Investment Data
The right hand panel of Table 4.1 only shows preliminary mean statistics, due to data
issues that were discovered at a very late stage of the analysis. Unfortunately, these issues
could not be fixed before the submission of this thesis. More specifically, it was discovered
that database entries that were registered as non-investors in the main database had in
fact never replied to any of the follow-up surveys. Hence, we have two different types of
zero observations (see Figure 4.1): households that did not invest, and households that
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Figure 4.1: Number of observations in the different investment intervals
did not answer the survey. This problem is not easy to address, as the final data analysis
was carried out on a server by Statistics Denmark, where it had to be anonymised. This
means that we cannot easily match the individual household survey response to the
household observation on the server. Furthermore, the new data structure may require
a different conceptual approach, which takes into account another selection effect in the
second stage, where only a subset of households answered the follow-up survey. While
the data issues do not affect the analysis of the decision to join the free energy audit
programme, the final paper will only be submitted to an academic journal once the data
issues in the investment decision have been resolved and the results have been revised.
4.3.2 Multiple Imputation
There is some degree of missingness in certain registry variables, but one of the main
concerns for this analysis is missingness in the values for annual heat consumption at
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the household level, which is missing for 23.6 % of all observations. As we believe this to
be an important variable to explain audit and investment behaviour, we do not consider
it an option to leave it out of the analysis. At the same time we are also reluctant to
lose a large number of observations through list-wise deletion, as it may create bias in
the dataset. We address this through Multiple Imputation (King et al., 2001) of missing
values with the R package Amelia II (Honaker et al., 2011).
Based on the assumption that individual variable observations are missing at random
and that variables follow a joint multivariate normal distribution, missing values are
imputed linearly:
D˜i j = Di,− jβ˜ + ε˜i, (4.6)
where ” ˜ ” indicates a random draw from a posterior distribution derived from ob-
served data, D˜i j the variable observation, j, that is imputed for observation, i, Di,− j other
variables from the same observation if they are observed, β˜ the variable estimate; and
ε˜i an error term (King et al., 2001).
In the imputation step we use all the available variable observations used in the anal-
ysis, as well as unused register variables available to us (e.g. alternative measures of
wealth and income). The random draws introduce a degree of uncertainty in the data,
so that every time this process is applied to the data, the imputed values are differ-
ent. Therefore, the imputation is repeated multiple times, to create a set of m imputed
datasets. A rule of thumb is suggested by White et al. (2011), to generate a number
of imputed data sets at least as high as the percentage of missing data in the analy-
sis. Using annual heat consumption with a missingness of 23.6 % as guidance, we have
generated a total of 25 imputed data sets, and regressions were run on each of these
individually.
The estimation results of the regressions were then averaged to generate a single
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estimation output, and standard errors were calculated as:
SE(q) =
√√√√ 1
m
m
∑
j=1
SE(q j)2 +
∑mj=1(q j− q¯)2
m−1 (1+
1
m
), (4.7)
with q the parameter estimate, and subscript j( j = 1, ...,m) indicating the imputed
dataset (Honaker et al., 2011).
As a test of the quality of the imputation we apply overimputation (Honaker et al.,
2011) to our data, which treats the existing observations as missing and imputes them
based on the estimation model applied to the missing variable observations. Overim-
putation results for variables with more than 50 missing observations are presented
graphically in Figure 4.2. The imputed values are shown as a dot indicating the mean
value of 100 repeated imputations, and a line indicating the 90% confidence interval.
The diagonal line in each graph indicates perfect imputation where observed and im-
puted values are identical. Hence, the closer observations are to this line, the better the
imputation.
The imputation seems to work quite well for Gross Family Income, Property Value,
Family Debt, and Building Sqm, with the general exception of outlier observations (see
Figure 4.2). Heat Consumption and Family Wealth are imputed less well, with the over-
imputed values close to a horizontal trend line. However, the share of overimputed Heat
Consumption observations with confidence intervals intersecting the diagonal line is still
around 90%, the threshold value given by Honaker et al. (2011) for a good imputation.
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Figure 4.2: Overimputation results for variables with more than 50 missing observations.
Note: Results plotted are from 100 repeated imputations for each variable ob-
servations; dots indicate the mean, with lines indicating the 90%-confidence
interval; the diagonal line in the graphs indicates perfect imputation, where
observed and imputed values are equal.
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4.4 Econometric Model of Energy Audit and Investment
The policy intervention took place over a time span of three years. Although, data is
available for each year individually, this analysis will treat the whole policy period as a
cross-sectional data set. Therefore, we estimate participation in the audit programme
and investment at any time in the policy period, without considering timing or changes
in the explanatory variables over time. To avoid reversed causality issues (e.g. for annual
heat consumption or family debt), we use the socio-economic and house characteristics
from 2010.
In the data, we observe a household’s audit decision through participation in the free
audit programme, which corresponds to the audit decision, Ai, in Equation (4.4). In
our theoretical model the decision to participate in the policy programme is driven by
the benefits and costs of the audit itself, and the benefits and costs of the different
retrofitting options, θi j, which in turn are determined by the household’s baseline char-
acteristics, Bi. We include a wide range of socio-economic characteristics to control for
the baseline characteristics. Physical characteristics of the dwelling are also included, as
this influences the set of available retrofitting measures, and may also be related to the
potential benefit of the measures. Our main variables of interest are a group of variables
we call life situation variables: marriage, retirement, unemployment, and relocation to
a new home. We include these either as a set of dummy variables that captures the
household’s initial life situation in 2010, or as a set of dummy variables that captures
the change in life situation during the policy period, i.e. if people got married, started
retirement, got unemployed (at least once), or relocated (at least once) in the policy
period (2010 - 2013).
In the theoretical model, Equation (4.4) shows that households already consider po-
tential investments when making the audit decision, which gives rise to selection issues
in which the error terms of the two decisions are correlated. The common approach to
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address sample selection suggested by Heckman (1979) is not suitable for our data, as
the final outcome variable (sum invested in energy saving measures) is coded in intervals,
and requires non-linear estimation of the second stage (Bhattacharya et al., 2006; Greene
and Hensher, 2009; Freedman and Sekhon, 2010).
To address this issue we base the estimation of the investment decision on a probit
selection equation in the first stage, and an interval regression in the second stage.
Selection issues are accounted for through joint maximum likelihood estimation of the
two decisions under the assumption of a bivariate normal distribution of the error terms.
4.4.1 Weighted Probit
While selection bias is an issue for the analysis of the investment decision, this problem
does not arise for the analysis of the decision to join the audit programme. However,
since only part of our data is based on a random sample of the population, while it
contains close to the whole population of the audit participants, the final sample we
have is subject to endogenous sampling. This leaves us with the issue of estimating a
dichotomous choice, in which the sample cannot be considered representative for the
whole population. This can be addressed by estimating a weighted probit model, which
is in large parts identical to the general probit model.
The probit equation estimates the decision to request an energy audit, corresponding
to Ai in Equation (4.4). This is based on a latent variable that describes the tendency of
a household to request an audit, which we can theoretically interpret as the net-benefit
of getting an audit:
yS∗i = β
S′xSi + ε
S
i (4.8)
ySi =

0 if yS∗i ≤ 0
1 otherwise
, (4.9)
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where subscript i indicates the household observation, ySi is a binary variable that
indicates whether the household has received an energy audit, yS∗i the latent variable
indicating the “tendency” that ySi is one, x
S
i is the vector of explanatory variables for the
selection equation, β S a vector of parameters, and εSi a random error term.
In the general probit model the individual likelihood contributions to the maximum
likelihood estimator are all weighted equally, while in the weighted probit weights are
calculated based on the ratio of the population share to the sample share (Solon et al.,
2015):
wi(s) =
N¯s/N¯
Ns/N
, (4.10)
where N¯s is the total number of observations in the population belonging to sub-group s,
N¯ the total number of observations in the population, Ns the total number of observations
in the sample belonging to sub-group s, and N the total number of observations in the
sample.
4.4.2 Interval Regression with Sample Selection
The joint-estimation of the investment decision includes a nested probit estimation,
which is then followed by an interval regression, where the latent variable is the financial
capital invested in energy saving measures in Danish Kroner. This part of the regression
corresponds to the investment decision for households that have received an audit as
described in Equation (4.5). An important difference between the theoretical model and
the econometric estimation is, however, that our theoretical model describes the decision
to invest over a set of discrete choices, while in the estimation the outcome is in terms of
the investment sum (though implemented in a discrete choice specification, due to the
interval coding). While the data does contain information about how many and what
type of measures were implemented, we consider the investment sum a better proxy
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for the scale of the retro-fitting activity carried out by the household. We define the
dependent variable in the selection equation the same as in Equations (4.8) and (4.9),
while the outcome dependent variable is specified as follows:
yO∗i = β
O′xOi + ε
O
i (4.11)
yOi =

unknown if ySi = 0
1 if α1 < yO∗i ≤ α2 and ySi = 1
2 if α2 < yO∗i ≤ α3 and ySi = 1
...
M if αM < yO∗i ≤ αM+1 and ySi = 1
, (4.12)
where yO∗i is a latent outcome variable, y
O
i is the partially observed investment sum
that indicates in which interval yO∗i lies, M is the number of intervals defined by the
boundary values α1, . . . ,αM+1 = (−∞,0, 30000, 60000, 90000, 120000, 150000, 180000,
210000,+∞) measured in Danish Kroner, xOi is the vector of explanatory variables for
the outcome equation, β O is a vector of parameters, and εOi is a random error term
following a joint bivariate normal distribution as follows:
 εSi
εOi
∼ N2

 0
0
 ,
 1 ρσ2
ρσ2 σ22

 , (4.13)
with ρ and σ2 scalars of unknown model parameters.
Based on the estimation of the decision to request an audit in Equation (4.8) we receive
the following probability of not receiving an audit (and not observing the investment
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decision, yOi ):
P
(
ySi = 0
)
= P
(
yS∗i ≤ 0
)
(4.14)
= P
(
β S
′
xSi + ε
S
i ≤ 0
)
(4.15)
= P
(
εSi ≤−β S
′
xSi
)
. (4.16)
Due to the joint distributions of the error terms εSi and εOi we receive a positive
selection outcome as joint probability of ySi = 1 and y
O
i = m:
P
(
ySi = 1∧ yOi = m
)
= P
(
yS∗i > 0∧αm < yO∗i ≤ αm+1
)
(4.17)
= P
(
β S
′
xSi + ε
S
i > 0∧αm < β O
′
xOi + ε
O
i ≤ αm+1
)
(4.18)
= P
(
εSi >−β S
′
xSi ∧αm−β O
′
xOi < ε
O
i ≤ αm+1−β O
′
xOi
)
(4.19)
Based on these probabilities we derive the log-likelihood function for each individual
household i as:
`i = (1− ySi ) ln
[
Φ
(
−β S′xSi
)]
+
M
∑
m=1
ySi (y
O
i = m) ln
[
Φ2
(
αm+1−β O′xOi
σ2
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)
(4.20)
−Φ2
(
αm−β O′xOi
σ2
,β S
′
xSi ,−ρ
)]
,
where Φ(.) indicates the cumulative distribution function of the univariate standard nor-
mal distribution and Φ2(.) indicates the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate
standard normal distribution.
The log-likelihood is similar to an ordered probit with sample selection (theoretically
described in Greene and Hensher (2009), an applied example is found in Jimenez and
Kugler (1987)) , with the only difference that the boundaries are known.
121
Chapter 4 Participation in Energy Audits and Investments in Energy Savings
Exclusion Restriction
In order for the outcome estimation of a selection model to be theoretically identified an
exclusion restriction is needed, if one does not want to purely rely on the distributional
assumptions of the estimator (Smith and Sweetman, 2016). This exclusion restriction
may only affect the outcome of interest through its correlation with the selection decision,
i.e. it has to be a sufficiently strong predictor of selection, but must not be correlated
with the final outcome. While a variable’s predictive qualities on selection can be tested,
the latter property cannot be shown in statistical terms. Instead, the case has to be
made on theoretical grounds.
In our case we are looking for a variable that predicts selection into the audit pro-
gramme, but does not play a role in the household investment decision. We believe that
exposure to marketing could be such a variable, as it raises attention for the campaign,
and chances of participation, but does not change the fundamental properties of the
investment decision. Unfortunately, we cannot control for this directly, because market-
ing was conducted pretty broadly and on multiple channels. Instead, we propose to use
distance from the center of the city of Sønderborg, which is the municipal capital. The
idea behind this is that households living further away from the city center are more
likely to consume local media from neighbouring municipalities that did not advertise
the programme, which means they are less likely to be aware of and select into it. The
office of ProjectZero is also located in the city center, so people could also be more
familiar with the organisation, which may increase participation as well.
Clearly, there are a lot of factors that determine household location in space. Dif-
ferences in house prices come to mind, which leads to higher income and higher wealth
households to live closer to the city, and other socio-economic grouping mechanisms,
like education and children. If these socio-economic variables also correlate with the
investment decision our exclusion restriction would not work. Thus, we have to assume
that we control for the socio-economic mechanisms behind household distance to the city
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center with our selection of socio-economic variables.
Partial Effects
In the investment data we register households that do not make an investment, which
are coded as a zero investment. As the estimation of the interval regression model with
sample selection is based on GLM maximum likelihood estimation, we can correct for
left-censoring in the same way as in a tobit estimation (Wooldridge, 2010). By doing this
we assume that the tendency to make an investment and the final investment sum are
influenced by our independent variables in the same way. To overcome this assumption
would require a specification with an additional stage that models the selection into
the investment category (Sigelman and Zeng, 1999). While theoretically desirable, this
would require an additional exclusion restriction, for which we cannot identify a suitable
candidate in the data.
Thus, partial effects of the continuous independent variables are calculated as:
∂E(yO∗i |xOi ,ySi = 1)
∂x j
=
∂P(yO∗i > 0|xOi ,ySi = 1)
∂x j
·E(yO∗i |yO∗i > 0,xOi ,ySi = 1) (4.21)
+P(yO∗i > 0|xOi ,ySi = 1) ·
∂E(yO∗i |yO∗i > 0,xOi ,ySi = 1)
∂x j
.
Partial effects for discrete independent variables are calculated based on the discrete
changes in the tobit corrected fitted values evaluated for each individual observation.
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4.5 Results
In this section we first present and discuss the estimation of the decision to join the policy
and have an energy audit. Following this we will direct our attention to the investment
decision to investigate determinants of making an energy investment.8 All estimations
were programmed and carried out in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2017).
4.5.1 Weighted Probit Results
The weighted probit regression was carried out using the ’survey’ package (Lumley,
2017), which uses the Horvitz-Thompson estimator instead of Maximum Likelihood es-
timation. While the general interpretations of the regression output is the same as for a
general probit estimated by maximum likelihood, we cannot apply the same statistical
tests. Therefore, to compare our different model specifications we use an adjusted Rao-
Scott Likelihood-Ratio test (Lumley and Scott, 2014), instead of the standard Likelihood-
Ratio test.
Table 4.2 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors for three different spec-
ifications. Panel (1) in Table 4.2 includes socio-economic variables and house charac-
teristics to predict the decision to have an audit. Most of the estimated coefficients in
this specification are significant. The second panel adds life situation variables in 2010,
to test if being in a certain life situation is associated with audit participation. None
of the added initial life situation variables are significant, and an adjusted Rao-Scott
Likelihood-Ratio test shows that the addition of these variables does not significantly
improve the fit of the model (P-value = 0.73).
Finally, panel (3) shows an alternative specification that instead adds dummy variables
for changes in the life situation of households during the policy period. In this estimation,
starting retirement is significant at the 10%-level, and moving in the first half of the
8Please note that the investment results are only preliminary, until data issues are addressed (see Section
4.3.1).
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Table 4.2: Weighted Probit Regression Results for Decision to Join the Audit Programme
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
(Intercept) -2.9559*** 0.3195 -3.0462*** 0.3452 -3.0137*** 0.3367
Socio-economic Variables
Gross Family Income 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
Property Value (in DKK 10.000) -0.0023*** 0.0006 -0.0022*** 0.0006 -0.0021*** 0.0005
Family Wealth (in DKK 10.000) 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0002
Family Debt (in DKK 10.000) -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0007** 0.0003
Higher Education (Dummy) 0.3572*** 0.0729 0.3628*** 0.0732 0.3584*** 0.0736
Household Head Age 0.0248*** 0.0093 0.0282*** 0.0100 0.0260*** 0.0100
Household Head Age Squared -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0001
Number of Adults -0.0371 0.0495 -0.0227 0.0609 -0.0399 0.0501
Number of Children -0.0855*** 0.0254 -0.0840*** 0.0259 -0.0797*** 0.0262
House Characteristics
Building Age -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.0010* 0.0005
Building Sqm 0.0057*** 0.0011 0.0058*** 0.0011 0.0057*** 0.0011
Heat Consumption (in 1.000 kWh) -0.0111 0.0076 -0.0111 0.0076 -0.0113 0.0075
Heat Consumption (kWh) per Building Sqm 0.0032*** 0.0010 0.0032*** 0.0010 0.0032*** 0.0010
City Center Distance (in km) -0.0232*** 0.0049 -0.0231*** 0.0049 -0.0227*** 0.0049
Oil Heating (Dummy) 0.1345* 0.0801 0.1356* 0.0805 0.1396* 0.0804
Life Situation Variables
Married -0.0405 0.0576
Retired 0.0367 0.0772
Unemployed -0.0820 0.1475
Got Married 2010-2013 0.0857 0.0940
Started Retirement 2010-2013 0.1277* 0.0712
Moved 2010-2011 0.2284*** 0.0840
Moved 2012-2013 -0.1143 0.0829
Note: * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
policy period is significant at the 1%-level. An adjusted Rao-Scott Likelihood-Ratio test
suggests that this specification does provide a better fit for the estimation of participation
in the audit programme (P-value = 0.007). Hence, we prefer this specification, and
discuss the results below. For a better interpretation of the effects of the different
variables we provide Average Partial Effects in Table 4.3.
Our results suggest that both family wealth and family debt are associated with the
decision to join the audit programme, while income is not statistically significant. We
also find that higher property value has a negative association with the propensity to have
an energy audit. This may be due to higher value properties being in better condition
both in terms of maintenance, and in terms of thermal properties, reducing the general
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Table 4.3: Average Partial Effects for specification (3) in Table 4.2
Average Partial Effect Std. error
Socio-economic Variables
Gross Family Income (in DKK 10.000) 0.00004 0.00005
Property Value (in DKK 10.000) -0.00022*** 0.00006
Family Wealth (in DKK 10.000) 0.00008*** 0.00002
Family Debt (in DKK 10.000) -0.00008** 0.00003
Higher Education (Dummy) 0.02982*** 0.00494
Household Head Age 0.00268*** 0.00104
Household Head Age Squared -0.00003*** 0.00001
Number of Adults -0.00412 0.00518
Number of Children -0.00823*** 0.00273
House Characteristics
Building Age -0.00010* 0.00006
Building Sqm 0.00059*** 0.00011
Heat Consumption (in 1.000 kWh) -0.00117 0.00078
Heat Consumption (kWh) per Building Sqm 0.00033*** 0.00011
Oil Heating (Dummy) 0.01582 0.00995
City Center Distance (in km) -0.00234*** 0.00051
Life Situation Variables
Got Married 2010-2013 0.00940 0.01091
Started Retirement 2010-2013 0.01428* 0.00857
Lost Job 2010-2013 -0.01555 0.01148
Moved 2010-2011 0.02745** 0.01164
Moved 2012-2013 -0.01090 0.00729
Note: * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
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need for energy improvements.
The partial effect for higher education is relatively strong, which may partly be ex-
plained by higher educated households being better informed through newspapers and
other channels, thus having more exposure to the marketing of the policy. An alternative
explanations could be that higher education is a correlate of social classes that care about
their environmental image, or that households with higher education are generally more
patient and therefore apply a lower discount rate to future savings. Household Head
Age is estimated both as a linear and quadratic term. Both are significant, but with
opposing signs, indicating that age increases the probability of having an audit up to a
point, but that at a certain point higher age decreases the likelihood of having an energy
audit. The estimates indicate a turning point of the effect of age at around 44.67 years
of age. The household composition plays a role, as we see that the number of children
in the household is a significant factor. More children reduce the probability of having
an audit, while the number of adults in the household is not associated with the audit
decision.
The age of a building is negatively associated with the probability to join the audit
programme, which is a bit surprising, though the average partial effect is very small.
Building square meters and annual heat consumption enter the model as individual pa-
rameters and as heat consumption per square meter. Therefore, their average partial
effects cannot be interpreted directly, but also need to account for the change in the in-
teraction term. The combined average partial effect of building square meters is 0,00023,
which means that an additional square meter increases the probability to have an audit
by 0.023 percentage points. Annual heat consumption has a combined average partial
effect of 0.0029, i.e. 0.29 percentage points, for a 1,000 kWh increase in consumption,
which appears somewhat low, given that the main motivation for policy makers is to
encourage energy savings. For oil heating the audit intervention seems to be more on
target with regard to the policy intention, as households with oil heating are almost
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1.6 percentage points more likely to join the audit programme. Distance from the city
centre aims to capture the intensity of marketing exposure to the policy campaign. As
such we would expect it to have a negative association with the probability to have an
energy audit, which is also the case. The partial effect implies that an additional kilo-
metre of distance decreases the probability of having an audit by 0.2 percentage points
on average.
Regarding the dummy variables indicating a change in the life situation, we find that
household heads that started retirement or moved in the first half of the policy period
are more likely to have an audit, with average partial effects of 1.4 and 2.7 percentage
points, respectively. This result supports the notion of a Fresh Start Effect, though the
fact that not all the change in life situation variables are significant also highlights that
this effect appears to be dependent on the context. An alternative explanation for the
influence of relocation could be that relocating households are more likely to engage
in other renovation activities, making them more attentive to the potential for energy
efficiency improvements from renovation.
Given that relocation in the first half of the policy period shows a relatively strong
association with having an audit, it is surprising that moving in the second half has
the opposite sign and is not significant. One reason for this could be that households
that relocated earlier had a longer exposure to the programme, giving them a longer
window of opportunity to join. Another reason could be that the reference group (i.e.
households that did not move) is more likely to join in the second half of the policy
period compared to the first half. This could be driven by the continuing marketing
campaign the non-relocating households are exposed to, which also makes less attentive
households aware of the audit programme over time, and relatively more likely to join.
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4.5.2 (Preliminary) Interval Regression Results
The maximum likelihood equations for the estimation of the final investment sum were
maximised using the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. We also
tested the Newton-Raphson (NR) and Berndt–Hall–Hall–Hausman (BHHH) algorithms,
but they did not handle the estimations as well as the BFGS algorithm. The NR algo-
rithm performed markedly worse and failed to provide a solution for our final specifi-
cations of the interval regression model with sample selection presented below. Results
from the BHHH algorithm were generally quite close to the results from BFGS, but the
latter was slightly more reliable in converging when applied repeatedly to the full set of
imputed data sets (see Section 4.3 regarding the description of the multiple imputation).
In trying different specifications for the estimation of the investments sums we found
that the estimations performed much better when applying an inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation (asinh) to the interval values in the dependent variable. While somewhat
uncommon in economics, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is an alternative to
the more common logarithmic transformation, but with the advantage of being contin-
uous through zero. (Burbidge et al., 1988) Average partial effects are calculated on the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformed latent variable, i.e. estimated investment in energy
saving measures. This allows us to interpret the partial effects as percentage changes in
the same way as a log-level model specification. To get an idea about numerical values
for the partial effects of the significant variables we have created box plots of the partial
effects shown in Figure 4.3, with outliers excluded for better readability.
As we described in the previous section, a valid exclusion restriction is crucial for the
joint estimation with the interval regression estimator with sample selection. Based on
the estimation results from the selection stage we see that City Center Distance, a proxy
for marketing intensity, does have the expected sign and is highly significant, which is
a necessary condition for its suitability as exclusion restriction. However, we need to
ensure that it has strong enough predictive properties to function as instrument. In
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order to test this we derive F-statistics from a Wald-test of the unrestricted selection
stage against a restricted model without the City Center Distance variable. The mean
F-statistic for all the estimations run on the imputed data sets is 19.95. According to
Smith and Sweetman (2016) this should qualify as strong enough instrument to serve as
exclusion restriction, which defines a value of 10 as rule-of-thumb threshold value.
Unfortunately, and despite the positive evaluation of the City Center Distance variable
as exclusion restriction, it was not possible to estimate the interval regression with
sample selection specification, as none of the algorithms we tried managed to numerically
solve the task. Therefore, it was necessary to exclude two additional factors (Higher
Education and Building Square-meters), to estimate the model. However, these exclusion
restrictions do not have a theoretical foundation, and were selected based on the fact that
they were not one of our main variables of interest and the estimation converged properly
when excluding them. Therefore, we also estimated a subsample interval regression that
does not account for self-selection, but contains the full set of variables, to provide an
indication on the robustness of the results.
The estimation results for the selection stage of the interval regression model with
sample selection are presented in Table 4.4. In terms of signs and relative magnitude of
the coefficients the results are mostly in line with the weighted probit results in Table
4.2. As the weighted probit model is the more appropriate model for investigating the
decision to have an audit, we do not further discuss the results of the selection stage
here.
The estimation results for the outcome stage are presented in Table 4.5 alongside p-
values and average partial effects. The coefficient estimates cannot be directly compared
between the two estimations, because they are scaled differently and also depend on the
fitted values of each individual observation. Thus, we mainly direct our attention to the
significance of the explanatory variables and the average partial effects. Between the
two models, results are fairly consistent with most estimated parameters at a similar
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Table 4.4: Selection Results for Interval Regression with Sample Selection
Model: Interval Regression with Sample Selection
Dependent Variable: Audit Decision
Variable Estimate Std. Error p-value
(Intercept) -2.3967*** 0.3892 0.0000
Socio-economic Variables
Gross Family Income (in DKK 10.000) 0.0007 0.0007 0.3193
Property Value (in DKK 10.000) -0.0023*** 0.0005 0.0000
Family Debt (in DKK 10.000) -0.0010*** 0.0003 0.0009
Family Wealth (in DKK 10.000) 0.0011*** 0.0002 0.0000
Higher Education (Dummy) 0.4582*** 0.0906 0.0000
Household Head Age 0.0364*** 0.0124 0.0033
Household Head Age Squared -0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0013
Number of Adults -0.0562 0.0628 0.3713
Number of Children -0.0935*** 0.0251 0.0002
House Characteristics
Building Age -0.0008 0.0006 0.1661
Building Sqm 0.0071*** 0.0012 0.0000
Heat Consumption (in 1.000 kwh) -0.0147* 0.0088 0.0972
Heat Consumption (kwh) per Building Sqm 0.0041*** 0.0012 0.0007
City Center Distance (in km) -0.0273*** 0.0054 0.0000
Oil Heating (Dummy) 0.1825* 0.1005 0.0695
Life Situation Variables
Got Married 2010-2013 0.1086 0.1197 0.3642
Lost Job 2010-2013 -0.2191 0.1866 0.2406
Started Retirement 2010-2013 0.1621* 0.0876 0.0645
Moved 2010-2011 0.2810*** 0.1067 0.0085
Moved 2012-2013 -0.1403 0.1092 0.1988
Log Likelihood -4140.8044
nObs 3197
Note: * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
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Table 4.5: Results for estimation of investment sum from Subsample Interval Regres-
sion and Interval Regression with sample selection estimation on Investment
Intervals
Model: Subsample Interval Regression Interval Regression with Sample Selection
Dependent Variable: asinh(Investment Interval) asinh(Investment Interval)
Variable Estimate p-value APE Estimate p-value APE
(Intercept) -12.2489** 0.0287 -17.8598*** 0.0028
Socio-economic Variables
Gross Family Income (in DKK 10.000) 0.0316** 0.0232 0.0316 0.0329*** 0.0077 0.0329
Property Value (in DKK 10.000) -0.0040 0.5783 -0.0040 -0.0063 0.3944 -0.0063
Family Debt (in DKK 10.000) -0.0015 0.6659 -0.0015 -0.0031 0.4135 -0.0031
Family Wealth (in DKK 10.000) -0.0023 0.1954 -0.0023 -0.0011 0.5809 -0.0011
Higher Education (Dummy) -1.1851 0.4463 -0.9865
Household Head Age 0.5971*** 0.0028 0.6337 0.6513*** 0.0017 0.6988
Household Head Age Squared -0.0052*** 0.0080 -0.0052 -0.0058*** 0.0044 -0.0058
Number of Adults -0.6698 0.4606 -0.7318 -0.7442 0.4274 -0.8290
Number of Children 0.1806 0.6202 0.1819 0.0105 0.9782 0.0106
House Characteristics
Building Age 0.0111 0.1831 0.0111 0.0099 0.2460 0.0099
Building Sqm -0.0054 0.7013 -0.0054
Heat Consumption (in 1.000 kwh) 0.1237 0.2570 0.1242 0.1304* 0.0776 0.1308
Heat Consumption (kwh) per Building Sqm -0.0092 0.5531 -0.0092 -0.0074 0.4153 -0.0074
Oil Heating (Dummy) 2.5040* 0.0702 2.8797 2.7356* 0.0548 2.6721
Life Situation Variables
Got Married 2010-2013 3.5393** 0.0369 6.8783 3.7362** 0.0348 5.7434
Lost Job 2010-2013 -2.2979 0.4159 -2.5007 -2.6533 0.3777 -2.2967
Started Retirement 2010-2013 0.7518 0.5390 0.5436 0.9502 0.4338 0.5975
Moved 2010-2011 2.3580* 0.0831 2.5649 2.8926* 0.0562 2.9941
Moved 2012-2013 1.0314 0.5159 0.7684 0.8648 0.6272 0.5332
Model Parameters
sigma 10.2413*** 0.0000 10.4377*** 0.0000
rho 0.2273 0.1610
Log Likelihood -2304.2303 -4140.8044
nObs 978 3197
Note: * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01
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level of p-values and average partial effects in a similar range. The numerical values
for the average partial effects plotted in Figure 4.3, however, are consistently higher for
the subsample interval regression. This is mainly due to the differences in the intercept,
diminishing the overall level of the fitted values in the interval regression with sample
selection.
For the interval regression with sample selection we also estimate the rho parameter,
which captures the selection effect. The parameter is not significant, indicating that we
cannot confirm the presence of a selection effect. However, as we are not completely
confident in the set of instruments used, we do not think that this is conclusive evidence
of the absence of selection effects. In light of the insignificant rho parameter it makes
sense, though, that the interval regression delivers results that are fairly similar to the
interval regression with sample selection.
The outcome estimation has generally proven difficult. Only a few factors appear
to be associated with the amount that is invested in energy saving measures. This is
possibly due to the strong selection effect, which leads to a low degree of variance in
most variables of the audit population, which we have already seen in the comparison of
means in the different subgroups in Table 4.1. The different models we estimated deliver
quantitatively similar results, which gives us some confidence in them with regards to the
investment decision of this specific sample. However, given the challenges encountered
during estimation the generalizability of the results is put in doubt.
For the financial variables we see a reverse picture of the selection equation, in that
Gross Family Income is significant, while the wealth based variables are all insignifi-
cant. The association with income is quite small with about 3 percent increase in the
investment sum per DKK 10,000 of income. Numerically, the majority of the partial
effects in the first boxplot in Figure 4.3 are below DKK 75 for the subsample interval
regression and below DKK 25 for the interval regression with sample selection. Age is
the only other significant socio-economic variable, with quite a substantial partial effect
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Figure 4.3: Box plots of individual partial effects for significant variables (without out-
liers)
predicted by the interval regression results (the majority of observations falling between
DKK 50 and DKK 300), but in the interval regression with sample selection results the
partial effect is much more modest (below DKK 100 for most observations). For some
observations the partial effect of age is negative, as the negative quadratic term leads to
a turning point of the partial effect of age at 57.41 years for the interval regression, and
at 56.14 years for the interval regression with sample selection.
Total heat consumption is only significant at the 10 percent level in the interval regres-
sion with sample selection estimation, while in the subsample interval regression it fails
to pass at this significance level. The combined average partial effect of heat consump-
tion and heat consumption divided by building square meters is 0.013 in the interval
regression with sample selection specification, i.e. an additional 1,000 kWh of annual
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heat consumption increases the investment sum by approximately 1.3 percent. This
translate into a fairly small numerical partial effect with less than DKK 50 additional
investment per 1,000 kWh of annual heat consumption for the majority of the obser-
vations. This supports the notion that energy efficiency concerns are rarely the main
driver of energy renovations (Wilson et al., 2015). As for the audit decision, however, we
see that oil heating as primary heating source does show a significant association with
the investment sum (significant at the 10 percent level). The average partial effects are
quite high, with a 288 percent increase in the investment sum predicted by the interval
regression model, and a 276 percent increase predicted by the interval regression with
sample selection. The correspoding numerical partial effects predict additional invest-
ments between DKK 1,000 and DKK 5,000 for the subsample interval regression, and
between DKK 200 and DKK 2,500 for the interval regression with sample selection.
Out of the variables indicating a change in the life situation, getting married in the
policy period and relocation in the first half of the policy period are significant in both
models. Getting married is strongly associated with the investment sum, with the invest-
ment sum predicted to increase by 688 percent in the subsample interval regression, and
by 574 percent in the interval regression with sample selection model. Numerically, par-
tial effects for the majority of the observations fall between DKK 2,500 and DKK 20,000
in the subsample interval regression, and between DKK 1,000 and DKK 5,000 in the
interval regression with sample selection. Relocation in the first half of the policy period
also has a very strong association with the investment decision, though somewhat lower
than getting married. The average partial effects indicate an increase of 256 percent for
the subsample interval regression, and a 299 percent increase for the interval regression
with sample selection. The majority of the partial effects in the interval regression are
between DKK 1,000 and DKK 5,000, and between DKK 200 and DKK 2,500 for the
interval regression with sample selection estimation.
Across the two decision – having a free energy audit and investing in energy saving
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measures – we find that households that moved in the first half of the policy period were
more likely to have an audit and invested more in energy saving measures. This may
indicate this target group as ’low hanging fruit’, though this evaluation cannot tell us if
the audits have generated any additional investments that might have also happened in
absence of policy.
4.6 Conclusion
In this article we have investigated the determinants of households joining a free energy
audit programme, and investing in energy saving measures in their home. We inves-
tigated the decision to have an energy audit by applying a weighted probit regression
framework with a comprehensive set of socio-economic variables and housing charac-
teristics. In two alternative specifications we included dummy variables capturing the
initial household life situation, and changes in the life situation of households during the
policy period. Findings indicate that while the initial life situation does not play a role
for the decision to have an audit, changes in two life situations – starting retirement
and relocation in the first half of the policy period – have a positive influence on the
propensity to have an energy audit.
In the estimation of the final investment in energy saving measures we applied two
regression frameworks: a subsample interval regression and an interval regression ac-
counting for sample selection. The application of the interval regression model account-
ing for sample selection has proven difficult, as the conceptualized exclusion restriction
did not allow for empirical identification of the second stage. This issue may be due to
the limited variance in the self-selected sample that had an energy audit. This made
it necessary to include two additional (theoretically unfounded) exclusion restrictions.
When applying the additional exclusion restrictions, the estimation does deliver results
that are qualitatively similar to the subsample interval regression.
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In the estimation of the final investment decision we find that getting married and
relocation in the first half of the policy period have a strong association with the amount
that is invested into energy saving measures. Together with the association found for
starting retirement and relocation with the decision to have an audit, this provides
support for the notion of a Fresh Start Effect (Peetz and Wilson, 2012), in which private
households are more likely to seek out new information or make changes in their life as
they find themselves in a new life situation. This insight is potentially useful for future
policy design, e.g. by marketing energy audits specifically to households that just moved
into a municipality as a window of opportunity to reach households that are susceptible
to new information. It could also be interesting to tailor and market energy efficiency
programmes to home owners starting retirement, as there is some evidence that elderly
households are harder to reach than the general population (Berry and Brown, 1988).
An additional, and somewhat surprising finding indicates that annual heat consump-
tion (both total and per square meter) is only weakly associated with both audit and
investment decision. Given that the main motivation for the policy maker is to encour-
age energy savings, energy consumption appears to play a remarkably small role for
home owners. This may be in line with evidence from the literature that households are
either inattentive to the energy properties of their home (Palmer and Walls, 2015), or
that energy efficiency renovations are rarely motivated by energy concerns alone (Wilson
et al., 2015).
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Detecting Behavioral Spillovers in a Real Effort
Public Good Experiment
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5.1 Introduction
Abstract
Social Norm interventions are increasingly used as a policy tool to influence people’s
everyday consumption behaviour. They promise a significant demand response at low
financial costs. Often overlooked in the application of such behavioural interventions,
however, is that they can have unintended spillover effects. This paper proposes a novel
experimental framework to investigate the conditions determining occurrence and di-
rection of spillovers. Subjects complete real effort tasks in a public good environment,
in what we call a Real Effort Public Good game. Earnings are generated through a
private task which benefits the individual only, and two public tasks, which benefit a
group. A social reference intervention is applied in the treatment group in which par-
ticipants receive information about session-level contributions to only one public good.
We find that contribution patterns in the control group resemble regular public good
games in the literature, which shows that our underlying public good framework delivers
comparable outcomes. We also find that our social reference intervention does have a
positive effect on contributions in the target public good. Finally, we find that the social
reference treatment leads to a diminished increase in contributions to the non-targeted
public good, indicating a positive spillover.
5.1 Introduction
Making society more sustainable requires individuals to act pro-environmental in their
daily life. While this general notion is easy to agree with, when it comes to actual change
resistance is often encountered. Due to the nature of democratic and liberal societies
this resistance cannot be overcome by mandates that dictate behaviour, which is one
of the rationales for libertarian paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) Within this
context behavioural science based interventions have become increasingly popular as a
soft policy alternative. This trend has even sparked the creation of government entities
145
Chapter 5 Behavioural Spillovers in a Real Effort Public Good Experiment
specialized in this type of policies, such as the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK and
the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in the US.
Social referencing is a policy tool proven to be effective at influencing people’s be-
haviour by communicating peer group behaviour in a salient way. Thus, it has the
potential to be used by policy makers to encourage pro-social and pro-environmental
behaviour. Providing a social reference works in a variety of settings. It has been used
to get hotel customers to reuse towels more often (Goldstein et al., 2008), get people to
donate more to charity (Frey and Meier, 2004), or help households reduce consumption
of energy or water (Schultz et al. 2007; Allcott 2011; Tiefenbeck et al. 2013).
Residential energy consumption is a frequent focus for environmental policy, as it ac-
counts for more than 20 percent of CO2 emissions in most developed countries. (IEA,
2008) Based on insights from behavioural science, the company Opower implemented
large-scale interventions in cooperation with utilities to send consumers home energy
reports providing a social reference about other households’ energy consumption. Short
run evaluations of the Opower intervention show that the average household reduces
electricity consumption by 2 percent (Allcott, 2011). In the long run households re-
duce consumption immediately upon receiving their energy report, but steadily adjust
consumption toward previous levels, until receiving a new report.(Allcott and Rogers,
2014).
The policy evaluation of the Opower intervention only measures the household re-
action in isolation of other behavioural domains, but Allcott (2011) notices that the
treatment could have unanticipated consequences because: ’Consumers could, for ex-
ample, also become motivated to drive their cars less, or could perhaps even drive more
[...]’ (Allcott (2011), p.1089). Since the ultimate goal of encouraging energy savings is to
reduce CO2 emissions, such behavioural spillovers could undermine the efficiency of the
policy. (Dolan and Galizzi, 2015) Mixed evidence is provided in the existing literature
on spillovers, with studies finding negative spillovers (Mazar and Zhong, 2010; Catlin
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and Wang, 2013; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013), positive spillovers (Lanzini and Thøgersen,
2014), or no spillovers (Poortinga et al., 2013; Littleford et al., 2014).
In this study we present an experimental framework to systematically explore spillovers
in the lab. Inspired by the Opower intervention in the field we apply a social reference
treatment in a Real Effort Public Good game. In the experiment, subjects choose to work
on a private task that only benefits themselves, or one of two group tasks that generate
less profit for themselves, but also provides profit to their group. The task we use is a
variety of the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2011), and the underlying incentive structure
corresponds to a regular public good game (Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996). We find
that our social reference intervention does produce higher contributions to the treated
public task, and that this effect also increases contributions in the untreated public task,
implying a positive spillover. We hypothesize that this result may be related to the
similarity of the two tasks and encourage future research to explore how task similarity
affects the occurrence and direction of spillovers.
The following section describes our experimental design and the implementation; Sec-
tion 5.3 formulates hypotheses based on previous results from the literature; Section 5.4
presents the results; and Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Experimental Design and Implementation
Our experimental design is based on a public good incentive structure to capture the
dilemma at the heart of pro-environmental behaviour that is beneficial for society, but
costly to the individual. The aim of the experiment is to create a simplified version of
the real world (Gneezy and Rey-Biel, 2015) that captures the decision environment in
which frequent, everyday consumption decisions are made. In line with this idea subjects
face a constant stream of decisions with limited time for deliberation in what we call a
Real-Effort Public Good (REPG) game. In the game, contributions to a public good
147
Chapter 5 Behavioural Spillovers in a Real Effort Public Good Experiment
encompass opportunity costs and a reduced pay-off for the individual, with additional
benefits for the group an individual is part of. In contrast to a regular public good game,
subjects have to complete slider tasks to earn points. The slider task we use is based on
Gill and Prowse (2012), of which we use the scrollbars version (see Figure 5.1). In the
task, subjects have to use their computer mouse to move the slider to the middle of the
bar, to a value of 50. The scrollbars are a bit easier than the regular sliders, reducing
the potential for subject frustration. At the same time it retains the general advantages
of the slider task, in that it is easy to communicate, contains no random elements, and
requires very little marginal effort to complete.
Figure 5.1: Scrollbars version of the slider tasks by Gill and Prowse (2012)
A second difference to a regular public good game is that subjects have the option to
contribute to two public goods instead of one. To differentiate the two public tasks we
have applied a framing to the experiment, with the two public tasks framed as energy and
water task. Contributions to the public goods are made by completing the corresponding
sliders, which means that subjects generate earnings and make contribution decisions
simultaneously by deciding which sliders they complete.
Figure 5.2 shows the decision environment. The top window is filled with 42 sliders
that are always available to subjects (they are replaced by another screen of 42 sliders,
if the whole screen is completed), these are framed as private tasks. The bottom two
windows are framed as water and energy task (together referred to as public tasks),
represented by a water faucet and a light bulb. The public tasks are not always available,
but instead appear in a randomized order throughout each period. Each task appears
five times per period, and tasks do not overlap. This means that subjects never face the
direct choice between the two public tasks, but only through redirecting effort from the
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private task. The public tasks are available for a limited time of ten seconds, after which
they disappear. Availability of the public tasks is communicated by either the light
bulb changing colour from transparent to yellow, or a water droplet appearing below
the water faucet. Additionally, a slider appears below one of the two pictures. Visual
feedback is given to subjects whenever a task is completed, with a coin appearing next
to a completed private task, the light bulb going transparent for the treated task, and
the water faucet droplet disappearing for the untreated task.
Figure 5.2: Screenshot of the decision environment of the Real-Effort Public Good Game
(with three completed private tasks and the untreated/water task available)
Subjects were assigned to groups of four, and the incentive structure of the experiment
corresponds to a public good game with a marginal per capita return of 0.5, i.e. for every
public task completed each subject in a group earns half the amount they receive for a
private task. Hence the game is in line with the general public good framework in which
the marginal earnings for each subject from the private task is higher than for the public
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tasks. At the same time the marginal earnings for the group are always higher for the
public tasks, than from the private task. The total earnings of each subject i is based
on private and public tasks they themselves and their group members have completed:
pii = 2 · xPi +1 · (xTi +Σ3j=1xTj )+1 · (xUi +Σ3j=1xUj ), (5.1)
with xPi the number of private tasks completed; x
T
i the number of treated tasks com-
pleted; xUi the number of untreated tasks completed; x
T
j the number of treated tasks
completed by another member of the group; and xUj the number of untreated tasks
completed by another member of the group.
5.2.1 Treatments
Subjects are assigned to a control or social reference treatment, with treatments assigned
between subjects and at session level. The evaluation screen shown to subjects after each
period differs between the two treatments. Both control and treatment group receive
feedback on their pay-off in the previous period, the total number of private and public
tasks they completed, and how many public tasks their other group members completed.
(see Figure 5.3, left side) In addition to this information, subjects assigned to the social
reference treatment received information on treated tasks completed by others in their
session through the communication of the session average and the average in the most
active group. (see Figure 5.3, whole screen)
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the evaluation screen for the treatment group
5.2.2 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in 4 experimental sessions of approximately 75 minutes,
with a total of 92 subjects. The experiment took place at the Laboratory for Experimen-
tal Economics (LEE) at the faculty for Social Sciences at the University of Copenhagen
in February 2017. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree version 3.4.7 (Fischbacher,
2007). Lab assistants followed a script to guide participants through the experiment,
with further instructions provided to the subjects in written form. The lab script de-
scribes how to run the experiment in z-Tree, provides announcements to read out to
participants at the different stages of the experiment to ensure replicability of the ex-
periment. The lab script and participant instructions are provided in Appendices B and
C.
Subjects were paid based on their decisions in each period of the experiment. During
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the experiment participants earned points, which were converted into Danish Kroner
(DKK) at a rate of 6:1. Average earnings across control and treatment group was DKK
135.96 (around e18.25). Participants were mostly students at Copenhagen University,
and were recruited through the ’Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments’
(ORSEE, Greiner 2015). Subjects played in groups of four, which made it necessary
to turn away subjects if the number of participants showing up were not divisible by
four. These subjects were selected on a volunteer basis or by random selection, and
compensated with a DKK 50 show-up fee.
Each experimental session consisted of four parts: (1) instructions to the experiment
including control questions; (2) 8 periods of the Real-Effort Public Good game; (3) a
questionnaire consisting of a risk attitude question, a set of ten questions on environmen-
tal behaviour, and some background information; and (4) payment. Differences between
control and treatment groups were limited to the evaluation screen in part 2.
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5.3 Hypotheses
Our experiment builds a novel experimental framework based on previous research for
investigating spillovers in a laboratory setting where all aspects of the decision environ-
ment can be controlled. We use the incentive structure of a standard public good game,
as it captures the dilemma at the heart of collective action problems, where the private
and social optimum diverge. For example, reducing consumption of energy or water
through efficiency gains or curtailment is often considered a public good (Hasson et al.,
2010; Allcott, 2011; Heitzig et al., 2011), as it can reduce resource scarcity or pollution
affecting everyone in a neighbourhood, a region, or even globally.
The Nash equilibrium prediction for a public good game is for every player to con-
tribute nothing to the public good, i.e. free-riding. Despite this prediction it is commonly
found that subjects contribute a sizeable part of their endowment to the public good,
with initial contributions often found in the range of 40-60 percent of the total endow-
ment (Ledyard, 1995; Cox and Sadiraj, 2007)). In repeated games with multiple periods
contributions usually deteriorate, especially in the final round of the game.
The basic setup of our experiment differs from the usual public good game in that
subject do not receive an endowment for free, but have to work for it. Studies that
investigate the effect of working for an endowment do not find any differences from
contribution patterns in other public good games (Cherry et al., 2005; Muehlbacher and
Kirchler, 2009). However, the majority of studies that investigate the effect of effort to
earn the endowment on contributions in a public good game conduct these two activities
in subsequent stages of the experiment, i.e. subjects first have to conduct some type of
real-effort task earning them the endowment, and in a second step decide how to use this
endowment. In our experiment, investing effort and contributing occurs simultaneously
and continuously, by deciding which slider tasks to work on. The closest experiment
we found in the literature was conducted by Dutcher et al. (2015). In this experiment
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subjects transcribed database entries, and while they were doing this task they could flip
a switch to decide if their current earnings are going towards their private or a public
account. Contribution patterns were again similar to results from other public good
experiments.
Given the public good incentive structure and results from related literature we for-
mulate our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The Real Effort Public Good game produces contribution patterns in line
with regular public good games.
Social norms can guide individual behaviour, because individuals often rely on rules
of thumb (also termed decision heuristics) in order to decide on an appropriate action
or behaviour (Kallgren et al., 2000). Behavioural insights demonstrate that individuals
evaluate their behaviour in a social context rather than in isolation, and people tend
to do what is socially approved (Cialdini, 2003). This insight can be used to induce
individuals to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of their decisions by directing attention
to the behaviours of others. However, social norms are not useful to direct behaviours
in all situations. Kallgren et al. (2000) argue that a social norm affects a subject’s
behaviour if the social norm is focal for the behaviour of the subject and from a group
that the subject identifies with.
In the field, social references have been found to be effective at reducing consump-
tion in domains such as water or energy use (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013; Ferraro and Price,
2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Costa and Kahn, 2013). In these domains behavioural
tools are used in addition to pricing mechanisms such as carbon taxes or energy effi-
ciency subsidies. Instead of changing the actual cost and benefits through market-based
mechanisms, the aim is to change the perceived costs and benefits (Madrian, 2014). By
communicating a social norm in a salient way interventions exploit people’s decision
heuristic to look at peer behaviour to achieve pro-environmental behaviour.
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In our experiment we provide a social reference by informing subjects about the con-
tribution behaviour of others in the same experimental session. Since the majority of
the participants are students, this implies a strong identification as peer group. Further-
more, the behaviour is elicited with low temporal lag, i.e. directly following a period.
The social reference is provided in a way that compares a subject’s contribution to the
treated public task to the average number of treated tasks completed in the same ses-
sion/room, and to the average number of treated tasks completed in the ’most active’
group. Thus, we provide a descriptive social reference (Cialdini et al., 1991). While the
injunctive social reference does give a higher benchmark, we avoid language giving a
positive framing (e.g. ’best’, ’highest’) of the benchmark, to avoid experimenter demand
effects (Zizzo, 2008).
Based on this evidence we formulate our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The social reference intervention increases contributions to the treated
task in the social reference treatment compared to the control treatment.
Finally, we turn to how contributions in the second, untreated public good will be
influenced by the social reference treatment applied to the treated public good. Dolan
and Galizzi (2015) describe the general idea of a spillover to be like dropping a pebble
into a pond (intervention), causing a splash (intended effect) and ripples on the surface
(spillover). A spillover can be in line with the initial, intended effect, but could also
contradict the purpose of the policy. Based on Thøgersen (1999) we generally define a
behavioural spillover as a change in a non-targeted behaviour caused by an intervention
aimed at changing another behaviour. In line with Truelove et al. (2014) we make a
simple distinction between positive and negative spillovers, where the former indicates
a spillover in the same direction as the primary effect on the treated behaviour, and a
negative spillover indicating an effect in the opposite direction. Following Dolan and
Galizzi (2015) we exclude spillovers that are automatic responses, as for example income
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effects (see also Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). In the experiment automatic responses are
prevented by not having overlapping public tasks, i.e. there is no direct competition
between the public tasks.
Psychological mechanisms behind negative spillovers are theorised to be forms of moral
licensing and single action bias. (Truelove et al., 2014) Moral licensing gives an individual
a good feeling about themselves when engaging in a behaviour perceived as morally
good and this creates the feeling that this good deed justifies transgressions in another
behaviour domains. The single action bias is based in worry about the circumstances of a
decision (e.g. desire to do something about climate change), and this worry is alleviated
by acting in a more social or environmental way. However, acting in the ’right’ way
makes the individual worry less, which reduces the chance of acting pro-social or pro-
environmental in a subsequent decision. Truelove et al. (2014) specifically raise the point
that social norms may induce negative spillovers, as they might invoke negative feelings
about pro-environmental behaviour in individuals that do not have a pro-environmental
mindset.
In Dolan and Galizzi (2015) the process of a positive spillover is explained by in-
dividuals having a preference for consistency, meaning that people have a preference
for behaving in a manner consistent with prior actions and beliefs. Therefore, positive
spillovers are more likely to occur for behaviours that share a common motive relevant
for a person’s view of themselves, e.g. their perception as pro-environmental individual.
In our experiment the two public good tasks are closely linked by a framing that present
the tasks as reducing water consumption and saving energy. At the same time the tasks
are identical in terms of cost and benefit.
Based on the literature we do not see a clear indication on whether to expect positive
or negative spillovers, which leads us to state our third hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 3 The social reference intervention targeting the treated task generates a
spillover, increasing or decreasing contributions in the untreated task in the treatment
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group compared to the control group.
5.4 Results
We first look at general results of the experiment and will look at treatment effects in
the following subsections. Figure 5.4 shows a boxplot of the total number of slider tasks
(i.e. both private and public tasks) completed by the test subjects in the control and
treatment groups across all 8 periods. Over the first five periods the average number
of tasks in both groups increase by about 10 sliders on average, indicating a learning
effect. In the last three periods the average number of tasks does not increase any more.
The mean number of sliders completed in both groups in the first period is 42.3, while
in the last period it reaches 51.9. This corresponds to an 18.5 percent increase. Gill and
Prowse (2011) and Benndorf et al. (2014) find a similar degree of learning for the slider
task, with 16.6 and 16.7 percent over 9 periods.
The boxplots in Figure 5.4 also reveal that subjects differ a lot in terms of their
performance. In later periods top performers were able to complete more than 70 sliders,
while a few low performers completed less than 20 sliders even in the last periods.
In terms of the incentives to complete public or private tasks this should not make a
difference, as these remain in the same proportion. However, low performers might see
completing a task as more costly, and thus have to sacrifice more effort in relative terms
to contribute to the public good. Even if this is the case, we would assume that this
effect is prevalent for both control and treatment group. A more critical issue with
low performers is that the public tasks are only shown for a limited time window of 10
seconds. This means that subjects that complete less than 15 tasks over the 150 seconds
of the experiment will have a hard time completing these, and might get frustrated
when trying them. We address this in a sensitivity analysis (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in
the Appendix), but the qualitative results remain unchanged.
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Figure 5.4: Boxplots for Total Number of Slider Tasks Completed Per Subject
Figure 5.5 plots the contributions to both public goods in the control group of our
Real Effort Public Good (REPG) experiment together with contribution values obtained
from public good experiments in the literature that also apply a partner matching and
similar marginal per capita return. (Croson 1996, Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, Keser and
van Winden 2000) Contributions start out at a similar level, with about 60 percent of
the public tasks completed by subjects in the control group. This is slightly higher
than what we see in the literature, but is generally in the same range. Across periods
we see declining contribution patterns in both our experiment and in the experimental
values from the literature. There is a similar overall trend in our REPG experiment, but
contributions in our experiment decrease monotonously, while in the other experiments
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Figure 5.5: Contributions to Public Good in Different Public Good Games
there are occasional up-ticks in contributions. We hypothesise that this might be related
to the randomization in the order of public task appearance, making it harder to plan
and follow strategic contribution patterns. Contributions in the final round reach their
minimum, which is in line with the literature values. Only Keser and van Winden (2000)
has significantly higher contributions in the last period shown in Figure 5.5, which is due
to their experiment running for a total of 25 periods. We conclude that the contribution
pattern in the REPG experiment are comparable to the ones found in regular public
good games.
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5.4.1 Social Reference Treatment Effect
To investigate the direct effect of the social reference treatment we compare contributions
to the treated public good in the two treatments. The first plot in Figure 5.6 shows the
mean number of treated tasks completed in the control and treatment groups.1 The
dotted lines delineate the periods which were directly affected by the intervention, i.e.
the evaluation screen directly before these periods gave feedback on the number of treated
tasks completed by others in the same session. Contributions in the control group appear
to start at a slightly higher level, with on average half a task more completed. However,
this difference is not significant at the 10%-level. Regarding the development of the
contributions there is a clear difference between the treatments, with the control group
decreasing monotonously, while the treatment group shows two small peaks in periods
3 and 6, and finally finishing higher than the control group.
The second plot in Figure 5.6 uses the first period task completion in the control and
treatment group as index, to better illustrate the differences in the development of the
contributions to the treated public good. Again we see the two peaks in periods 3 and
6, with the peak in period 3 raising contributions above the initial level. However, this
does not change the general trend of declining contributions over time, as is commonly
observed in public good experiments. When looking over the whole course of the ex-
periment the control group decreased contributions to the treated task by around 1.75,
while the treatment group only reduced contributions by about 1 task compared to the
index in period 1.
Since the observations after the first period are not independent, the comparison of
means only gives us an indication that the treatment group completed slightly more of
the treated public tasks. To address this we run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
in pooled and fixed effects specifications to get a more robust and precise estimate of
1The control group in period 8 is only based on one control session, because there was a glitch with the
public tasks in the other session. This explains the inconsistency between the upper and lower graph
in Figure 5.6 and 5.7 for period 8.
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Figure 5.6: Development of contributions to the treated public task across periods (the
dotted lines delineate the periods directly affected by the social reference
treatment)
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the effect of the social reference treatment. As dependent variable we use the number of
treated tasks completed by the subjects in a period.
Table 5.1: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects regression results for the treated public task
Dependent variable:
Number of treated tasks completed
(1) (2) (3)
SocialReference 0.127 0.146 0.434∗∗
(0.292) (0.313) (0.202)
Period −0.153∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.048)
ContributionByOthers 0.167∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.060∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.035)
MeanEnvironmentScore −0.240
(0.219)
Risk 0.057
(0.100)
GenderMale −0.033
(0.308)
Constant 1.651∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗
(0.411) (0.878)
Subject fixed effects? No No Yes
Observations 620 613 620
R2 0.170 0.180 0.134
F Statistic 41.941∗∗∗ (df = 3; 616) 22.189∗∗∗ (df = 6; 606) 27.032∗∗∗ (df = 3; 525)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
Column (1) of Table 5.1 shows the results of a simple OLS regression with a dummy
for the social reference intervention that is 1 for the treatment group from period 3
to 8, when they are or have been subject to the treatment evaluation screen; a period
variable to capture the time trend; and the number of treated tasks completed by others
in the group in the previous period. The latter captures the influence the different group
members have on each others contributions, assuming that the main effect is based on
contributions in the most recent period. The Period variable has a negative sign, as
expected based on the diminishing public task contributions seen in Figure 5.6. Treated
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public tasks completed by others in the group has a positive sign, which may be a sign
of some degree of conditional cooperation as motivation to complete public tasks. The
social reference dummy is not significant in this specification, which is not too surprising,
given that the number of treated tasks completed did look fairly close in Figure 5.6.
In column (2) we add variables based on the questionnaire participants answered after
the experiment, and a gender dummy. The MeanEnvironmentScore variable is derived
from ten responses about behaviours related to environmental themes (e.g. recycling,
saving energy), where participants indicated how much they engage in the behaviour
on a five point scale ranging from Never to Very Often. This qualitative scale was
translated into points from 0-4, with the average over all answers used as the MeanEn-
vironmentScore variable. Subjects had the choice to not answer a question, which was
then excluded from the average calculation. One subject refused to give any answers
and had to be excluded in this specification. The Risk variable is based on a simple
risk elicitation question, where participants are asked to indicate how risk taking they
judge themselves to be on a scale of 1 to 10. None of the added variables are significant
in this specification, but it is still a bit surprising to see a negative sign on the mean
environmental score variable.
Column (3) presents the results from an OLS regression with subject level fixed effects,
which accounts for the correlation across periods for each subject. As the estimator
subtracts the mean differences from both dependent and independent variables, this will
also address any issues with differences in the initial contribution levels in the control
and treatment groups. In this specification all the included variables are significant, at
least at the 10%-level. Based on the coefficient on the social reference dummy we see
that the treatment increases the number of treated tasks completed by about 0.4. In line
with the graphical analysis this effect does not reverse the time trend, which shows that
contributions to the treated public good go down by an average of 0.2 each period. Due
to the mean differencing we cannot include the time invariant questionnaire answers in
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this specification.2
5.4.2 Evidence for a Spill-over Effect
Having established a direct effect of the social reference, we investigate a potential
spillover on the untreated public tasks. Figure 5.7 shows the mean contributions to
the untreated public task in the upper graph, and the mean contributions compared
to the first period as index in the lower graph. Also for the untreated task the initial
contribution level appears to be lower in the treatment group, which is significant at
the 10%-level. Although, the social reference intervention did not take effect, there is a
slight increase in contributions in the second period for the treatment group.
After the social reference intervention targeting the treated task is shown to the treat-
ment group after period 2, this increasing trend continues to a peak in period 3. After
this the development of the two groups is nearly identical. Hence, it appears like any
effect of the social reference on the untreated Task had only a singular effect, without
changing the rate of decay in contributions. From the graphical investigation it appears
that mean contributions are more similar for the untreated task (in periods 3-8 that
were actually affected by the treatment), which may suggest the absence or only weak
spillover effects. Again, we run some OLS regressions to investigate the spillover effect
further.
The specifications presented in Table 5.2 use the number of untreated tasks completed
in a period by each subject, and the same independent variables as we reported in Table
5.1. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) are very similar to the results from the
OLS regressions for the treated public task. The social reference treatment has small
and non-significant coefficients, with only the time trend and contribution of other group
members correlating with the number of completed tasks with expected signs. Also here
2We also ran a Random Effects estimation with the questionnaire variables included, but they remained
insignificant and a Hausman test revealed that the model is inconsistent, hence we do not include it
here.
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Note: For period 8 only one control session is reported, due to a glitch in the first session of the
experiment, which explains the slight inconsistency between the two graphs in the last period.
Figure 5.7: Development of contributions to the untreated public task across periods
(the dotted lines delineate the periods directly affected by the social reference
treatment)
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Table 5.2: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects regression results for the untreated public task
Dependent variable:
Number of untreated tasks completed
(1) (2) (3)
SocialReference 0.059 0.066 0.369
(0.283) (0.308) (0.240)
Period −0.169∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048)
ContributionByOthers 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
MeanEnvironmentScore −0.213
(0.217)
Risk 0.056
(0.096)
GenderMale −0.212
(0.302)
Constant 1.821∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗
(0.409) (0.904)
Subject fixed effects? No No Yes
Observations 620 613 620
R2 0.164 0.173 0.145
F Statistic 40.304∗∗∗ (df = 3; 616) 21.199∗∗∗ (df = 6; 606) 29.666∗∗∗ (df = 3; 525)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
we do not see a significant effect of the questionnaire variables in column (2).
In the results from the fixed effects regression in column (3) of Table 5.2 all variables
have the same sign as in the fixed effects regression for the treated task in Table 5.1, but
neither the treatment dummy nor the contribution of other group members are highly
significant. However, the coefficients for both variables are just barely failing the 10%-
level (p = 0.124 for the social reference dummy; p = 0.122 for the lagged contributions
of other group members). Thus, we still consider this as evidence for the existence of a
diminished positive spillover from the social reference intervention on the treated task
into the domain of the untreated task. The spillover is positive, as it promotes behaviour
in line with the intended treatment effect on the treated public good, but the effect is
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diminished both in magnitude and in terms of statistical significance.
5.4.3 Variance in Public Task Completion
We have shown that the social reference intervention increased contributions in both
the treated and untreated task, without compensating the overall diminishing trend in
contributions. In the following we investigate heterogeneity in the treatment effects,
i.e. does the social reference intervention affect all subjects equally, or just some? To
investigate this, we carry out F-tests to compare the variance between the control and
treatment group in each period (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
Table 5.3: Variance in Treated Task Completion (with session 1 excluded)
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Control 4.592 4.418 4 4.027 3.130 3.101 2.911 1.462
Treatment 4.716 4.340 4.754 4.818 4.568 5.215 4.389 3.596
Difference -0.124 0.078 -0.754 -0.790 -1.438 -2.114 -1.478 -2.134*
*Significant at 95%-level
Table 5.4: Variance in Untreated Task Completion (with session 1 excluded)
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Control 4.348 3.607 3.955 3.819 3.129 3.114 2.723 1.172
Treatment 4.725 4.767 3.959 4.391 4.643 4.353 4.750 3.715
Difference -0.377 -1.161 -0.005 -0.572 -1.514 -1.239 -2.027 -2.542*
*Significant at 95%-level
While differences in variance are not significant throughout most of the game, it be-
comes significant in the final period for both the treated and the untreated task. Thus,
it appears that in the final round the intervention does not affect all subjects equally.
Instead some subjects appear to reduce contributions a lot, while others maintain high
contribution levels. Thus, we see some indication that the social reference intervention
cushions the end of game effect in some subjects. It is also interesting to see that in
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period 3 – when the intervention takes effect – the variance in the completion of treated
tasks starts diverging between the control and treatment group, after being very close
before. Although, this difference is not significant, this may be an indication for hetero-
geneous treatment effects of the intervention. This hypothesis is supported by Costa and
Kahn (2013), who found significant heterogeneity with regards to the effect of a social
reference type intervention in the field.
5.5 Conclusion
This study presented a framework that allows for the detection of spillovers in an exper-
iment with real effort tasks and an underlying public good incentive structure. Results
from this experiment are threefold. First, we show that using our novel experimental
design produces results that are comparable to a standard public good game. This result
validates our design, and informs us, that subjects understood the decision environment
to a degree similar to other forms of the public good game. Second, we demonstrate
that our social reference intervention successfully increases contributions to the targeted
public good. This result confirms our hypothesis and is again well in line with literature
investigating the influence of communicating social norms. Finally, our results indicate
that the social reference intervention produces a positive spillover, increasing contribu-
tions to the untreated public good. This result is less significant, with a significance level
just below the 10%-level, which is driven by a diminished effect size of the intervention
on the untreated task.
Our experiment was set up in a way to favour the occurrence of spillovers, as the
tasks were only marginally differentiated through framing with a common environmental
motive. This makes it somewhat obvious for subjects to apply the social reference from
the treated task to the untreated task. Nevertheless, we see merit in this result as a
baseline from which to generate a systematic analysis framework by varying, e.g.: the
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similarity of the motive of the two public goods; the public good tasks; group composition
in the public goods; or the type of intervention that is applied to the treated public good.
Such experiments would greatly increase our knowledge of the occurrence of spillovers.
While we advise caution when translating lab results into advice for policy makers, our
results support general notions from the literature that spillover effects should receive
more attention when designing and evaluating policy. Our result of a positive spillover
in closely related tasks with a similar motive may open up ways to design policy that
generates positive spillovers, by making these linkages between activities salient to con-
sumers. However, further research is needed to support this claim both in the lab and
the field.
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5.A Sensitivity Analysis
Table 5.5: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects regression results for the treated task without
subjects that completed less than 15 tasks in any period
Dependent variable:
Number of treated tasks completed
(1) (2) (3)
SocialReference 0.083 0.037 0.416∗∗
(0.300) (0.323) (0.207)
Period −0.158∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.049)
ContributionByOthers 0.170∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
MeanEnvironmentScore −0.321
(0.217)
Risk 0.124
(0.102)
GenderMale 0.027
(0.314)
Constant 1.732∗∗∗ 1.626∗
(0.431) (0.890)
Subject fixed effects? No No Yes
Observations 586 579 586
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.6: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects regression results for the untreated task without
subjects that completed less than 15 tasks in any period
Dependent variable:
Number of untreated tasks completed
(1) (2) (3)
SocialReference 0.039 −0.016 0.358
(0.292) (0.308) (0.251)
Period −0.177∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.050) (0.050)
ContributionByOthers 0.160∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.035) (0.032) (0.035)
MeanEnvironmentScore −0.280
(0.217)
Risk 0.112
(0.096)
GenderMale −0.174
(0.302)
Constant 1.905∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗
(0.431) (0.904)
Subject fixed effects? No No Yes
Observations 586 579 586
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis
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1 INSTRUCTIONS FOR RUNNING THE SPILLOVER EXPERIMENT IN THE LAB  
1.1 BEFORE PEOPLE ARRIVE:  
- Make sure there is a sufficient amount of money to pay all subjects 
- Make sure that all subjects have a keyboard and a mouse which is working 
- Check paper in printer 
- Print instructions 
- Familarize yourself with the instructions 
Then:  
 
A. Start a server 
B. Start 28 computers in the lab 
C. Start Z-tree version 3.4.7, and open the z-leafs on each computer, by:  
a. computer\Z:\zTree\zTree_3.4.7. 
b. Run the file: ztree_experiment_(update_zleaf).bat 
c. Run the file ztree_experiment_(start_ztree).bat 
D. Please distribute a copy of the instructions and a pen at each computer.  
1.2 BEFORE SUBJECTS ENTER THE LAB:  
1. Meet subjects outside the lab. Bring participation list and plastic cards numbered 1-28 (corresponding to 
the computer numbers) 
2. Count number of subjects. If the number is below 28 and not divisible by 4 then wait a few minutes to 
see if anybody else shows up.   
3. Welcome people in a standard greeting, e.g.:  
“Dear all, welcome to this economic experiment. We are ready to begin in a few seconds. Before you 
enter the lab, please pick a card. Each card has a number between 1-28, and this number corresponds to 
your computer at which you will sit. When we go in to the laboratory please find the computer which 
matches your number. Please do not speak when we enter the laboratory and please switch off your 
cellphone  Next to your computer you will find the instructions for today's experiment. Please read these 
instructions carefully. The experiment will begin when all people have read the instructions and 
answered a few questions about them.  (#) 
Now I will shuffle (*) the cards and then come and pick one.”  
(#): People are playing in groups of 4 so there should be a number of subject divisible by four (20, 24, 
28) . If there are too many people please add:  
“Unfortunately we have to send XX people home with their show up fee of XX kr, are there any 
volunteers?”  
If there are no volunteers then follow the standard procedure and add in XX number of cards with X 
written on it. Please say:  
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“Since there are no volunteers, we will add these cards with an X to the deck of cards. If you draw a 
card with X on it, then please go to the next room, where we will give you your show-up fee”     
(*): Please shuffle the card while saying that you do it.  
1.3 IN THE LAB:  
1.  
When people are seated please welcome people again and ask them to read the instructions. Also say 
that everybody are playing the same game and have the same instructions. It is not necessary to read out 
the full instructions but please show the instructions and mention that there are four pages. Say the 
following:  
“Dear all, we are now ready to begin, but first, please listen carefully. In this experiment you earn 
money. Please read the instructions carefully. There are 4 pages of instructions, and they are at your 
desk next to your computer. You will all play the same game, and you all have the same instructions. 
After the experiment itself you will be asked to answer a questionnaire.  
We will inform you when the experiment is over and pay you your earnings in the room next door. You 
get 1 kroner for every 6 points you earn during the experiment“ 
 
2.  
Please start performing these steps while the subjects are reading the instructions. All programs are 
located in the following folder: Z:\Experiments\146. Spillover experiment\c. Program (zTree (please 
update according to the lab folder system), and:   
The programs are ordered and named 1-4. This is the order in which the programs are to be run. 
Regarding program 3:  
 
I:  
If this is a control session, please run the file that’s called “3_Experiment_CONTROL”. 
If this is a treatment session, please run the file that's called "3_Experiment_TREATMENT_DYN" 
In the program you have to specify the number of subjects in the “background”, and number of groups.  
 
Then 
 
A. Open the clients table and choose “Shuffle clients”.   
B. Run program number 1 (the control questions) state in Z-tree: Number of participants, group=1  
C. The answers for the control questions are: 5, 5 (see page 2), 0, 30 (see page 3, section 2.1 and 2.2 ), 
40, 40, 40  (see page 3) and 20, 13, 33 (see page 4). If some are having troubles answering then 
please help by showing them the relevant information and if necessary help them calculating the 
answers. However, subjects must type in the right answer themselves.  
 
After all answered the control questions say out loud:  
 
“You have now all read the instructions and answered the control questions. There will now be a 
practice round where you can get familiar with the task but you will not earn point. After this trial 
round the real experiment will begin, and you will earn points.  
If you have any questions then raise your hand and we will come to your computer.  
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We will now start the trial round.   
 
D. Run programme number 2 (the practice round) state in Z-tree: Number of participants, group=1  
E. Run programme number 3 (the experiment OR control), state in Z-tree: the number of participants 
AND, number of groups =Participants/4). Choose partner matching.  
After this programme has run, please say:  
“You have now finished the first part of the experiment. The next part of the experiment is a 
questionnaire. The questions will be shown on your screen shortly. Please note, that your choices in 
the previous phases will have no consequences for this phase.”  
  
F. Run the questionnaire. 
1.4 AFTER THE SESSION 
Pay subjects according to the payment file.  Please say:  
“The experiment is now finished and you are ready to receive your payment. (*)in the room next door. Please 
come to the room next door one by one”.  
(*) Or however the payment is done.  
 
Copy all the files produced by Z-tree to the relevant session folder, located in:  
Z:\Experiments\146. Spillover experiment\b. Files by zTree codes 
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Welcome 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment undertaken by researchers from the University of 
Copenhagen.  
By participating in this experiment you can earn money. How much money you earn depends on your 
decisions, and the decisions of other participants. The following instructions will explain you how. Please 
read the instructions carefully. You will have to answer control questions to check that you have understood 
the instructions, and these must be answered correctly before the experiment starts.  
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with others in the room. If you have any 
question, just raise your hand and an assistant will come to your desk. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. These points will be converted to Danish 
kroner at the following rate:  
6 points = 1 DKK 
 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid to you in cash.  
The experiment has two parts: the experiment itself and a questionnaire. The two parts are independent of 
each other and your behavior in one does not influence the other part in any way. The following instructions 
explain the experiment. The questionnaire will be explained on your screen.    
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1. Instructions for the Experiment 
In this game you will play 8 periods of 3 minutes. In the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly 
assigned to a group of 4 members, that is, besides you there are 3 other group members. You will be in the 
same group in every period of the game. Everybody will be anonymous, meaning that you will not know 
who is in your group, and they will not know you. Each member in your group faces the same situation: You 
will see a screen with a set of 42 tasks looking like this:  
 
Your task is to move the slider from the left side to the middle of the bar, to a value of exactly 50. Every 
slider that has been moved to a value of “50” by the end of the period will count as a completed task.   
In each period you will see a screen as the ones below. The tasks in the upper part of your screen are called 
private tasks, which will only earn points for you. In the lower part of your screen the water and energy 
tasks appear occasionally. These tasks will earn points to all members of your group (including you). 
During each round it will be possible to complete 5 water tasks (in the bottom-left corner) and 5 energy 
tasks (in the bottom-right corner).  
In this screen you can either do a private task, or the water group task:  
 
In this screen you can either do a private task, or the energy group task: 
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2. Your earnings 
 
2.1 Private work 
When you complete a private task in the upper part of the screen a token will appear and you earn 2 points. 
That is:  
Earnings from private tasks = sum of private tasks completed * 2 
This task is always available to you. If you finish all the private tasks on one screen, a set of 42 new sliders 
will appear.  
 
2.2 Water and energy group tasks  
In addition to your private work, you can also choose to complete the water and energy tasks that appear 
during each round. The water task is available when a water drop appears and an energy task is available 
when the lightbulb lights up. When completed, the water drop will disappear, or the lightbulb will turn off. 
The same will happen after 10 seconds if you do not complete the group tasks, but you will not earn any 
points.  
5 of each group task will appear on your screen in random order and at random points in time throughout 
each period.      
You and each group member will earn 1 point for every water and energy task completed in the group, 
that is: 
Earnings from group tasks = sum of water tasks completed by group + sum of energy tasks completed by 
group 
Since you are 4 people in your group and each of you face 5 water and 5 energy tasks your total earnings 
from the group task can reach a maximum of (4*5) + (4*5) = 40, if all group member completes all group 
tasks.  
 
2.3 Total earnings in each period 
Your total earnings in each period are equal to your earnings from your private task plus your earnings from 
the group tasks. That is  
 
Total earnings = earnings from private work + earnings from group tasks you completed  
        + earnings from group tasks completed by others in your group 
 
 
After each period you will see a feedback screen reporting your earnings from each round. These earnings 
will be stored for you and your number of points will determine your final payment.   
5.C Instructions for Participants
183
  
3. Examples 
 
• If you complete 33 private tasks (each giving 2 points), 2 energy tasks and 3 water tasks, and each 
of the other people in your group complete 2 energy task and 1 water task, then your earnings will 
be:  
 
Earnings from private work 33 ∗ 2  
+ Earnings from group tasks you completed  2 + 3  
+ Earnings from group tasks completed by others in your group (3 ∗ 2)  +  (3 ∗ 1) 
Total earnings 80     
 
OR  
• If you complete 25 private tasks (each giving 2 points), 5 water tasks and 5 energy tasks, and the 
other people in your group only complete private tasks, then you will earn:  
 
Earnings from private work 25 ∗ 2  
+ Earnings from group tasks you completed  5 + 5  
+ Earnings from group tasks completed by others in your group (3 ∗ 0) + (3 ∗ 0) 
Total earnings 60     
  
 
Once the 8th period is over, you will have to complete a questionnaire in which you are asked to answer 
questions about yourself.  
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